Wooden Locker Against an A-60 Bulkhead with an Open Cable Transit

1. The open cable transit is the most serious defect. An A-60 division has been penetrated and the approved fire-stop has been removed. A plywood plate is combustible, provides no insulation and cannot stop smoke or flame; cables passing through an unprotected hole can also transmit fire and heat. This alone makes the division non-compliant.
2. The locker is combustible and is intended for paints and solvents. A timber locker full of flammable liquids in a machinery space adds fire load next to ignition sources and defeats the principle of keeping machinery spaces clear of combustible material. Paints and solvents belong in a dedicated paint locker, not in the engine control room.
3. The fixing method damages the division. Each self-tapping screw through the steel is a small penetration, and driving screws through or compressing the mineral wool creates thermal bridges and local loss of insulation continuity. An A-class division must remain continuous and intact.
4. Covering the identification plate and the transit removes inspection access and survey traceability. It also makes the penetration impossible to check without dismantling the locker, so future defects will go unnoticed.
5. Operational access: the locker must not obstruct escape routes, switchboards or the water-mist controls, and its contents must not interfere with the space's fire detection.

Sequence:

• Raise a permit to work and remove the plywood cover. Inspect the three new cables for damage, support them properly and confirm their type and fill ratio against the fire-stop system's approval.
• Re-seal the transit with an approved A-60 cable transit system using the correct blocks, sealant and cable loading, installed by trained personnel in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Label the penetration with the system, date and installer.
• Re-locate the locker away from the bulkhead. If a locker is genuinely needed, make it of steel or other non-combustible construction, fixed by brackets or welded studs so that no new holes are made in the division and so that the transit remains accessible for inspection.
• Remove paints and solvents to the paint locker; keep only non-flammable items in the control room.
• Reinstate the identification plate, update the fire plan if the space use changes, and record the fire-stop in the planned maintenance system.

Witness and approval: the fire-stop installation should be inspected by the chief engineer and witnessed by the classification surveyor, who will confirm that the A-60 integrity is restored. Any penetration that cannot be avoided must be individually approved and fire-stopped to the same standard.

I would separate the storage need from the fire-boundary problem.

• The open transit must be sealed before the vessel sails, regardless of the locker. There is no operational justification for leaving an A-60 division open, and a plywood cover is not a temporary fire-stop.
• If storage is urgent, provide a proprietary steel cabinet in a position that does not obstruct access, escape or equipment, and that does not require penetrations or conceal the bulkhead plate. Keep flammable liquids in the paint locker.
• If the crew's real need is to reach the cable gland, the correct solution is to relocate the gland or provide a properly engineered steel access panel with a gasketed, dogged closure outside the fire boundary - not a plywood hatch cut into an A-60 bulkhead.
• Record the decision, the defect and the interim arrangement in the log and the defect list, inform the master, and obtain class/flag acceptance in writing for anything that remains outstanding. Do not sign off the space as compliant until the fire-stop is reinstated and inspected.