MATSEC AM Philosophy cheat sheet

MATSEC AM Philosophy is a two-year advanced-level subject examined by written papers; the syllabus is organised around compulsory core areas (typically epistemology, metaphysics/philosophy of mind, ethics, and logic) plus optional set-text or theme modules chosen by the school.

A standard answer structure is: define the key term, state the thesis, give the argument in numbered premises, then present and rebut the strongest objection. Marks are awarded for argument, not for name-dropping philosophers.

Distinguish valid from sound: an argument is valid when the conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true; it is sound when it is valid and all premises are actually true. Validity concerns form, soundness concerns truth.

Necessary condition: A is necessary for B when B cannot occur without A (B implies A). Sufficient condition: A is sufficient for B when A guarantees B (A implies B). A condition can be necessary without being sufficient, and vice versa.

Use counterexamples to test universal claims: a claim of the form 'All F are G' is refuted by a single clear case of an F that is not G. This is the standard tool against definitions in ethics and epistemology.

When citing a philosopher, give the position, the reason for it, and one standard objection. For example: Descartes holds the mind is a thinking substance really distinct from body because they can be conceived apart; the objection is that conceivability does not entail real possibility.

Keep terminology consistent across a paper: do not switch between 'belief', 'knowledge', and 'justified true belief' as if interchangeable; define each on first use and hold the definition for the whole answer.

Time management rule: allocate minutes to marks in roughly a 1:1 ratio, and reserve the final minutes of each essay for a one-paragraph conclusion that states which side you judge stronger and why.

The tripartite analysis of knowledge: S knows that p if and only if (i) p is true, (ii) S believes that p, and (iii) S's belief is justified. Gettier cases purport to show these three conditions are jointly insufficient.

Foundationalism holds that justified belief rests on basic beliefs needing no further justification; coherentism holds that justification is a relation of mutual support among beliefs; reliabilism holds that a belief is justified if produced by a reliable belief-forming process.

Sceptical arguments typically use closure: if I know I have hands, I can know I am not a brain in a vat; I cannot know I am not a brain in a vat; therefore I cannot know I have hands. Responses either deny the premise or deny the closure principle.

Descartes' method of doubt: suspend assent to anything that can be doubted; the cogito ('I think, therefore I am') survives because even the demon cannot make a doubter who does not exist.

Hume's problem of induction: no non-circular justification exists for inferring future regularities from past ones; the principle of uniformity of nature is itself an inductive assumption. Popper replaces induction with falsifiability as the demarcation criterion for science.

The mind-body problem positions: dualism (mental and physical are distinct), identity theory (mental states are brain states), functionalism (mental states are defined by causal role, multiply realisable), and eliminativism (folk-psychological categories are false).

The knowledge argument (Jackson's Mary) and the philosophical zombie argument are standard challenges to physicalism about consciousness; replies include the ability hypothesis and denying that conceivability entails possibility.

Personal identity: psychological continuity theories (Locke's memory criterion, Parfit's relation R) versus bodily or animalist accounts; fission and teleportation cases test which criterion is doing the work.

Consequentialism evaluates acts by outcomes; utilitarianism is the form that specifies welfare as the good to be maximised. Act- and rule-utilitarianism differ over whether the rule or the individual act is the object of assessment.

Kant's categorical imperative has standard formulations: universalisability (act only on maxims you can will as universal law) and humanity (never treat persons merely as means). The test is on maxims, not on consequences.

Virtue ethics locates the moral question in character: what would a virtuous person do? Aristotle's doctrine of the mean places virtue between vices of excess and deficiency, relative to the agent and situation.

The fact-value distinction (Hume's is-ought gap): no set of purely descriptive premises entails a normative conclusion without an implicit evaluative premise. Naturalistic fallacy (Moore): 'good' cannot be defined in natural terms.

Metaethical positions: moral realism (mind-independent moral truths), cognitivism (moral statements express beliefs), non-cognitivism (emotivism, prescriptivism: they express attitudes or commands), and error theory (moral claims are false because there are no moral facts).

Distinguish descriptive cultural relativism (people differ in moral codes) from normative cultural relativism (rightness is defined by one's culture). Only the latter generates the standard objection about moral criticism and reform.

Rawls' original position and veil of ignorance generate principles by impartial choice; the difference principle permits inequalities only if they benefit the least advantaged. Nozick's entitlement theory opposes patterned redistribution.

Trolley problems isolate the doctrine of double effect (intended harm versus foreseen side-effect) and the doing/allowing distinction; use them to test whether a theory's verdict matches considered judgements, then ask which commitment to revise.

Standard form: list premises P1, P2, ... then 'Therefore C'. An argument's form can be tested by substituting content-neutral letters and checking for any possible case where premises are true and conclusion false.

Common valid forms: modus ponens (P implies Q; P; therefore Q), modus tollens (P implies Q; not Q; therefore not P), disjunctive syllogism (P or Q; not P; therefore Q).

Common fallacies: affirming the consequent (P implies Q; Q; therefore P) and denying the antecedent (P implies Q; not P; therefore not Q) are both invalid. Ad hominem, straw man, false dilemma, and begging the question are relevance or structural failures.

Informal fallacies to name precisely: equivocation (a term shifts meaning), composition (parts have F, so whole has F), hasty generalisation (sample too small), and post hoc (sequence treated as causation).

Evaluating an objection: state it in the strongest form (principle of charity), identify which premise of the target argument it attacks, then say whether the target can be repaired or must be abandoned.

Essay marking rewards exegesis plus critique: a paragraph summarising a position should be followed by a paragraph assessing it. Pure summary earns limited credit at advanced level.

Quote sparingly and paraphrase accurately; a short quotation needs a philosopher's name and, where the syllabus requires it, the work. Unattributed quotation is treated as unoriginal material.

Definitions should be tested by counterexample and by borderline cases; if a definition excludes a paradigm case or includes an obviously wrong case, revise the definition and say what the revision costs.