TEE Standards, Governance, and Compliance
This domain tests the standards landscape and how certification and governance constrain TEE claims. Expect questions about which document defines what, and how a certificate maps to a product configuration.
Standards bodies and documents
- GlobalPlatform publishes the TEE System Architecture, TEE Internal Core API, TEE Client API, TEE Management Framework, and protection profiles used in Common Criteria evaluations.
- IETF RATS (RFC 9334) defines attestation roles and architecture; EAT (RFC 9397) defines a token format. TCG defines TPM 2.0 and DICE; NIST SP 800-193 covers platform firmware resiliency and recovery.
- PSA Certified defines a root of trust and three assurance levels; its crypto and attestation APIs are widely used on Arm microcontrollers. The Confidential Computing Consortium publishes common terminology and open-source projects.
- Common Criteria evaluates a target of evaluation against a protection profile; FIPS 140-3 and ISO/IEC 19790 validate cryptographic modules. SESIP is a lighter IoT evaluation scheme.
Governance
- Certification is configuration-specific: the evaluated version, patch level, and options matter. A vendor's EAL4+ claim without the security target and scope is not evidence for your deployment.
- Vulnerability handling is part of the standard: CVE assignment, coordinated disclosure, TCB recovery through microcode or TCB updates, and revocation of attestation keys.
- Regulatory context: GDPR data-protection principles, DORA operational resilience for financial entities, and sector rules such as PCI DSS do not certify a TEE but shape what you must document.
Worked example
A payments team wants to claim a certified TEE. They map the product to a Common Criteria protection profile, select EAL4+ with ALC_FLR.2 (flaw remediation) and AVA_VAN.3, and define the security target: TA, TEE OS, and boot chain, with the REE excluded. The lab evaluates that exact build. The certificate does not cover a later TA version or debug-enabled devices, so the team adds configuration control and a re-evaluation trigger. Reasoning: the certificate's scope and assumptions must match the deployed configuration.
Traps
- Treating a standard as an implementation.
- Quoting an assurance level without the protection profile and scope.
- Assuming a certificate covers future patches.
- Confusing FIPS 140-3 module validation with TEE isolation.