Fatigue, Crosswind, and the Unstable Approach
A two-pilot crew is on the third sector of a 13-hour duty day after a 3-hour unplanned delay. The captain slept 4 hours in the previous 24 and has been hand-flying; the first officer is newly type-rated with 40 hours on type. Destination runway 16 is 2,400 m, wet. Wind is 190°/22 kt gusting 34 kt, giving a crosswind component of about 19 kt gusting 29 kt; visibility is 1,500 m, ceiling 300 ft, ILS minima 200 ft/550 m, touchdown-zone RVR 1,200 m. At 400 ft, the aircraft is on glide path but 15 kt fast and slightly right of centerline; the captain has the runway in sight. The first officer calls “not stable.” The captain replies, “I have it, we'll make it.” The aircraft is at flaps 30, landing reference speed 138 kt, and current speed 153 kt. The crew must decide whether to continue or go around.
1. Should the crew continue the approach? Apply stabilised approach criteria and the available conditions.
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The crew should go around. At 400 ft, the aircraft is 15 kt fast, slightly right of centerline, in a gusty crosswind of about 19 kt gusting 29 kt, on a wet runway with a 1,200 m touchdown-zone RVR. The ceiling is 300 ft and visibility is 1,500 m. The aircraft is not stabilised by the normal gate - 1,000 ft in IMC, or 500 ft in VMC - and at 400 ft it is still not stabilised. Continuing would require a large correction close to the ground, in gusty conditions, with reduced braking action.
The captain's statement 'I have it, we'll make it' is not an operational argument. A go-around is a normal, low-risk manoeuvre; a late correction on a wet runway in a near-limit crosswind is high risk. The correct call is 'Go around, flaps 30, set go-around thrust.' The captain should not overrule the first officer's unstable call without a clear, factual reason; here there is none.
2. Identify the human factors and CRM failures in the captain's response.
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The captain is significantly fatigued: a 13-hour duty day, a 3-hour delay, only 4 hours' sleep in the previous 24, and a third sector. Fatigue reduces vigilance, slows risk assessment, impairs mood regulation, and increases the tendency to take the first available option. The captain has also been hand-flying, adding workload.
The first officer is inexperienced on type, which can create a steep authority gradient. The first officer did make the correct call, 'not stable,' but the captain's reply 'I have it, we'll make it' cuts off further challenge. This is a classic plan-continuation bias: because the crew has already flown the approach and the runway is in sight, the captain wants to complete the landing. The phrase 'I have it' also transfers control without a proper briefing or closed-loop confirmation.
Good CRM would require the first officer to be assertive and specific: 'Captain, we are 15 kt fast and right of centreline at 400 ft; I am calling go-around.' The captain should acknowledge the call, state the decision, and delegate tasks. The crew should use the stabilised-approach briefing and agree on a hard go-around gate before the approach.
3. What should the crew do after the go-around?
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Fly the published missed approach, set go-around thrust, establish a positive climb, and configure the aircraft on schedule. Notify ATC that the crew is going around and state the intention, for example to hold or to make another approach. Use the autopilot to reduce workload if conditions permit, and do not rush into a second approach.
Assess fuel, weather, and crew fatigue. If the crosswind and gust spread remain near the aircraft limit, or if the crew is not fit for another approach, divert to a suitable alternate. The captain should consider whether fatigue is affecting judgement; if so, the first officer should take a more active role, and the crew should discuss the situation openly. A second approach should only be flown if the aircraft can be stabilised by the gate, with a clear go-around plan. After landing, the crew should report the unstable approach and go-around through the normal safety-reporting channel.