EUC-EO flashcards
EUC-EO · Build recall with a focused review session.
33 cards. Read the term and the definition here. The deck at the top of this page is optional.
- Kerckhoffs's principle
- A cryptosystem should remain secure even if everything about it except the key is public. Security depends on key secrecy, not algorithm secrecy.
- Confusion and diffusion
- Confusion makes the relationship between key and ciphertext complex, typically via substitution. Diffusion spreads plaintext influence across the ciphertext, typically via permutation and mixing.
- One-time pad condition
- The pad must be truly random, at least as long as the message, used exactly once, and kept secret. Violating any condition, especially reuse, breaks its proven security.
- Stream cipher keystream reuse
- XORing two ciphertexts encrypted with the same keystream yields the XOR of the plaintexts, which often allows recovery through crib-dragging and statistics.
- AES key and block sizes
- AES uses a fixed 128-bit block with 128-, 192-, or 256-bit keys and 10, 12, or 14 rounds respectively. It replaced DES as the standard block cipher.
- ECB mode weakness
- Electronic Codebook encrypts each block independently with the same key, so identical plaintext blocks produce identical ciphertext blocks, leaking structure and patterns.
- CBC IV requirements
- CBC needs a unique, unpredictable initialization vector per encryption under a given key. A predictable or reused IV enables chosen-plaintext attacks and leaks equality of first blocks.
- GCM nonce reuse
- Reusing a GCM nonce with the same key reveals the authentication key and the XOR of plaintexts, destroying both confidentiality and integrity guarantees.
- Meet-in-the-middle attack
- Against double encryption, the attacker computes and stores intermediate values from both directions, finding the key pair in roughly 2^(k+1) work instead of 2^(2k).
- RSA hard problem
- RSA security relies on the difficulty of factoring the modulus, the product of two large primes. Recovering the primes yields the private exponent.
- Diffie-Hellman limitation
- Diffie-Hellman establishes a shared secret over an open channel but does not authenticate participants, so it is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle unless combined with signatures or certificates.
- Certificate revocation checking
- CRLs publish revoked serial numbers periodically, while OCSP queries status in real time. OCSP stapling lets the server present a signed, cached response.
- Certificate key usage extension
- The key usage and extended key usage extensions restrict what a certified key may do, such as digital signature, key encipherment, server authentication, or code signing.
- Hash collision resistance
- Collision resistance means finding any two distinct inputs with the same digest is infeasible. By the birthday bound, an n-bit hash offers about n/2 bits of collision resistance.
- HMAC construction
- HMAC hashes the key XORed with an inner pad concatenated with the message, then hashes that result with the key XORed with an outer pad.
- Length extension attack
- Given hash(secret||message), an attacker can compute hash(secret||message||padding||extra) for Merkle-Damgård hashes without knowing the secret. HMAC prevents this.
- Password salting purpose
- A unique random salt per password prevents precomputed rainbow tables and hides identical passwords. It does not slow guessing, so a slow KDF is also required.
- Digital signature process
- The signer hashes the message and transforms the digest with a private key. The verifier recomputes the digest and checks the signature with the public key.
- ECDSA nonce reuse failure
- Reusing the same random k for two ECDSA or DSA signatures lets anyone solve for the private key from the two signatures and the known messages.
- Certificate chain validation
- Validation verifies each signature up to a trusted root, checks validity dates, key usage, basic constraints, name matching, and revocation status.
- Certificate signing request
- A CSR contains the subject's public key and identity attributes and is signed with the matching private key to prove possession before a CA issues a certificate.
- Envelope encryption
- A data key encrypts the data, and a key-encryption key encrypts the data key. This limits exposure and simplifies rotation of the root key.
- Perfect forward secrecy
- Ephemeral per-session key agreement ensures that compromise of a long-term private key does not expose previously recorded session keys or past traffic.
- Hardware security module
- An HSM is tamper-resistant hardware that generates, stores, and uses keys internally so private key material never appears in general-purpose memory.
- Key zeroization
- Zeroization securely erases key material by overwriting or destroying the storage medium, ensuring deleted keys cannot be recovered by forensic analysis.
- TLS 1.3 key changes
- TLS 1.3 removes RSA key transport and static Diffie-Hellman, mandates forward secrecy, and completes the handshake in one round trip.
- IPSec ESP versus AH
- ESP provides confidentiality plus integrity and authentication, while AH provides integrity and authentication of the packet header but no encryption.
- SSH authentication layers
- SSH authenticates the server with a host key and the client with a password or user key pair, after a key exchange that establishes session encryption.
- S/MIME versus PGP trust
- S/MIME relies on hierarchical X.509 certificates from CAs, while PGP uses a decentralized web of trust where users sign each other's public keys.
- LSB steganography
- Least significant bit embedding replaces low-order bits of carrier samples with message bits. It is high capacity and imperceptible but fragile to compression and resizing.
- Steganalysis chi-square test
- The chi-square attack detects LSB embedding by testing whether the frequency pairs of adjacent pixel values have been equalized, a statistical artifact of embedding.
- Chosen-ciphertext attack
- The attacker submits chosen ciphertexts to a decryption oracle and observes results. Adaptive versions model padding oracles and Bleichenbacher attacks on RSA.
- Side-channel attack
- Side-channel attacks infer keys from physical leakage such as timing, power consumption, cache behavior, or electromagnetic emissions rather than from mathematical weakness.