GCE A/L Political Science cheat sheet

Legitimacy (Weber): traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational authority; legal-rational rests on impersonal rules and office, not the person.

Sovereignty has two faces: internal supremacy over all associations within the territory, external independence from other states.

Negative liberty = absence of interference (Berlin); positive liberty = self-mastery or collective self-rule, which can justify coercion in Rousseau's general will.

Justice as fairness (Rawls): principles chosen behind a veil of ignorance; first principle (equal basic liberties) lexically prior to the difference principle.

The state differs from government: state = durable set of institutions claiming monopoly of legitimate coercion; government = temporary office-holders.

Power (Dahl) is exercised when A gets B to do something B would not otherwise do; Lukes adds agenda-setting and preference-shaping faces.

Social contract logic: Hobbes (security under a sovereign), Locke (trust revocable when government breaches natural rights), Rousseau (general will).

Civil society = voluntary associations between family and state; it is analytically distinct from both the market and the state apparatus.

Equality types to distinguish: formal (equal treatment), proportional (to merit/need), and substantive (equal outcomes or capabilities).

Written vs unwritten: the UK has no single codified text; its constitution rests on statutes, common law, conventions, and works of authority.

Rigidity test: amendment by ordinary statute = flexible; amendment requiring special majorities or referendums = rigid.

Separation of powers (Montesquieu) requires distinct personnel as well as distinct functions; partial fusion (e.g., parliamentary executives) is common.

Federal features: two levels of government each with enumerated powers, constitutional division of competence, and a constitutional court or arbiter.

Judicial review: power to declare acts unconstitutional; in parliamentary sovereignty systems courts may only interpret, not invalidate primary legislation.

Unitary systems may still devolve power; devolution is statutory and reversible, unlike federal entrenchment.

Bicameralism checks: differing composition, terms, and powers; a weak upper house may only delay (suspensory veto) rather than reject.

Constitutional conventions are binding political rules enforced politically, not by courts; breaching one is a political, not legal, wrong.

Entrenchment devices: supermajority requirements, referendum locks, eternity clauses, and limits on amendment of core rights.

First-past-the-post: single-member districts, plurality wins; tends to manufacture single-party majorities and under-represent third parties.

Proportional representation (list or STV): seats track vote share; list systems use thresholds (e.g., 5%) to limit fragmentation.

Duverger's law: plurality single-member districts tend toward two-party competition; PR tends toward multiparty systems.

Electoral systems shape party systems via mechanical effect (seat conversion) and psychological effect (strategic voting by voters and elites).

Parliamentary government: executive drawn from and accountable to the legislature; a no-confidence vote or loss of majority can force resignation or election.

Presidentialism: fixed terms, separate election of executive and legislature; divided government arises when different parties control each, raising deadlock risk.

Interest groups: insider/outsider typology; pluralist systems have many competing groups, corporatist systems institutionalise peak associations in bargaining.

Political parties perform aggregation, recruitment, mobilisation, and government formation; catch-all parties dilute ideology to widen appeal.

Voter turnout correlates with compulsory voting, PR, close races, and registration ease; not simply with civic virtue.

Regime typology: democracy (contestation plus participation), authoritarianism, and hybrid regimes combining elections with restricted contestation.

Minimalist (Schumpeterian) democracy = competitive elections; maximalist definitions add civil liberties, rule of law, and accountability.

Lijphart's consociational model: grand coalition, mutual veto, proportional representation, and segmental autonomy for divided societies.

Majoritarian (Westminster) model: concentration of power, two parties, plurality elections, unitary and centralised government.

Lijphart's consensus model: power-sharing executive, multipartyism, PR, federalism, and strong judicial review.

State capacity dimensions: extractive (tax), coercive (security), administrative (service delivery); weak capacity undermines any regime type.

Rentier state: revenue from resource rents rather than taxation weakens the accountability link between rulers and taxpayers.

Path dependence: earlier institutional choices raise the cost of switching, so institutional trajectories persist even when suboptimal.

