PSEB SS Public Admin cheat sheet

Public administration is the management of public programs and the translation of politics into the daily lives of citizens; Wilson's 1887 essay urged a politics–administration dichotomy to build neutral, competent bureaucracy.

Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy rests on hierarchy, written rules, impersonal merit appointment, career tenure, and recorded files; these raise predictability but risk goal displacement and ritualism (Merton).

Taylor's scientific management sought one best way via time-and-motion study and functional foremanship; Fayol added POSDCORB-style principles (planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating, controlling) plus unity of command and scalar chain.

The Hawthorne studies (Mayo) shifted emphasis from structure to human relations: informal groups, morale, and social incentives can override formal rules and pay schemes.

Systems and public-choice approaches treat agencies as open systems and bureaucrats as utility-maximizing actors; Niskanen's budget-maximizing model and Ostrom's polycentric governance illustrate this.

New Public Management borrows market tools: performance contracts, competitive tendering, customer charters, devolved managerial autonomy, and output-based accountability rather than input controls.

New Public Service (Denhardt) and governance networks reframe citizens as co-producers and administrators as stewards; accountability runs through law, professionalism, and democratic dialogue, not just markets.

Norms and values of the field: efficiency, economy, effectiveness (the 3Es), equity, responsiveness, transparency, and rule of law; trade-offs among them are the central ethical problem of administration.

Line agencies carry out core mission and hold command authority; staff agencies (personnel, finance, legal) advise and control; auxiliary units provide housekeeping services - confusing the three blurs accountability.

Span of control, unity of command, delegation, and decentralization are structural choices: widening span flattens hierarchy but raises supervisory load; delegation transfers authority, not ultimate responsibility.

Merit systems use open competition, position classification, and performance appraisal; spoils/patronage appointment trades competence for political loyalty and invites corruption.

Civil-service neutrality means impartial execution of lawful policy regardless of personal preference; responsiveness to elected officials is bounded by legality and professional standards.

Budgeting cycle: executive preparation, legislative authorization/appropriation, execution and apportionment, audit and evaluation; line-item budgets control inputs while program and performance budgets link money to results.

Zero-based budgeting re-justifies every activity each cycle; incremental budgeting funds last year's base plus a margin - ZBB improves prioritization but is information-intensive and hard to sustain.

Accountability tools include legislative oversight, audit institutions (supreme audit offices), ombudsmen, freedom-of-information laws, judicial review, and whistleblower protection; each has distinct reach and limits.

Principal–agent problems (shirking, information asymmetry) are managed with monitoring, incentives, and transparency; excessive controls raise red tape and crowd out intrinsic motivation.

Policy cycle: agenda setting, formulation, adoption/legitimation, implementation, evaluation, and termination or succession; stages are analytical heuristics, not a strict sequence.

Kingdon's multiple-streams model: problem, policy, and politics streams couple at a policy window, often opened by a focusing event and driven by a policy entrepreneur.

Implementation is not automatic: top-down models stress clear goals and controls; bottom-up models stress street-level discretion and adaptation - mismatch between design and context causes failure.

Evaluation distinguishes outputs (activities delivered) from outcomes (results achieved) and uses before–after, comparison groups, or randomized designs to attribute causation.

Ethical frameworks for administrators: utilitarian consequences, deontological duty to law and rights, and virtue/character ethics; codes of conduct set minimum standards, not full moral reasoning.

Corruption control combines prevention (transparency, asset disclosure, rotation), enforcement (independent anti-corruption bodies, prosecution), and incentives (competitive pay, whistleblower protection).

Reform waves: Weberian legal-rational bureaucracy, then NPM marketization, then whole-of-government/digital-era governance emphasizing integration, co-production, and data-driven services.

Change management in public agencies faces political cycles, statutory constraints, and unionized staff; sequencing, stakeholder mapping, and pilot testing reduce reform failure.