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Privileged Access After an Acquisition

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Privileged Access After an Acquisition

Meridian Group acquired a 900-person logistics firm eight months ago and absorbed its identity estate. An internal audit has issued a finding with a 90-day remediation deadline. The findings: 47 active accounts hold domain administrator rights across the combined environment, of which 22 belong to staff at the acquired firm who have never logged in from a Meridian-managed device; 130 orphaned accounts remain enabled for departed contractors, including 9 service accounts with interactive logon permitted; and in the accounts payable workflow, 14 users can both create a vendor in the master file and approve payment runs, a segregation-of-duties conflict that predates the acquisition but was never remediated. The acquired firm's IT lead argues that removing administrator rights will break month-end close, which is 12 days away, and asks to defer.

1. Sequence the 90-day remediation and explain the ordering.

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Order by time-to-exploit and reversibility, not by finding number.

Days 1–10: orphaned accounts and interactive service accounts. These require no negotiation and cannot break month-end - nobody owns them. Disabling 130 accounts plus removing interactive logon from 9 service accounts is reversible, auditable, and removes standing access that no business process needs. Highest return per hour of effort.

Days 10–30: the 22 dormant domain admins at the acquired firm. Not a blanket removal on day one: confirm ownership with the acquired IT lead, convert to just-in-time elevation for those with a genuine need, disable the rest. The 12-day month-end constraint is real, so pair the change with a tested break-glass path and rehearse it before cutover.

Days 30–90: the remaining 25 admins and the SoD conflict. Tier the admin model - domain admin only for directory work, delegated rights for everything else - and fix accounts payable by splitting the create and approve entitlements.

Deferring the whole finding for month-end is the wrong trade: three of the four sub-findings carry no close-related risk at all.

2. How should the segregation-of-duties conflict be resolved without halting payments?

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The conflict is that one person can both create a vendor and approve payment to it - the classic fictitious-vendor path. Removing the entitlement outright from all 14 users risks close.

Workable sequence:

  • Detect first. Run a report of payments in the last 12 months where the same user created the vendor and approved the run. This establishes whether the conflict has been exploited and converts a theoretical risk into a known quantity for the audit committee.
  • Split by role. Determine which of the 14 genuinely need vendor creation (usually procurement or master-data) and which need approval (usually finance). Most can lose one side without any process impact.
  • Compensating control where a split is impossible - typically a small team: mandatory second-person review of every new vendor before first payment, logged and sampled monthly.
  • Detective backstop: quarterly duplicate-bank-detail and new-vendor screening until the design fix is in place.

The trade to state explicitly: a compensating review is slower and error-prone, so it is acceptable as a bridge with a dated end, not as a permanent answer.

3. What should the audit committee see at day 45 to judge whether this is on track?

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They need evidence of closure and evidence of durability, not a percentage complete.

  • Closed findings with counts: orphaned accounts disabled (target 130), interactive logon removed from service accounts (9), dormant admin accounts converted or disabled (22).
  • Break-glass test result: date last tested, time to restore admin access, who holds the credentials. This is what the "it will break month-end" objection actually hinges on.
  • Residual admin population: 47 trending to a stated target, with a justification on file for each retained admin.
  • SoD exposure: number of payments historically made under conflicting entitlements, and the count of new vendors created since day 1 that have passed independent review.
  • Recurrence control: is there an automated rule that flags re-creation of an orphaned account or a reintroduced conflict? Without it the finding will return in the next cycle, and the committee should be told that explicitly.