Most-similar and most-different systems designs: control variables by matching cases, then compare on the variable of interest.

Realism: states are unitary rational actors in anarchy; survival and self-help drive balancing, not institutions or norms.

Neorealism (Waltz) locates cause in system structure and polarity; neoliberalism (Keohane) argues institutions reduce transaction costs and cheating.

Constructivism: interests are not given; identities and norms constitute what states want (Wendt: anarchy is what states make of it).

Levels of analysis (Singer): system, state, and individual; explanation should state which level is doing the causal work.

Balance of power vs bandwagoning: weaker states either counter the rising power or align with it; balancing is the structural prediction.

Deterrence requires capability, credibility, and communication; second-strike nuclear capability produces mutual assured destruction stability.

Foreign policy instruments: diplomacy, economic statecraft (sanctions, aid, trade), military force, and informational or soft power.

Soft power (Nye) = attraction through culture, values, and legitimate policy; it differs from hard power coercion and payment.

Collective security (UN Charter) differs from collective defence (NATO Art. 5): the former targets aggression generally, the latter external attack on members.

GDP measures output within borders; GNP/GNI measures income of residents, including net factor income from abroad.

Purchasing power parity adjusts GDP for price levels, giving a better welfare comparison than market exchange rates.

Human Development Index combines life expectancy, education (mean and expected years), and GNI per capita, each equally weighted.

Gini coefficient ranges 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality); Lorenz curve plots cumulative income share against population share.

Modernisation theory: development produces structural change (industrialisation, urbanisation, education) that favours democratic institutions.

Dependency and structuralist accounts (Prebisch-Singer) argue primary-commodity exporters face declining terms of trade; import substitution is the policy response.

Washington Consensus: fiscal discipline, liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, and property rights; criticised for neglecting institutions and sequencing.

Developmental state (Johnson): state guidance via industrial policy and credit allocation, as in East Asian late industrialisers.

Public goods are non-excludable and non-rival; markets under-provide them, justifying state provision or regulation.

Weberian bureaucracy: hierarchy, written rules, merit appointment, impersonality, and career officials; contrasted with patronage spoils systems.

New Public Management: managerial autonomy, performance targets, contracting out, and quasi-markets; aims at efficiency, risks fragmentation.

Good governance indicators: accountability, transparency, rule of law, responsiveness, effectiveness, and participation.

Policy cycle: agenda setting, formulation, adoption/legitimisation, implementation, evaluation, and termination or succession.

Kingdon's multiple streams: problem, policy, and politics streams converge at a policy window; a policy entrepreneur couples them.

Principal-agent problem in administration: politicians (principals) cannot fully monitor officials (agents); tools include audits, incentives, and transparency.

Street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky) exercise discretion in implementation; their coping routines effectively remake policy.

Public choice applies rational-actor assumptions to officials and voters, predicting budget-maximising bureaus and log-rolling.

Accountability types: vertical (elections, media, courts), horizontal (legislature, audit, ombudsman), and diagonal (citizen oversight bodies).

Populism is a thin-centred ideology dividing society into a virtuous people and a corrupt elite; it can attach to left or right programmes.

Democratic backsliding is usually incremental: court-packing, media capture, and electoral-rule manipulation rather than a single coup.

Climate governance: UNFCCC, Kyoto (1997, binding targets for developed states), and Paris (2015, nationally determined contributions).

Globalisation backlash: trade shocks concentrate losses regionally and sectorally, so compensation and adjustment policy shape political response.

Digital politics: filter bubbles, micro-targeting, and disinformation raise regulatory questions of platform liability and electoral integrity.

Migration regimes: asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention requires well-founded fear of persecution; economic migrants lack that legal status.

Terrorism definitions require a political motive plus violence against civilians; state terrorism complicates actor-focused definitions.

Feminist and identity politics: descriptive representation (who is present) and substantive representation (whose interests are acted on) are distinct.

International institutions face legitimacy deficits: representation formulas, veto power, and compliance mechanisms are contested in UN Security Council reform debates.