Microsleep on an Overnight Expressway Run

He is not fit to continue. Two rumble-strip excursions and an eyes-closed episode of about 2 seconds are signs of microsleep, not simple tiredness; at expressway speed the bus travels a long distance with no effective control during that time. Four hours of sleep before a second consecutive overnight run is insufficient recovery, and the 4-hour gap since a proper break adds to the fatigue load. The antihistamine carries a drowsiness warning, and even a second-generation drug can impair attention, especially when combined with sleep loss. The energy drinks may mask fatigue briefly but do not restore alertness. Opening the window is a short-term stimulant, not a treatment. The fact that he feels 'okay now' is unreliable after a microsleep; the safe assumption is that he could lapse again within minutes.

He should stop at the earliest safe place, not push to the service area if he is fighting another microsleep. That may mean an emergency parking zone or the next interchange; he should use hazard lights, park as far from the traffic lane as possible, apply the parking brake, and stay off the road. He should radio the operations manager and say clearly that he is unfit to continue because of drowsiness and possible microsleeps, give his location, and ask for relief or recovery of the bus. He should not drive further while waiting. If passengers are on board, he should explain that a safety stop is being made and that arrangements are being organized. He should also mention the antihistamine and the sleep pattern so the manager can assess the wider fitness issue.

The driver should complete an incident report describing the rumble-strip events, the eyes-closed episode, the medication, and the sleep history. The company should refer him for a fitness-to-drive assessment, including screening for sleep apnea if his history suggests it, and should review the medication with a pharmacist or doctor. The roster should be examined for back-to-back overnight runs and insufficient recovery time, because the problem is not only the driver's choices. The report should be treated as a safety-learning event rather than hidden, since fatigue-related near misses are exactly the warning signals that should prevent a crash. He should not return to driving until he has been assessed and cleared, and the operations manager should confirm the relief arrangement in the dispatch record.