CLAT PG common mistakes
CLAT PG · Understand the traps and how to avoid them.
Answering a constitutional law question from general memory of the Article number without checking which constitutional amendment altered its text (e.g., treating Article 19 freedoms as absolute, or quoting Article 368 as it stood before the 24th Amendment and Kesavananda Bharati).
CLAT PG constitutional questions frequently hinge on the amended position; candidates revise from bare-Act summaries or coaching notes that predate amendments, so they recall the original clause and treat it as current.
What to do instead
For every constitutional provision you revise, write the amendment history beside it (Article 31A/31B by 1st and 4th Amendments, Article 368 by 24th and 42nd, Article 21A by 86th, Article 15(6) by 103rd). Before answering, ask: 'Has this text been amended, and does the question turn on the pre- or post-amendment position?'
Treating writ jurisdiction as interchangeable - writing that a writ of quo warranto lies against a private company, or that certiorari can be sought against a purely administrative policy decision, or confusing Article 32 with Article 226 territorial and remedial scope.
The five writs are memorised as a list of definitions without the standing rules, the distinction between 'public duty' and private acts, and the difference between fundamental-right enforcement (Article 32) and 'any other purpose' (Article 226).
What to do instead
Build a one-page grid: writ, purpose, who can apply, against whom, and leading case. Anchor each writ to a fact pattern (mandamus needs a public duty; quo warranto tests a public office; certiorari corrects a quasi-judicial record). Practise by classifying ten hypothetical orders before reading the options.
In administrative law, asserting that natural justice always requires an oral hearing and examination of witnesses, or that the audi alteram partem rule is violated by every ex parte interim order.
Candidates conflate 'fair hearing' with 'court-style trial' and ignore that natural justice is flexible and context-dependent, so they pick the most absolute-sounding option.
What to do instead
Learn the settled propositions: no fixed form of hearing, no right to counsel in every proceeding, ex parte interim orders permissible where urgency or prejudice exists, and post-decisional hearing can cure some defects. When an option says 'always' or 'never' about natural justice, test it against Maneka Gandhi and the 'fair play in action' standard.
Applying the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita or Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita sections to a question that names the Indian Penal Code or Code of Criminal Procedure, or mixing the two numbering systems in one answer.
The exam syllabus names the IPC and CrPC, but candidates study current criminal statutes and then mis-map section numbers (e.g., BNS 103 for murder versus IPC 302), producing an answer that is internally inconsistent.
What to do instead
Read the question stem for the statute named. Keep a two-column conversion sheet (IPC 302/304/307/376/420 against BNS equivalents) and, when the question is silent, state the provision you are applying. Practise answering five questions in each statute's numbering so the mapping becomes automatic.
Answering evidence-law questions on burden of proof by instinct ('the accused must prove innocence') rather than applying Sections 101-114 and the special rules in Sections 113A, 113B, 114A and 106 of the Evidence Act.
General criminal-law intuition conflicts with the statutory scheme, and candidates do not distinguish 'burden of proof' from 'burden of adducing evidence' or the effect of presumptions.
What to do instead
Memorise the presumptions by number and trigger fact (113A dowry death, 113B dowry death, 114A rape, 106 facts especially within knowledge). For each, note who bears the burden and what standard applies. Answer by first naming the presumption and then the burden-holder.
Treating 'acceptance' and 'consideration' as satisfied by a promise to do something, without checking whether the promise is past, illusory, or barred by the privity rule - and missing the Section 25 exceptions for no-consideration agreements.
Contract questions are drafted to look morally or commercially obvious, and candidates answer by fairness rather than by the Indian Contract Act's technical requirements.
What to do instead
Run every contract fact pattern through four gates in order: offer, acceptance (absolute and communicated), consideration (real, lawful, not past unless Section 25 applies), and enforceability (capacity, free consent, legality). Separately list the Section 25 exceptions and the privity exceptions (trust, family arrangement, acknowledgement, estoppel) so you do not reflexively reject third-party claims.
In torts, choosing the strict-liability option whenever harm follows a dangerous activity, without checking the Rylands v Fletcher conditions or the defences (act of God, plaintiff's default, consent, statutory authority) - and confusing strict with absolute liability.
The two doctrines are taught together, and candidates remember 'hazardous activity means liability' without the escape, non-natural use and foreseeability elements.
What to do instead
Write the elements of each rule side by side: Rylands requires escape from land, non-natural use, and mischief; absolute liability (M.C. Mehta) applies to hazardous enterprises and admits no exceptions. For each practice question, first identify which doctrine the facts trigger, then test each element explicitly.
Answering company-law questions on board powers, related-party transactions or oppression and mismanagement from the Companies Act 1956 memory, or ignoring SEBI LODR requirements when the question involves a listed company.
Older study material and case law predate the 2013 Act, and candidates do not separate provisions that apply to all companies from those applying only to listed companies.
What to do instead
Tag every company-law note as '2013 Act section', 'Rules', or 'SEBI LODR'. For board and shareholder approval questions, build a checklist: which section, which approval threshold, whether the company is listed, and whether an audit-committee or shareholder resolution is needed. Verify section numbers against the current Act before answering.
Writing jurisprudence and legal-reasoning answers as opinion essays, asserting a school of thought without naming the jurist or the case, and failing to distinguish ratio decidendi from obiter dicta when asked to extract the rule from a passage.
Jurisprudence feels abstract, so candidates write generally, and legal-reasoning passages reward precision about the rule applied versus observations made in passing.
What to do instead
For every theory, attach one jurist and one proposition (Austin on command, Hart on rule of recognition, Dworkin on principles, Fuller on inner morality). For reasoning passages, answer in a fixed three-step format: identify the issue, state the principle actually applied, then apply it to the new facts. Explicitly label anything merely persuasive as obiter.
In environmental and labour law, citing constitutional articles and general principles (polluter pays, precautionary principle) without the governing statute - e.g., answering a question on consent to operate under the Water Act 1974 as if it were the Air Act 1981, or ignoring the Factories Act thresholds for safety committees.
These domains are largely statutory, but candidates revise them through case-law slogans and never learn which statute and schedule governs a specific obligation.
What to do instead
Build statute-by-obligation tables: Water Act (SPCB consent, Section 25/26), Air Act (Section 21 consent), EP Act 1986 (EIA, hazardous substances), and for labour, Factories Act thresholds, Minimum Wages Act, and the four Labour Codes with their commencement status. Answer by naming the statute, section and authority before applying the principle.