RBSE SS Philosophy common mistakes
RBSE SS Philosophy · Understand the traps and how to avoid them.
Writes a single blanket pramana list for all schools, e.g. "Buddhism accepts perception and inference; Nyaya accepts perception, inference and shabda; Charvaka accepts all three." In a 10-mark answer on pramanas, the same three-item list is pasted under every school with only the name changed.
Pramana tables get memorised as one column of terms rather than as a per-school position, and the exam often asks for comparison, which exposes the missing distinctions. Charvaka's radical empiricism is the standard trap because it is the exception that must be stated negatively.
What to do instead
Build a pramana matrix with schools as rows and pratyaksha, anumana, shabda, upamana, arthapatti, anupalabdhi as columns, and mark accept/reject with a one-line reason. Learn the two or three contested cells cold: Charvaka rejects anumana and shabda; Buddhism accepts pratyaksha and anumana but not shabda as independent; Mimamsa adds arthapatti and anupalabdhi.
Glosses maya as "the world is unreal, like a dream" and then uses the same word for Samkhya's prakriti evolving into the world. In an answer on Advaita, writes that Brahman "changes itself" into the world, which is parinamavada, not vivartavada.
The English word "illusion" is imported wholesale, and vivarta/parinama are learned as two Sanskrit labels without the causal picture behind them. The three levels of reality (paramarthika, vyavaharika, pratibhasika) are usually skipped because they are not in short summaries.
What to do instead
Write one paragraph defining vivartavada as apparent transformation without real change of the substrate, and parinamavada as real transformation of a cause into an effect (Samkhya, and Ramanuja's qualified version). Memorise the three levels with one example each, and always state that vyavaharika is empirically real, not fictitious, when answering maya questions.
Attributes a doctrine to the wrong thinker in a way that inverts the position: writes "for Plato, universals exist only in particular things" or "Aristotle held that the Form of the Good is separate from the world"; similarly swaps rationalist and empiricist theses, e.g. "Hume held the self is a substance" or "Descartes held the mind is a blank slate."
The survey is revised as a list of names with one tag each ("Plato: Forms", "Hume: sceptic"), so the tag survives but its content drifts. Opposing pairs are stored adjacently and get crossed under exam pressure.
What to do instead
For every thinker write a doctrine card in the form "X holds P because of Q, against opponent Y who holds not-P." The 'against Y' clause is what prevents inversion. Prioritise the classic inversion pairs: Plato/Aristotle on transcendence vs immanence of universals, Descartes/Hume on the cogito and the bundle self, rationalism/empiricism on the origin of ideas.
Declares a categorical syllogism valid without checking distribution: accepts AAA-2 or an undistributed middle, or misses an illicit major. In a question asking to test validity, the answer names the mood and figure and then asserts "hence valid" with no distribution or Venn work shown.
Mood-and-figure names are memorised as passwords, and validity is judged by whether the conclusion sounds plausible rather than by the distribution rules. The rules are few but are rarely practised on deliberately invalid arguments.
What to do instead
Apply a fixed checklist before writing: (1) exactly three terms; (2) middle term distributed at least once; (3) no term distributed in the conclusion that was not distributed in the premise; (4) no two negative premises; (5) negative premise requires negative conclusion. Then confirm with a three-circle Venn diagram. Practise on near-valid forms (AAA-2, AII-2, IAI-1) so the failure becomes visible.
Imports deductive vocabulary into induction: writes "this inductive argument is invalid" or "the conclusion follows necessarily"; and confuses Mill's methods, e.g. calls the method of agreement the method of difference, or claims the method of residues proves causation deductively.
The word "argument" triggers the only evaluative vocabulary the candidate has practised, which is deductive. Mill's methods are learned as five names without the elimination logic that distinguishes them.
What to do instead
Use the correct terms for induction: strong/weak, cogent/uncogent, probable, and never valid/invalid or 'necessarily'. For Mill, write each method as a schema of cases and differing circumstances (agreement: one factor common; difference: one factor absent; concomitant variation: paired degrees). State explicitly that all five give probable, not demonstrative, conclusions.
