Data Center Security and Network Services
This domain tests control-plane protection, tenant isolation, Layer 2 hardening, and service insertion such as firewalls and NAT inside an EVPN fabric.
Control-plane protection
- Apply a firewall filter to the loopback (
set interfaces lo0 unit 0 family inet filter input protect-re) that permits BGP only from spine peer addresses, SSH only from management subnets, and ICMP, then discards everything else. - Use DDoS protection policers and routing-engine filters selectively; over-blocking BGP or BFD breaks the fabric faster than any attack.
- Put management on a dedicated interface or VRF and enable only the specific services you need rather than
all.
Tenant isolation
- VRFs and route targets are the isolation boundary. Never leak route targets between tenants unless the design explicitly requires inter-tenant routing.
- Private VLANs, port isolation, and
no-local-switchingblock lateral traffic inside the same VLAN.
Layer 2 hardening
- DHCP snooping, dynamic ARP inspection, MAC limiting, and port security restrict spoofing and flooding.
- Storm control for broadcast, multicast, and unknown unicast protects the fabric from loops and misbehaving NICs.
- Filter-based forwarding steers selected tenant traffic into a service VRF or firewall.
Worked example
Loopback filter terms, in order: term bgp allow source-address 10.0.0.0/31 protocol tcp destination-port bgp; term ssh allow source-address 192.0.2.0/24 protocol tcp destination-port ssh; term icmp allow protocol icmp; term else discard. Reasoning: underlay BGP peers use /31 addresses, so permitting only those subnets keeps BGP working while making the control plane unreachable from tenant VRFs.
Traps
- Applying the filter under the wrong family or interface, so it silently does nothing.
- Using
destination-addresswheresource-addresswas intended, blocking peers. - Locking yourself out with a filter change; always use
commit confirmedand a rollback plan.