RCE flashcards
RCE · Build recall with a focused review session.
32 cards. Read the term and the definition here. The deck at the top of this page is optional.
- Recovery Point Objective
- The maximum amount of data loss, expressed as time, that the business can tolerate. It drives backup frequency and is defined by business owners rather than by technical teams.
- Recovery Time Objective
- The maximum acceptable elapsed time to restore a service after disruption. It must be proven by measured restore tests, because backup job success does not demonstrate restore speed.
- 3-2-1 backup rule
- Keep at least three copies of data, on two different media types, with one copy offsite. A common modern extension adds one immutable or offline copy to resist ransomware.
- Differential versus incremental backup
- A differential captures everything changed since the last full backup; an incremental captures changes since the most recent backup of any type. Differentials restore faster, incrementals store smaller.
- Synthetic full backup
- A new full backup reference point created by merging the prior full with subsequent incremental backups, without reading production data again. It shortens restore chains and reduces production load.
- Immutable backup retention
- Backups written under WORM or object-lock policy that cannot be altered or deleted until the retention period expires. The lock period must exceed expected attacker dwell time.
- Snapshot is not a backup
- Snapshots usually reside in the same array or cloud account as production data. An attacker with production credentials can delete or encrypt both, so snapshots alone fail resilience requirements.
- Tier-0 identity assets
- Directory services, identity providers, federation services, privileged access management, and the backup platform itself. Compromise of any Tier-0 asset invalidates controls that depend on it.
- Phishing-resistant MFA
- Authentication bound to origin using FIDO2, WebAuthn security keys, or passkeys. Push notifications and SMS codes can be defeated by MFA fatigue and adversary-in-the-middle proxy kits.
- Break-glass account
- A cloud-only emergency account excluded from conditional access, with a long random credential stored offline. At least two should exist, and any sign-in use should trigger an alert.
- Golden SAML attack
- Theft of the token-signing key lets an attacker forge valid SAML assertions for any user. Response requires rotating the signing certificate and revoking all issued refresh tokens.
- Identity recovery order
- Restore the identity provider first, then federation trust, then privileged accounts, then standard users and service principals. Restoring applications before identity leaves them unreachable and unmanageable.
- Non-human identity governance
- Service accounts, API keys, and application registrations require named owners, rotation schedules, and least-privilege scoping. Unowned credentials are a frequent attacker persistence mechanism.
- Conditional access inputs
- Signals evaluated per request: user or group, device compliance, network location, application sensitivity, sign-in risk, and session controls. Policies combine these into allow, block, or require-step-up decisions.
- Cyber recovery versus disaster recovery
- Disaster recovery assumes an accidental failure with a stable environment. Cyber recovery assumes an active adversary, so containment and scoping precede any restore activity.
- Isolated recovery environment
- A clean-room network with separate credentials, separate management plane, and no standing trust back to production. Restores are validated there before reintroduction to the enterprise.
- Recovery point triage
- Scanning candidate restore points for compromise indicators such as ransomware notes, unexpected encryption, anomalous file extensions, or new admin accounts to select the last known-good point.
- Dwell time and retention gap
- Attackers often persist for days or weeks before detonation, so the clean restore point frequently predates the incident date. Backup retention must span that gap.
- Restore order for cyber incidents
- Identity and authentication first, then network and security telemetry such as logging, EDR, and DNS, then core infrastructure, then business applications and data.
- Pre-rejoin validation
- Before a restored host rejoins production, rotate credentials, scan for malware, verify data integrity, and obtain application owner sign-off. Restored systems often carry the original persistence.
- Cyber recovery exercise
- A tabletop or full-scale test that exercises decision authority, communications, isolation procedures, and measured RTO against the documented recovery plan rather than only backup jobs.
- Shared responsibility model
- The provider secures the physical and virtual infrastructure and managed service availability. The customer secures data, identities, configuration, and access inside the cloud service.
- SaaS vendor retention limits
- Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, and Salesforce retain deleted data only briefly in recycle bins. Vendor retention does not protect against malicious deletion by an authorized account.
- S3 Object Lock modes
- Governance mode can be bypassed by users with special permissions; compliance mode cannot be shortened or removed, even by the root account, until retention expires.
- Backup role separation
- The backup service principal should lack delete rights on its own repository, and production administrators should lack delete rights on backup storage. This prevents a single compromised identity from erasing recovery points.
- SaaS restore scope
- SaaS recovery covers mailboxes, OneDrive and SharePoint sites, Teams channels, plus metadata and permissions. Restoring content without permissions leaves users unable to access recovered data.
- Cross-account backup isolation
- Writing backups to a separate cloud account or region with distinct credentials prevents an attacker holding production account rights from deleting or encrypting the backup copies.
- Agent least privilege
- Each platform agent role, whether discovery, protection, detection, or recovery, should carry its own narrowly scoped credential rather than sharing a broad administrative service account.
- Agent heartbeat monitoring
- A silent agent represents an unprotected workload, not a neutral state. Track heartbeat, last successful policy run, version currency, and credential expiry as health signals.
- Policy precedence
- When multiple policies apply, the most specific scope wins: object over group over global. Precedence changes should be tested in a non-production scope before rollout.
- Staged agent upgrade
- Upgrade a pilot group first, verify policy execution and a test restore, then roll out broadly while retaining a rollback path to the previous agent version.
- Platform RBAC separation
- Separate platform administrator, operator, and read-only auditor roles. Every recovery action should be logged with actor, timestamp, and target for audit reconstruction.