Removal, Unanimity, and a State-Court Forum Clause

Conclusion: remand is required. Removal requires every defendant served with process to join in or consent to the notice of removal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A), Whitcomb's failure to consent is a procedural defect, and it does not matter that the fraud claim is analytically separate from the contract claim against Cascade. The unanimity rule applies defendant by defendant, not claim by claim. Ridgeview must move to remand within 30 days under § 1447(c); the prompt says it moves, so the defect is timely raised. The forum-selection clause supplies an independent reason. A mandatory clause choosing 'the state courts of Idaho' is strong evidence that Cascade waived removal; many courts enforce such a clause by remanding or transferring. Cascade's contrary argument confuses personal jurisdiction with removal procedure. Even if the clause were only a contractual promise, Ridgeview can enforce it, and the clause reinforces the remand result. The federal court should remand rather than decide the merits.

Conclusion: yes, specific jurisdiction exists. The constitutional question is whether Cascade purposefully availed itself of the Idaho market and whether the claim arises out of or relates to those contacts. Cascade contracted with an Idaho company for a two-year distribution relationship worth $120,000, and its website generated 214 orders and $86,000 in Idaho revenue in one year. Those are deliberate, sustained contacts with Idaho, not accidental ones. The breach-of-contract claim arises directly from the Idaho distribution agreement, so relatedness is satisfied. The reasonableness factors also favor jurisdiction: Idaho has an interest in protecting its resident company, the contract selected Idaho law and an Idaho forum, and Cascade can hardly claim surprise at defending where it deliberately sold goods. The fact that Cascade has no Idaho office or employees is not dispositive; physical presence is not required for specific jurisdiction. A court would likely uphold jurisdiction over Cascade.

Conclusion: the record is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Whitcomb. A state court still needs minimum contacts between Whitcomb and Idaho. Whitcomb's guarantee of Cascade's $30,000 debt to an Idaho creditor is a relevant contact, but a single guaranty does not automatically show purposeful availment. Ridgeview would need facts showing that Whitcomb reached into Idaho-negotiating the guarantee there, directing payments or communications to Idaho, or otherwise invoking Idaho law and benefits. The fraud claim must also arise from or relate to those Idaho contacts; if the alleged fraud concerned statements made entirely in Washington, the relatedness showing is weaker. The state court should permit jurisdictional discovery rather than assume jurisdiction from the guarantee alone. If no purposeful availment is shown, the fraud claim must be dismissed or severed, even though the contract claim against Cascade remains in Idaho.