Fourteen Months on the Governor's Desk
A state legislature passes the Agricultural Produce Marketing (State Oversight) Bill, which transfers licensing powers from 240 mandis to a new state board and imposes a one per cent cess. It is passed by voice vote in a House of 403 where the ruling party holds 255 seats. The Governor neither assents nor returns it for 14 months. He then returns it once with a message asking for a committee review. The House considers the message, rejects it, and passes the Bill again unchanged. The Governor again does nothing, and separately reserves two unrelated Bills for the consideration of the President under Article 200; one of these has been pending with the President for eight months. Farmer unions and the state government both approach the High Court. The state argues that Article 361 protects the Governor and that Article 200 gives an untrammelled discretion; the petitioners argue that indefinite sitting on a re-passed Bill is a constitutional vacuum. Assembly elections are due in 11 months.
1. What options does Article 200 give the Governor, and can he sit on a re-passed Bill indefinitely?
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Article 200 gives four courses and no fifth: assent; withhold assent; return the Bill with a message (available only for non-Money Bills); or reserve it for the President. The provisos narrow these: the Governor shall not withhold assent from a Money Bill and shall not return a Money Bill for reconsideration, and where a Bill is passed again by the House with or without amendments, the Governor 'shall not withhold assent therefrom'.
Indefinite inaction is not among the options. A Governor has no absolute veto and no pocket veto over a Bill passed by the elected legislature; the power is a check, not a substitute for legislative will. In 2023 the Supreme Court, dealing with a Governor sitting on Bills for years, held that the Governor must act within a reasonable period (indicating three months) and cannot defeat a re-passed Bill. Here the Governor used up his one return with a message; the House considered and rejected it and re-passed the Bill unchanged. At that point the proviso leaves only assent. His second silence is unconstitutional.
The state's claim of 'untrammelled discretion' confuses discretion with arbitrariness. Discretion under Article 200 must be exercised on constitutional grounds and for constitutional reasons, recorded in writing. A 14-month delay followed by a dilatory message and further silence is unreviewable in form only; in substance it is a refusal to perform a constitutional duty.
2. When may a Bill be reserved for the President, and does Article 201 permit indefinite delay?
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Reservation is exceptional, not routine. It is properly used where the Bill derogates from the powers of the High Court, is repugnant to a constitutional provision or to a Directive Principle, is opposed to a law of the Union, or deals with a matter of grave national importance. It is not a device to freeze legislation the Governor dislikes, and the more so when the state legislature has already re-passed the Bill. Reserving the same subject after re-passage, as happened here, effectively converts a suspensive check into an absolute veto by another route.
Article 201 allows the President to assent, withhold assent, or return the Bill for reconsideration. If returned, the House must reconsider it within six months, and after re-passage the President may still withhold assent, unlike the Governor's position after re-passage. The text sets no outer time limit on the President's decision, but indefinite pendency has been criticised by the Supreme Court as incompatible with responsible government, and delay can be challenged where it has the effect of nullifying the legislative power.
Practically, the remedy is not to strike down Article 201 but to demand reasons. A written, reasoned decision within a defined period satisfies the constitutional scheme; eight months of unexplained silence on a Bill concerning agricultural markets does not. Commissions on Centre-State relations (Sarkaria, Punchhi) have recommended time limits for both the Governor and the President, and this case is the strongest argument for enacting them.
3. Given Article 361, what remedy is realistically available to the state government, and what should it do before the Assembly elections?
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Article 361(1) bars proceedings against the Governor in respect of acts done in his official capacity, and Article 361(2) bars criminal proceedings during his term. The state therefore cannot implead the Governor or seek a personal writ against him. What it can do is:
- Target the office, not the person. A writ of mandamus can run to the Secretary and the state government to place the Bill for assent and to process the constitutional communication. In the 2023 litigation the Supreme Court proceeded against the Principal Secretary and used Article 142 to deem assent, showing that relief is possible without breaching Article 361.
- Seek a declaration. The High Court can declare that inaction beyond a reasonable period on a re-passed Bill is unconstitutional, which puts the record straight even if no immediate assent follows.
- Press the Article 201 route. For the two reserved Bills, the state can request a decision with reasons and challenge unexplained delay.
- Preserve the Bill. A Bill passed by both Houses and awaiting assent does not lapse on dissolution under Article 107(5), which deals with Bills pending in the House. The damage is delay, not automatic death - but a new House may not revive it in the same form, so timing matters.
Given elections in 11 months, the state should file early, seek a fixed-date hearing, and simultaneously prepare a fresh Bill for the incoming House rather than rely on litigation alone.