The Sign Caller Who Trusts You

Pat is the seller's agent. Dana is a customer, not a client.

What Pat may do for a customer: show the property, give factual information about it, provide standard forms, transmit offers exactly as the buyer directs, and explain the process. These are clerical/ministerial acts.

What Pat may not do without a written brokerage agreement: advocate for Dana, advise her on what to offer, evaluate the property for her, negotiate on her behalf, or promise her confidentiality. Pat also owes Dana honesty and fair dealing - no misstatements about the property, the seller's motivation, or other offers.

The disclosure comes before Dana says anything she would regret, not after. Pat's correct opening line at the sign call was: "Before we go in, you should know I represent the seller." Iowa practice is to put the brokerage relationship in writing and confirm it in a signed agency/brokerage agreement before representing anyone; a verbal "I'll take care of you" creates an agency by implication that the licensee never intended.

The ceiling is the problem. Pat cannot accept a secret that conflicts with the duty owed to the client.

• The promise must be refused, immediately. "Dana, stop for a second - I represent the seller. I can't take information you don't want the seller to have. If you want someone in your corner, you need your own agent." A licensee who says "your secret is safe" to a customer has created an undisclosed conflict and set up a later accusation of divided loyalty.
• The seller's motivation and bottom line are confidential client information. Pat may not answer "will they take less?" with anything other than market facts. Pat may confirm the list price and any written disclosures; Pat may not hint at $288,000, at the transfer deadline, or at the seller's anxiety.
• Dana's financial position is not Pat's to broadcast either. Pat should not volunteer Dana's ceiling to the seller, and should not use it to push the seller down or up. The clean path is to steer Dana to another brokerage (or another licensee in Pat's office only through designated agency with written consent) and, until then, write and present whatever offer Dana instructs, in her own words.
• If Dana signs with Pat's brokerage later, the prior conversation becomes a conflict that must be disclosed and consented to, and Pat's seller-side knowledge (the $288,000 floor) would make Pat an unsafe representative for Dana at all.

Option 1 - Dual agency (the same licensee, or the broker, representing both).

• Requires the informed written consent of both seller and buyer.
• Both parties become clients, but the representation is limited: the agent may not disclose either party's price position, motivation, or negotiating strategy, and may not advocate for one against the other. Both sides lose full advocacy and full confidentiality.
• Pat already knows the seller's $288,000 floor and Dana's $310,000 ceiling. That is the textbook case where dual agency should be refused - Pat could not lawfully use either number and would be negotiating with one hand tied behind her back for both clients.

Option 2 - Designated agency (Iowa's usual answer when the office has both sides).

• The broker appoints one licensee to represent the seller and a different licensee to represent the buyer inside the same brokerage, with written consent from both parties.
• Each designated agent keeps that client's confidences from the other designated agent, so Dana gets real advocacy from someone who does not know the seller's floor.
• The broker/supervisor is treated as a dual agent as to information in the file; internal procedures must keep the seller's confidential data away from the buyer's designated agent.

Process in either case: written agency agreements on both sides, a written consent form that explains the limits in plain language, disclosure of the arrangement at the outset, and a written record of any change in the relationship. If consent is refused, the brokerage must release one side - Pat stays with the seller and Dana is referred out.