ATT&CK Threat Hunting flashcards
ATT&CK Threat Hunting · Build recall with a focused review session.
32 cards. Read the term and the definition here. The deck at the top of this page is optional.
- ATT&CK Tactic
- A column in the ATT&CK matrix representing the adversary's tactical goal at a stage of an intrusion, such as Credential Access or Lateral Movement. Tactics group techniques by purpose rather than by tool or platform.
- Sub-technique ID format
- Sub-techniques extend a parent technique ID with a dot and three digits, for example T1059.001 under T1059. The parent ID is never reused for a different behavior after publication, preserving mapping stability.
- x_mitre_platforms field
- A STIX property on ATT&CK technique objects listing applicable platforms such as Windows, Linux, macOS, AWS, or Azure AD. Filtering by this field prevents mapping cloud-only techniques to endpoint telemetry.
- Data Component
- A STIX object nested under a Data Source that names a specific observable category, such as Process Creation under the Process source. It is the join key between ATT&CK techniques and actual telemetry fields.
- Deprecated technique handling
- ATT&CK marks retired techniques with revoked or x_mitre_deprecated flags instead of deleting or reassigning IDs. Pipelines must filter these flags so stale mappings do not inflate coverage scores.
- Intrusion Set versus Campaign
- An Intrusion Set groups activity attributed to one actor across time, while a Campaign is a bounded set of activity within a period. Map durable TTPs to Intrusion Set and transient infrastructure to Campaign.
- Software uses relationship
- ATT&CK links Software objects to the techniques they can perform via uses relationships. Traversing these links from a named tool yields a capability map independent of whether the behavior was observed.
- Mapping confidence ladder
- A ranking of mapping evidence: explicit technique citation ranks highest, behavioral description next, then inference from tooling, then inference from actor profile. Each mapping should record its evidence tier.
- Navigator layer JSON
- A JSON file describing technique scores, color scales, and comments for display in ATT&CK Navigator. It is the standard interchange format for coverage heat maps and scoring rubrics.
- Indicates relationship in STIX
- A STIX relationship connecting an Indicator object to an Attack Pattern it detects. It allows indicator feeds to be resolved to ATT&CK techniques for coverage and prioritization queries.
- Falsifiable hunt hypothesis
- A statement pairing an adversary behavior, target platform, expected telemetry, and an observable outcome that could disprove it. Without a disprovable outcome the activity is monitoring, not hunting.
- Intelligence-to-hypothesis chain
- The derivation path from actor or technique to Data Component, telemetry source, query, expected result, and validation criterion. Each link must be explicit or the hunt cannot be validated.
- Predefined benign baseline
- The measured normal distribution for the population a hunt queries, established before execution. It converts deviation judgments from impressionistic to quantitative and supports threshold selection.
- Inconclusive hunt outcome
- A hunt result where telemetry was absent or insufficient to test the hypothesis. It is recorded as a data-source gap rather than a negative finding and feeds acquisition requests.
- Hunt population scoping
- Explicitly specifying the host subset, user cohort, and time window before querying. Unbounded scope produces unreadable result sets and prevents meaningful baseline comparison.
- 4688 command-line auditing
- Windows Security event 4688 records process creation, but the process command line field appears only when the command-line inclusion policy is enabled. Without it, argument-based hypotheses cannot be tested.
- Sysmon Event ID 10
- Sysmon process access events record cross-process handle requests with GrantedAccess masks. Masks such as 0x1F0FFF or 0x1010 indicate access rights consistent with process injection.
- CloudTrail data events
- AWS CloudTrail management events are logged by default, but S3 object-level and Lambda invoke data events are opt-in and incur cost. Absence of data events silently limits cloud hunting scope.
- Zeek protocol logs
- Zeek emits structured conn, dns, http, and ssl logs capturing protocol-level metadata without full payload retention. They are the durable network substrate when packet capture windows are short.
- Retention versus hunt window
- A hunt window longer than the log retention period is silently truncated, producing false negatives. Retention must exceed the longest planned hypothesis window, commonly ninety days or more.
- Process lineage rarity
- A frequency comparison of parent-child image pairs against a population baseline. Rare pairs involving scripting hosts such as mshta or rundll32 carry high signal for proxy execution.
- Argument tokenization versus regex
- Parsing command lines into normalized argument tokens resists evasion through quoting, case, and whitespace variation. Raw string regex matching is brittle against trivial adversary obfuscation.
- Sigma rule portability
- Sigma is a vendor-neutral detection format converted to backend query languages. Field mappings differ per SIEM, so converted rules require validation against the target schema before deployment.
- Sequence correlation entity key
- Multi-step analytics need a stable key such as host plus user and explicit time windows. Without it, events from different entities correlate falsely and inflate alert volume.
- First-seen API call detection
- Flagging API actions a principal has never previously invoked, derived from CloudTrail history. Behavioral rarity outperforms enumerating known-malicious API names, which adversaries rotate.
- Zero-result source health check
- Before accepting an empty query result as negative, confirm the underlying log source is ingesting and parsed. Silent source failure is a common cause of false negative hunts.
- Triage decision tree
- An ordered set of questions: is the event a telemetry artifact, is it explained by sanctioned tooling, does it match the hypothesis observable, and should it escalate. It standardizes closure rationale.
- True positive to rule
- A confirmed hunt finding must become a detection rule carrying the query, ATT&CK mapping, and tested false-positive profile. Otherwise the finding remains a one-time observation with no lasting value.
- Atomic test validation
- Executing a controlled emulation of the target behavior and confirming the analytic fires. An untested analytic is a hypothesis about detection rather than a validated detection.
- Hunt chain of custody
- Preserving raw event identifiers, query text, execution timestamp, and result counts for each hunt. It makes findings reproducible, auditable, and defensible during incident review.
- Handoff package contents
- Rule logic, required log sources and field mappings, ATT&CK and Data Component mapping, known false positives, test evidence, severity routing, and named owner. It enables independent rule maintenance.
- Claimed versus validated coverage
- Claimed coverage is a mapped rule with no test evidence; validated coverage has fired in controlled testing and carries a false-positive profile. Only validated coverage should be reported as detection.