FortiSOAR Administrator cheat sheet

Case context, playbook logic and connector actions are different objects.

Viewing, editing and executing can require different permissions.

Retries need actual idempotency and remote-state evidence.

Test branching, approvals, failure handling and platform recovery.

Identification, authentication, authorisation and accounting are four distinct steps.

MFA needs two different factor categories, not two instances of one.

RBAC suits stable job roles; ABAC suits context-dependent, fine-grained rules.

Kerberos uses a KDC with TGT and service tickets for SSO.

Symmetric ciphers handle bulk data; asymmetric ciphers solve key distribution and signatures.

Signing uses a specified signature scheme with the signer’s private key; verification and custody are essential to origin evidence.

ECB leaks patterns; use authenticated modes such as GCM or encrypt-then-MAC.

Asset inventory and configuration baselines underpin every operational control.

Changes need an appropriate authorization path, recovery planning and relevant evidence.

Emergency changes still require retrospective documentation within a defined window.

Monitor log sources for silence, not just for events.

Distinguish historical Revision 2 phases from current NIST incident-response guidance integrated with broader risk management.

Containment precedes eradication in almost every scenario.

Capture volatile evidence (memory, connections) before disk and before power-off.

Harden from a documented baseline image: minimal services, default-deny host firewall, secure boot.

With conventional requested modes 0666/0777, umask 027 yields 0640 files and 0750 directories.

SUID/SGID binaries must be inventoried as escalation paths; avoid shared root.

EDR adds behaviour detection and response beyond signature antivirus.

Third-party applications are as important to patch as the operating system.

CIA triad plus authenticity, non-repudiation and accountability define what is protected.

Risk combines threat, vulnerability and business impact; a vulnerability alone is not a risk.

Bell-LaPadula: no read up, no write down - confidentiality.

Biba: no read down, no write up - integrity.

Governance decides acceptable risk and accountability; management decides how to achieve it

Risk appetite (board-approved) differs from tolerance (variation) and capacity (maximum bearable)

Three Lines Model: internal audit must remain independent of control ownership

Risk assessment cycles through identification, analysis, and evaluation, producing a maintained risk register

Single loss expectancy = asset value x exposure factor; annualized loss expectancy = SLE x annualized rate of occurrence

Risk requires a threat, a vulnerability, and an impact; none alone is sufficient

Inherent risk is before controls, residual risk after them - always state which is being scored

Control effectiveness and uncertainty affect any expected-loss comparison.

Distinguish tolerated data loss from tolerated interruption.

A recovery point and restore time must both meet the stated targets.

A same-failure-domain snapshot alone does not cover loss of that domain.

Verify complete restore procedures and actual dependency behavior.