Yellow Card in Trilogue: A Maltese MEP and the Packaging Regulation
A Maltese MEP sits on the European Parliament's ENVI committee during trilogues on a proposed packaging and packaging waste regulation. Her constituency concern: 60% of packaging placed on the Maltese market is imported, and four beverage SMEs employing 250 people each estimate compliance costs of €120,000 per firm to meet a proposed 10% reusable takeaway packaging target. Meanwhile, 12 national parliaments (24 votes out of 54) have submitted reasoned opinions within the eight-week deadline, arguing that the proposal breaches subsidiarity. The Council's general approach keeps the reuse targets but adds a five-year exemption for member states with a high import share. The rapporteur wants a final trilogue before the parliamentary term ends. The MEP has one week to decide whether to table amendments, join the Council compromise, or vote against. Her party group is split, and a Maltese general election is due within 18 months.
1. What are the legal consequences of 12 national parliaments submitting reasoned opinions on this file, and what should the MEP do about it?
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Under Protocol 2 on subsidiarity, a yellow card is triggered when reasoned opinions reach 18 of the 54 votes (one third) in an ordinary legislative procedure. Twelve chambers with two votes each give 24, so the threshold is comfortably met.
The consequence is procedural, not a veto. The Commission must review the proposal and give reasons for maintaining, amending or withdrawing it; Parliament and Council must take those reasons into account before continuing. There is no 'red card' for this procedure, so the MEP cannot stop the file on subsidiarity grounds.
She should therefore not present the yellow card as a block. She should use it to demand that the committee report address subsidiarity and proportionality explicitly, to press the question of whether an EU-wide reuse target is necessary for a market where most packaging is imported, and to convert the Council's exemption into a reasoned proportionality safeguard. Overclaiming the yellow card would damage her credibility in trilogue and invite the reply that the objection has already been answered.
2. Explain the strategic dilemma: why is the Council's five-year exemption attractive to Malta but risky to accept without amendment, and what should she ask for in exchange?
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Attractive: it directly relieves the four Maltese SMEs, and Malta is routinely outvoted in Council, where qualified majority means 55% of member states representing 65% of the population. For a small member state, a negotiated exception in the text is worth more than a symbolic amendment that will be dropped in trilogue.
Risky: a five-year derogation postpones investment and creates a cliff edge for the very firms it protects. It is also fragile - if the Council's general approach shifts after the election, the clause may disappear, and an exemption defined by 'high import share' could be redrafted into something Malta no longer qualifies for.
What to ask in exchange: (i) objective market criteria rather than a national label, so the exemption is legally robust; (ii) transition support for SMEs to adapt during the five years, not merely delay; (iii) a review clause with data. She should also confirm the Council's voting arithmetic before committing her final vote, because her split group may make the parliamentary margin thin.