A Village Water Dispute in 1723
In 1723, a mountain village in what is now Shimane Prefecture sent a petition to the daikan's office. The village had 84 households and paid an annual rice tax of 310 koku. A new irrigation channel built by a neighboring village reduced water to the lower fields, and 12 households threatened to leave. The petition asks the daikan to order the neighboring village to restore the flow. It is signed by the headman and 25 representatives, but not by the largest landholder, who has lent money to people in both villages. A village regulation from 1701 says water disputes must first be settled by the two headmen; if that fails, the villages may appeal to the daikan. The daikan's office has a copy of the 1701 regulation. The neighboring village claims that a previous official approved the channel orally, but no written record exists.
1. Identify the main parties to the dispute and explain one material interest of each.
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The petitioning village wants water restored to protect 12 households and its tax capacity. The neighboring village wants the channel, probably for its own fields, and claims oral approval. The daikan wants tax revenue and order, and must follow the 1701 regulation to avoid setting a precedent. The largest landholder has lent to both sides and may prefer compromise; his absence weakens the petition's claim to village unity and may signal that he fears losing borrowers. The headman and 25 representatives show broad support but not unanimity. The daikan's own interest is not to side openly with one village if both pay tax. A good answer links each party's material interest to its likely action.
2. Based on the 1701 regulation, what process should the daikan follow, and what outcome is likely? Explain your reasoning.
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Under the 1701 regulation, the daikan should first send the dispute back to the two headmen for settlement. Only if that fails should he hear an appeal. The oral approval claimed by the neighboring village is weak because no written record exists, and the daikan has a copy of the regulation. The likely outcome is a compromise: a schedule for water use, or a new channel that restores some flow, rather than a total order. The daikan may also remind both villages of their tax obligations. The petition is more likely to succeed if it shows measured harm-12 households, 310 koku-and offers a workable solution. A blanket demand to 'restore the flow' may be less effective than a request for an inspection. The outcome depends on the daikan's need for both villages' cooperation.
3. Why does the absence of the largest landholder's signature matter? Discuss two reasons.
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His absence matters in three ways. First, it shows the village is not fully united; the daikan may discount the petition as a factional complaint. Second, as a creditor to both villages, he has an interest in avoiding a ruinous dispute; his mediation could be more effective than an order. Third, his lending may explain why 12 households are vulnerable: debt, not only water, may drive them out. The petition does not mention debt, which is a gap. A strong answer should note that the headman may have excluded him deliberately to present unity, but that this omission could backfire. The daikan might summon him as a witness or mediator.