Compresses Kant into "be good and treat people nicely" and then attributes maximisation of happiness to him, or labels the categorical imperative a rule you follow to get a reward: "act so as to be happy." In an applied ethics question, applies utilitarianism to a Kantian question or vice versa without noticing the switch.
Kant is remembered through slogans ('duty for duty's sake') that lose the contrast with hypothetical imperatives, and the two formulations of the CI are not learned as tests. Under time pressure, the familiar utilitarian cost-benefit template takes over.
What to do instead
Learn the CI in both formulations verbatim in meaning: universalisability (act only on a maxim you could will as universal law) and humanity (treat persons as ends, never merely as means). Test each with the false promise and the suicide-from-desperation examples, and state the contradiction-in-conception vs contradiction-in-will distinction. Contrast with a hypothetical imperative, which is conditional on a desired end.
Defines Aristotle's virtue as "the mean is moderation" and equates it with an average or with "nothing in excess"; omits eudaimonia and the function (ergon) argument, and cannot say why courage is a mean between cowardice and rashness rather than simply a middle amount of fear.
The 'golden mean' is one of the most repeated phrases in the syllabus, and its compressed form survives revision while the surrounding teleology does not. 'Mean' in ordinary English suggests an arithmetic midpoint.
What to do instead
Write the mean as "relative to the agent and determined by reason, as the person of practical wisdom would determine it" (phronesis), and give two worked examples showing that the mean is not equidistant: courage vs cowardice/rashness, generosity vs stinginess/prodigality. Add one sentence linking virtue to eudaimonia via the ergon argument, so the doctrine has its purpose attached.
Uses a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic interchangeably: writes "analytic truths are known a posteriori", or "all a priori knowledge is analytic", and then treats Kant's 7+5=12 as an analytic judgement.
The two distinctions overlap on the standard examples (bachelors, triangles), so they look like one distinction. Textbook tables list them side by side and the crossing examples (Kant's synthetic a priori, Kripke's necessary a posteriori) are the ones usually left out.
What to do instead
Lay out a 2x2 grid and place one example in each cell: analytic a priori (no bachelor is married), synthetic a posteriori (water boils at 100 degrees Celsius at sea level), synthetic a priori (7+5=12; every event has a cause, for Kant). State the two axes explicitly: analytic/synthetic concerns the predicate's containment in the subject; a priori/a posteriori concerns justification. Then name one challenge to the grid (Quine on the analytic-synthetic distinction).
Reports the theistic proofs as one blurred set: presents Anselm's argument as "everything has a cause, so there must be a first cause", presents the cosmological argument as an argument from design, or lists Paley's watch as if it established God's existence deductively.
The proofs are memorised as a list of names (Anselm, Aquinas, Paley) without the type of premise each begins from, and 'God exists' is the shared conclusion, which makes them feel interchangeable.
What to do instead
For each proof record its starting point and its classic objection in one line: ontological (from the concept of God; objection: existence is not a predicate, Gaunilo's perfect island); cosmological (from contingency and causal series; objection: why no infinite regress, Hume's empirical scruple); teleological (from apparent design; objection: Hume's stone/analogy and Darwinian explanation); moral (from moral experience; objection: needs the moral premise defended). Attach the objection to the proof whenever you name it.
Treats social-contract vocabulary as one idea: describes Rawls's original position and veil of ignorance as a historical or actual agreement, or as the same device as Locke's state of nature, and uses 'freedom' without distinguishing negative from positive liberty.
Contract language ('state of nature', 'agreement', 'rights') is shared, so the thought experiment is remembered by its vocabulary rather than its function; liberty is similarly treated as a single word.
What to do instead
For Rawls, state the function in one sentence: the veil removes knowledge of your place, talents and conception of the good so that chosen principles are fair, and it is hypothetical, not historical; then give the two principles (equal basic liberties; fair equality of opportunity plus the difference principle). Contrast with Locke's state of nature as a moral condition with natural rights. For liberty, define negative as non-interference and positive as self-mastery or collective self-rule, with one example each.