Three Suspect Notes at the Counter

The three suspect notes

1. Do not return them and do not credit value for them. A note that fails authentication is not treated as money; handing it back would put a suspected forgery into circulation and destroy the audit trail.
2. Impound them. Separate them from the rest, run them through the branch's note-sorting machine for a second reading, and endorse them as counterfeit in the manner prescribed by the bank's currency instructions.
3. Issue the tenderer an acknowledgement receipt showing the denomination, the number of pieces and the serial numbers. He is entitled to know what was taken from him even though he is not being paid for it.
4. Record them in the counterfeit note register with serial numbers, date, time, counter and staff code, and keep them in a separately sealed cover - never in the general cash balance.
5. Report to the local police and to the controlling office and RBI in the prescribed format. The exact form and timeline are set by RBI's currency management instructions and the bank's current circular, so the branch should follow the version in force, not memory.
6. Preserve evidence - CCTV of the counter, the teller's records and the customer's written statement - because his claim to have drawn the notes from the bank's ATM opens a separate line of investigation.

The thirty-seven other notes are a normal deposit. If they clear authentication they are credited in the usual way; suspicion attaching to three pieces does not taint the bundle.

The proposal fails on three counts.

Legal and procedural. The obligation to impound arises at the point of detection, which is this counter. Pushing a detected counterfeit into the remittance chain does not discharge that obligation; it moves the loss to another office and leaves the branch's own register, police report and RBI return blank - all of which are auditable.

Operational. The chest will sort the consignment on receipt and will report the notes back as a discrepancy against this branch, so the branch still faces the same consequences, now compounded by a delayed and unexplained report. Sealed-packet discipline exists precisely so that responsibility can be pinned to the point where the notes entered the system.

Analytical. The customer says the notes came from the bank's own ATM. If that is true, the failure sits in the cassette-filling and note-verification process, and the branch needs the notes, their serial numbers and the CCTV in its own hands while the trail is fresh. Sending them away loses exactly the evidence that would settle the question.

Correct action: retain and impound the three, remit the thirty-seven genuine notes with the van under the usual seal and acknowledgement.

What to tell him: in plain language, that three notes have failed authentication and have therefore been impounded; that no value can be credited or cash returned for impounded notes, which is a rule the branch cannot waive for any customer; that he has been given a receipt with the serial numbers; and that he may be asked for a short written statement with his ATM transaction reference, card number and the time of withdrawal. Keep the tone factual - he is a complainant and a witness, not an accused, and the police report is a procedural step, not an accusation against him.

What to check in parallel, and why it matters: if the notes did come out of the bank's own ATM, the branch has an internal process failure, and that is a separate matter from the customer's claim for value. Reconcile the ATM cassette-fill records for the previous evening, check which packets were loaded and from which verified stock, review the note-sorting machine's rejection log, and check whether other withdrawals from the same ATM that evening produced similar complaints. That check determines where the loss sits and who is accountable - it does not convert impounded notes into payable value at the counter.

So the answer to the customer is 'no' on payment and 'yes' on investigation, and both halves must be said in the same conversation.