FCP FortiWeb 7.4 cheat sheet
FCP FortiWeb 7.4 · Keep the key ideas within reach.
FortiWeb-style application protection, API controls and measured tuning
Addressing, topology and version distinguish deployment modes.
Check client-facing and back-end TLS legs separately.
WAF/APIshape controls do not replace application authorization or safe code.
Tune narrow verified rules and measure impact rather than assume all anomalies are attacks.
Application and data protection
OWASP Top 10 is the standard vocabulary for application weaknesses.
Parameterised queries prevent SQL injection; output encoding prevents XSS.
Authorisation must be checked server-side on every request.
XSS executes script in the victim's browser; CSRF abuses the victim's session.
Classify data first, then apply encryption, masking, DLP and disposal rules by class.
Identity, access and cryptographic protection
Identification, authentication, authorisation and accounting are four distinct steps.
MFA needs two different factor categories, not two instances of one.
RBAC suits stable job roles; ABAC suits context-dependent, fine-grained rules.
Kerberos uses a KDC with TGT and service tickets for SSO.
Symmetric ciphers handle bulk data; asymmetric ciphers solve key distribution and signatures.
Signing uses a specified signature scheme with the signer’s private key; verification and custody are essential to origin evidence.
ECB leaks patterns; use authenticated modes such as GCM or encrypt-then-MAC.
Network boundaries and protected communication
Internet-facing services belong in a DMZ; data stores sit in a filtered internal zone.
VLANs alone are not a trust boundary - add DAI, private VLANs and 802.1 X.
IPsec AH gives integrity only; ESP adds confidentiality.
IDS is passive and alerts; IPS is inline and blocks.
NAT is not a security control and temporary rules must be removed.
Security operations, monitoring and response
Asset inventory and configuration baselines underpin every operational control.
Changes need an appropriate authorization path, recovery planning and relevant evidence.
Emergency changes still require retrospective documentation within a defined window.
Monitor log sources for silence, not just for events.
Distinguish historical Revision 2 phases from current NIST incident-response guidance integrated with broader risk management.
Containment precedes eradication in almost every scenario.
Capture volatile evidence (memory, connections) before disk and before power-off.
Cyber-risk identification and analysis
Risk assessment cycles through identification, analysis, and evaluation, producing a maintained risk register
Single loss expectancy = asset value x exposure factor; annualized loss expectancy = SLE x annualized rate of occurrence
Risk requires a threat, a vulnerability, and an impact; none alone is sufficient
Inherent risk is before controls, residual risk after them - always state which is being scored
Control effectiveness and uncertainty affect any expected-loss comparison.
Continuity, backup and technical recovery
Distinguish tolerated data loss from tolerated interruption.
A recovery point and restore time must both meet the stated targets.
A same-failure-domain snapshot alone does not cover loss of that domain.
Verify complete restore procedures and actual dependency behavior.