Five Documents and Six Hundred Words

(a) Ultimatum - primary, official, produced at the time by a government. It shows exactly what Vienna demanded and the deadline it set. What it cannot show is Vienna's internal reasoning; a text is a decision's output, not its motive.

(b) German telegram, 5–6 July - primary, official and confidential. This is the strongest single document for the 'blank cheque' argument, because it shows a great power urging a weaker ally on. Limits: it is a summary rather than a verbatim record, and it proves encouragement, not a plan for a European war.

(c) Serbian nationalist memoir, 1920 - primary but retrospective and self-serving, written after the state it celebrates had been created. Useful for the motives of the nationalist milieu and for how the assassination was understood. Useless as a neutral account of the July decisions.

(d) British cabinet minute, 2 August - primary and official, and revealing precisely because of its angle: it shows British ministers approaching intervention through Belgium. It tells us about British decision-making, not about German or Russian intentions.

(e) 1960s historian - secondary. An argument to be tested against evidence, not a source of facts. Useful for the long-term structural case (alliances, arms races, imperial rivalry). A secondary work should be named and dated, because its own moment shapes its questions.

Why 'Germany alone' fails A general war required decisions in several capitals. Vienna chose to attack Serbia on 28 July rather than accept a diplomatic settlement. St Petersburg ordered general mobilisation on 30 July, a decision with its own logic and its own costs. Paris and London made choices too, and the alliance system converted a Balkan quarrel into a continental one. Serbia's own nationalist movement supplied the trigger. Any answer that stops at one capital is describing a mood, not explaining an event.

How to still assign a large share

1. The blank cheque. The assurance of 5–6 July encouraged Vienna to be firm while diplomacy continued; without it, Austria-Hungary might have accepted the Serbian reply as a basis for talks.
2. The ultimatum's design. A demand that foreign officials investigate inside Serbia was one a sovereign state could hardly accept, and the 48-hour deadline left no room for mediation.
3. Speed as policy. The timetable of German mobilisation and the decision to strike at France through Belgium turned a two-front plan into a war that brought Britain in.
4. Escalation. Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August and on France on 3 August, and invaded Belgium on 4 August.

The distinction to make explicitly: responsibility is not a single verdict of guilt; it is a judgement about which decisions made war likely and which made it certain. Shared responsibility is not equal responsibility.

Move 1 - Define the question (60 words). Say that 'most responsible' is a question about decisions as well as conditions, and that long-term causes explain why Europe was war-ready while short-term decisions explain why war came in July 1914.

Move 2 - The July crisis (200 words). A narrative using (a), (b) and (d): Sarajevo, the blank cheque, the ultimatum and its 48 hours and internal-investigation demand, the mobilisations, the declarations, Belgium and Britain. This carries the bulk of the marks because it is where the documents actually speak.

Move 3 - The long-term causes (150 words). Alliances, the arms race, nationalism, imperial and colonial rivalry, the Balkan question - using (e) as an argument, not as evidence.

Move 4 - Weigh and conclude (130 words). Give Germany and Austria-Hungary the largest, not the sole, share; note what a different judgement would need.

Move 5 - Source criticism (60 words). Explain how (c)'s retrospective memoir and (e)'s 1960s argument shape what they say.

Why structure earns marks: a marker cannot reward reasoning he cannot find, and an allocation that protects space for source criticism shows that the student knows the difference between telling a story and arguing a case.