The Green Scheme That Did Not Feed the Village
Omusati Region, Namibia. A 400-hectare irrigation scheme was set up to grow hybrid maize with subsidised fertiliser, seed and diesel for pumps. Average yields rose from 1.8 to 3.2 tonnes per hectare in the first two years, then fell to 2.1. Soil salinity is spreading, and the pumps cost more to run each season. Farmers sell most of their maize immediately after harvest, when prices are low, and buy maize meal back during the lean season at a higher price. Households also keep cattle, but grazing is deteriorating and numbers have fallen. Pearl millet (mahangu) grows well without irrigation but has a thin market. Three consecutive poor rainy seasons have reduced off-farm work. The cooperative that manages the scheme owes money to the fertiliser supplier and has started charging farmers water fees per hectare, which larger farmers can pay more easily than smallholders. A government report calls the scheme 'a success' because total maize output is higher than before.
1. Using the four dimensions of food security, explain why higher yields have not produced food security for most households in the scheme.
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Food security has four dimensions: availability, access, utilisation and stability. The scheme improved only the first, and only partly.
Availability: total maize output is higher, but the report confuses output with food. Some maize is sold, and the scheme does not produce the diverse foods households need.
Access: farmers sell immediately at low prices and buy back at high prices in the lean season, so they are made poorer by the price spread. Water fees per hectare are regressive - a large farmer pays the same rate but can absorb it, while a smallholder may have to sell livestock or borrow. With three poor rainy seasons and less off-farm work, purchasing power is weak, so even available maize is not accessible.
Utilisation: a maize-heavy diet is less nutritious than one with millet, legumes, milk and vegetables. Salinity and falling yields may also reduce quality.
Stability: yields rose then fell; debt to the fertiliser supplier and fluctuating pump costs make the system fragile. A single bad season can wipe out gains.
So the scheme increased availability but weakened access, diversified utilisation and stability. Higher output is therefore not evidence of food security.
2. Evaluate the design of the input subsidy and irrigation scheme. In your answer, distinguish between short-run and long-run effects.
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Short run. The subsidised fertiliser, seed and diesel raised yields from 1.8 to 3.2 tonnes per hectare. That is a real gain in output and probably in farm income in the first two years. Subsidies also reduced the risk of trying hybrid maize.
Long run. Several design faults appear. The subsidy encouraged continuous maize on irrigated soil without drainage or rotation, and salinity is now spreading; yields have fallen to 2.1 tonnes. Diesel pumps make the scheme vulnerable to fuel prices. The cooperative has accumulated debt and is passing costs to farmers through water fees, which is regressive. Selling at harvest and buying later means the scheme transfers value to traders, not farmers. And the subsidy is an input subsidy, not a credit or storage subsidy, so it does not fix the price risk that drives distress sales.
The report's 'success' criterion - total output higher than before - is therefore misleading. A proper evaluation would compare net farm income, soil salinity, debt and household food consumption, not gross output. The scheme may be profitable in aggregate while leaving smallholders worse off. Long-run sustainability requires soil management and risk instruments, not more fertiliser.
3. Recommend two changes to the scheme and explain how each would improve food security, including one that addresses risk.
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Two changes:
Replace part of the fertiliser subsidy with a soil and water management package: drainage, gypsum or other salinity treatment where appropriate, crop rotation with legumes, and a salinity monitoring schedule, with the subsidy tied to participation. This improves long-run productivity and stability because it addresses the cause of falling yields rather than compensating for it. It also reduces the debt spiral, since farmers are not buying more inputs to chase declining returns. The package should be phased: full subsidy in year one, reducing as soil improves.
Introduce collective storage and a warehouse receipt or floor-price scheme through the cooperative, so farmers can delay sales and borrow against stored grain. This directly addresses the sell-low, buy-high cycle and improves access and stability. A school-feeding contract buying local maize at a published floor price would create a stable outlet and improve child nutrition.
Design detail: water fees should be graduated by area and ability to pay, with a rebate for smallholders; otherwise change 2 will be undermined by cost recovery. Success should be measured by the lean-season price households pay, the share of grain sold later than three months after harvest, salinity levels and dietary diversity - not by total maize output.