Unstable Approach with an Authoritarian Captain
A Boeing 737-800 is on approach to Runway 31 at a mountain airport. Weather: wind 310°/22 kt gusting 35, visibility 5 km in rain, broken cloud at 1,200 ft AGL. The crew is cleared for the ILS, but the localizer is offset 15° because of terrain; the approach is not authorised below 1,200 ft with a tailwind. The captain, who has been flying for 22 years, is pilot flying. The first officer, 3 years on type, notes that the aircraft is 15 kt fast and above the glidepath at 1,000 ft AGL. The captain says, 'I've got it, we'll make it.' The first officer repeats the speed and sink rate; the captain does not respond. At 500 ft AGL, the aircraft is still 12 kt fast and 0.4 dot above glidepath. The first officer calls 'go around' twice. The captain continues. The runway is in sight at 400 ft.
1. Analyse the captain's decision-making and the crew communication in this approach.
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The captain shows plan continuation bias and goal seduction: because the runway is in sight and he has 22 years of experience, he continues despite clear evidence that the approach is unstable. The offset localizer, tailwind and mountain terrain are threats that should have been briefed. At 1,000 ft the aircraft is already fast and high; at 500 ft it remains outside stabilised-approach criteria. The captain's 'I've got it, we'll make it' is a statement of intent, not a rational assessment.
The first officer's repeated calls are not acknowledged, which indicates a steep authority gradient and poor communication. Stress and high workload narrow the captain's attention, and confirmation bias may lead him to treat the first officer's calls as noise. The first officer's calls are also not specific enough to force a decision: speed and sink rate are given, but the consequence-'we are unstable, go around'-is not stated firmly. The crew has no shared plan for a go-around, so the barrier fails.
2. What should the first officer do at 500 ft AGL, and why?
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The first officer should make a clear, specific and assertive call: 'Captain, we are 12 kt fast and 0.4 dot high at 500 ft; this is unstable; go around.' If the captain does not respond, the first officer should use the company's escalation phrase and, if the SOP authorises it, take control: 'I have control, go around.' The reason is that a stabilised approach is a hard safety limit, not a preference. Continuing below 500 ft in this state risks a long landing, runway excursion, tail strike or loss of control in gusty conditions.
The first officer should not be passive. Silence allows the captain's plan continuation bias to continue. At the same time, the first officer should avoid a physical struggle; the correct procedure is a clear challenge, then assumption of control if the captain is unresponsive. After the go-around, the crew must debrief and report. The first officer's assertiveness is a safety barrier, and the captain's experience does not override the approach criteria.
3. What post-event and systemic actions should follow?
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After the event, the crew should file an ASAP or occurrence report, preserve FDR/CVR data and conduct a non-punitive debrief. The debrief should cover the approach briefing, the offset localizer, the tailwind restriction, the stabilised-approach gate and the decision to continue. The captain should acknowledge the first officer's calls; the first officer should be supported for speaking up.
Systemically, the operator should reinforce decision-making models such as FOR-DEC or DECIDE, and train crews on plan continuation bias, authority gradients and assertiveness. It should audit approach briefings at this airport and ensure the tailwind limit and offset-localizer restrictions are clear. A hard go-around policy below 500 ft, supported by training and LOFT scenarios, would help. The airline should also review whether the captain needs additional training and whether the first officer's report is handled fairly. The aim is to learn, not to blame.