Assent, Commencement, Repeal and the Last Day for Appeal
Shreyas Agro Private Limited manufactures fertiliser. On 15 March 2025 it sold a consignment to a distributor at a 14 per cent discount. The Fertiliser (Discounts) Act, 2025 received the President's assent on 1 February 2025, but section 1(2) provides that it shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification, appoint, and the Government notified 1 April 2025. The 2025 Act repeals and re-enacts the Fertiliser (Discounts) Act, 2019, under which discounts up to 15 per cent were permissible, and it caps discounts at 8 per cent. It contains no savings clause. Earlier, on 20 January 2025, the Collector had issued a show-cause notice alleging that an October 2024 discount of 16 per cent breached the 2019 Act, and that proceeding was still pending on 1 April 2025. The Collector passed his order on 20 June 2025, which the company received on 28 June 2025. Under the 2025 Act an appeal lies within 60 days from the date of receipt of the order. The appellate office was closed from 26 to 31 August 2025, and the company filed its appeal on 1 September 2025.
1. Does the 2025 Act apply to the sale made on 15 March 2025? Explain the effect of section 1(2) and the presumption against retrospectivity.
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Commencement, not enactment. Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that where a Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, it comes into force on the day it receives assent. But where the statute either fixes a date or empowers the Government to appoint one, the Act does not operate until that date arrives. The 2025 Act falls in the second category: assent on 1 February 2025 merely completed the enactment. The notification of 1 April 2025 is the commencement, and until then the Act had no force.
Presumption against retrospectivity. A statute is presumed to be prospective unless the language expressly or by necessary implication makes it retrospective. The presumption is strongest for penal provisions, and the 8 per cent cap carries penal consequences. Nothing in the 2025 Act expresses an intention to reach backwards, and the repeal-and-re-enactment structure suggests a forward-looking consolidation.
Application. On 15 March 2025 the governing law was the 2019 Act with its 15 per cent ceiling. A 14 per cent discount was within that ceiling. There was therefore no contravention, and any demand founded on the 8 per cent cap for that transaction is unsustainable.
Caution. If the sale had been on or after 1 April 2025, the 8 per cent cap would apply and a 14 per cent discount would be a contravention. The date of the invoice, not the date of payment, is what must be checked.
2. Does the January 2025 proceeding survive the repeal of the 2019 Act, even though the 2025 Act has no savings clause?
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Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Unless a different intention appears, the repeal of an enactment does not affect the previous operation of the repealed enactment, anything duly done or suffered under it, any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under it, any penalty or forfeiture incurred, or any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, liability, penalty or proceeding. The pending proceeding before the Collector falls squarely within the last limb.
Does the absence of a savings clause matter? No. A savings clause is inserted out of caution; section 6 supplies the saving where the repealing statute is silent. What defeats section 6 is a contrary intention appearing in the repealing Act, and mere silence is not such an intention. The company cannot argue that the repeal extinguished the proceeding.
Repeal and re-enactment. Section 8 provides that where an enactment is repealed and re-enacted, references to the repealed enactment in any instrument or proceeding are read as references to the corresponding provisions of the re-enacted enactment, unless the context requires otherwise. That is a rule of construction only; it does not change the substantive law to be applied.
Which law governs the October 2024 discount? The 2019 Act, because the 2025 Act is prospective. A 16 per cent discount breached the 2019 ceiling of 15 per cent. The Collector may therefore continue and decide the proceeding under the 2019 Act, but he cannot apply the 8 per cent cap to a transaction of October 2024.
3. Compute the last date for filing the appeal and decide whether the appeal filed on 1 September 2025 is in time.
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Excluding the first day. Section 9 of the General Clauses Act provides that the use of the word from is sufficient to exclude the first day in a series of days. The order was received on 28 June 2025, so that day is excluded and the period starts on 29 June 2025.
Counting sixty days. Day 1 is 29 June 2025. The remaining days of June give days 1 and 2 (29 and 30 June); July gives days 3 to 33; August gives days 34 to 64. Day 60 therefore falls on 27 August 2025. The department's calculation, which includes the day of receipt and so arrives at 26 August 2025, is wrong on this point.
Effect of the closure. Section 10 provides that where an act is directed to be done within a prescribed period and the office is closed on the last day, the act is treated as done in time if it is done on the next day on which the office is open. The last day, 27 August 2025, fell within the closure from 26 to 31 August 2025. The next open day was 1 September 2025, and the appeal filed that day is in time.
Why the argument matters. Had the department's computation been accepted, the last day would have been 26 August 2025, when the office was still open on its own theory, and the appeal would have been barred. Note also that sections 9 and 10 in terms apply to Central Acts; if the appeal lies under a State enactment, the identical provisions of the State General Clauses Act apply. The company should plead both sections expressly and, in the alternative, seek condonation of delay.