Coal, Equity and the 2035 Phase-Out: A Delegation's Judgement Call
A delegation from a country of 90 million people is at a climate conference. Coal supplies 55 per cent of its electricity, and 300,000 workers depend directly on coal mining. Its per-capita emissions are 1.9 tonnes of carbon dioxide, against a global average of 4.7 and 14 tonnes in the largest historical emitter, and its cumulative share of emissions since 1850 is about 1 per cent. A draft text asks all parties to phase out unabated coal by 2035, to be supported by a fund pledged at 100 billion dollars a year but currently only 60 per cent delivered, and mostly as loans rather than grants. The country's own development plan requires doubling electricity generation by 2035 in order to lift 12 per cent of the population out of energy poverty. A bloc of small island states demands that everyone accept the 2035 date; several large emerging economies want it softened to 'phase down'. The delegation must decide its position and whether to sign a separate declaration on loss and damage.
1. Apply the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) to the phase-out date. What should the delegation argue?
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Judgement: accept an obligation to phase out, refuse the unqualified 2035 date, and make the actual date conditional on finance and technology being delivered.
- CBDR-RC has two limbs, and a delegation that uses only one of them will lose the argument. The historical limb supports a longer timeline: a 1 per cent cumulative share, against roughly a fifth of the total held by the largest emitter, cannot fairly be treated as equivalent.
- The capability limb cuts the other way. At 1.9 tonnes per capita and middle-income status, this country is not a least-developed state with no capacity to act. Refusing any commitment invites carbon border tariffs on its exports, forfeits the moral authority of its equity claim, and breaks the coalition with the island states whose support it needs for finance.
- The honest test is whether a commitment keeps the country within its fair share of the remaining global carbon budget. A short phase-out date combined with the planned doubling of generation would very likely exceed that share; so the argument should be about the date and the financing, not about whether to act.
- On the money: 60 per cent delivery, mostly loans, is not a credible basis for a thirty-year commitment. Loans shift the cost of adjustment onto the adjusting country and can push it into debt distress.
Position to argue: a conditional clause, phase-out by a stated later date, brought forward automatically if grant finance and technology transfer are delivered.
2. The 300,000 coal workers: how should the delegation weigh a just transition against the 2035 date?
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Judgement: the transition is acceptable only if it is funded and managed in the same agreement; a date without a domestic transition package should be rejected by the country's own representatives.
- The 300,000 jobs are not evenly spread. Coal districts usually have one dominant employer, so the social effect of closure is concentrated in a small number of areas where nothing else exists. Aggregate national growth cannot absorb that.
- A just-transition package has four parts, and each must be financed rather than announced: guaranteed re-employment or retraining into renewables and grid work; a pension bridge for workers too close to retirement to retrain; economic diversification funds for the coal districts; and consultation through the unions rather than decisions taken over their heads.
- The ethical point is distributive. The workers did not create the emissions problem, and the country's historical share is small, so they are being asked to absorb costs generated elsewhere. That is precisely why CBDR-RC exists.
- The political point is practical. A transition that is seen as externally imposed will be reversed by the next government. A transition with a domestic settlement attached will survive.
So the delegation should argue for the phase-out with a domestic just-transition clause written into the commitment, not as a separate promise made later.
3. Should the delegation also sign the separate declaration on loss and damage? Does that conflict with its coal position?
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Judgement: sign, and there is no contradiction. Refusing would be the more damaging choice.
The two positions look inconsistent only if both are read as requests for exemption. They are not.
- On coal, the country is accepting a real, dated obligation, differentiated in timing and made conditional on finance. That is a genuine commitment, not a refusal.
- On loss and damage, it is supporting a separate claim held by states that face existential harm and have contributed least. Solidarity with them costs this country little and buys a great deal.
- Strategic reasoning: its strongest argument on the phase-out date is that equity requires differentiation. That argument depends on a coalition, and the island states are the core of that coalition. Refusing to sign a declaration they regard as vital would isolate the country at exactly the moment it needs allies. It would also read as free-riding, which is the charge its opponents want to make.
- One check before signing: confirm the declaration is political and does not create a binding financial liability at a scale beyond the budget. A declaration is not a treaty, but the wording matters, and the delegation should ensure it commits the country to engagement rather than to a stated contribution.
Conclusion: sign the declaration, and use the coalition to press for grant finance on the phase-out.