NSPM-C flashcards
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54 cards. Read the term and the definition here. The deck at the top of this page is optional.
- CSF 2.0 Functions
- Six Functions: Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover. Govern was added in version 2.0 and addresses organizational context, risk strategy, roles, policy, oversight, and supply chain.
- CSF Implementation Tiers
- Four tiers from Partial to Adaptive describing the rigor of cybersecurity risk governance and management. Tiers reflect organizational practice, not the maturity of individual controls.
- RMF seven steps
- Prepare, Categorize, Select, Implement, Assess, Authorize, Monitor. Prepare was added in SP 800-37 Rev. 2 and operates at organization and system levels.
- FIPS 199 categorization
- Assigns Low, Moderate, or High impact to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The system category is the high-water mark across the three objectives.
- SP 800-53 control families
- Twenty families identified by two-letter codes such as AC, AU, CA, CM, IA, IR, RA, SC, SI, and SR. Rev. 5 added PT for PII processing and SR for supply chain.
- Authorization to Operate
- A senior official's time-bound acceptance of residual risk for a system. Alternatives include ATO with conditions, Interim ATO, and Denial of ATO.
- Risk response options
- Accept, Avoid, Transfer, and Mitigate. Monitoring is a continuous cross-cutting activity that supports these choices rather than a fifth response option.
- Privacy Framework Functions
- Five Functions: Identify-P, Govern-P, Control-P, Communicate-P, Protect-P. The framework is voluntary and shares the CSF Core structure of Functions, Categories, and Subcategories.
- Recovery time objective
- The maximum tolerable downtime before impact becomes unacceptable. RTO must be less than or equal to the maximum tolerable downtime minus recovery effort time.
- Recovery point objective
- The maximum tolerable data loss expressed in time. It drives backup frequency and replication design for a system or process.
- SP 800-137 continuous monitoring
- Defines an ISCM program: strategy, program establishment, implementation, analysis and reporting, response, and review. Outputs support ongoing authorization decisions.
- Privacy risk definition
- The likelihood that an operation creates problems for individuals such as embarrassment, discrimination, or loss of autonomy. It is distinct from organizational security risk.
- Security Assessment Report
- Documents assessment scope, methods, findings, and evidence. It supports the authorization decision and is part of the authorization package with the SSP and POA&M.
- Plan of Action and Milestones
- Records weaknesses with planned remediation, resources, milestones, and status. It is reviewed at defined intervals and does not by itself permit unacceptable risk.
- SP 800-171
- Protects controlled unclassified information in nonfederal systems through 110 requirements across 14 families. CMMC Level 2 aligns with these requirements.
- SP 800-61 Rev. 3
- Aligns incident response with CSF 2.0 Functions: Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover. It supersedes the older four-phase incident response lifecycle.
- Incident severity factors
- Functional impact, information impact, and recoverability effort. These three factors drive escalation, notification, and resource allocation decisions.
- C-SCRM per SP 800-161
- Integrates supply chain risk management across the acquisition lifecycle and RMF steps. The SR control family implements it in SP 800-53 Rev. 5.
- Three-tier risk hierarchy
- SP 800-39 defines Tier 1 organization, Tier 2 mission or business process, and Tier 3 information system. Risk decisions flow down and risk information flows up.
- Authorization package contents
- System security plan, security assessment report, plan of action and milestones, and the authorization decision document. The AO signs the decision and defines its term.
- Significant change examples
- New interfaces, changed categorization, new processing location, or changes affecting inherited controls. Each can require reassessment before continued operation.
- Assessment methods
- Examine, Interview, and Test. Each SP 800-53A assessment procedure specifies the objects to examine and the methods to apply for a control.
- Privacy engineering objectives
- NISTIR 8062 defines predictability, manageability, and disassociability. These translate privacy risk into system design goals that engineers can implement.
- Privacy Threshold Analysis
- Determines whether a system processes personally identifiable information and therefore whether a Privacy Impact Assessment is required before operation.
- PII confidentiality impact levels
- SP 800-122 defines Low, Moderate, and High based on identifiability, quantity, sensitivity, context, and access. High requires the strongest safeguards.
- Zero trust components
- SP 800-207 defines the Policy Decision Point, Policy Enforcement Point, Policy Engine, and Policy Administrator. Trust is never implicit based on network location.
- SP 800-160 Vol. 2
- Addresses cyber resiliency: anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to adverse conditions. Design principles include diversity, redundancy, and segmentation.
- Awareness and training lifecycle
- SP 800-50 defines design, develop, implement, and maintain phases. Role-based training is required for personnel with significant security responsibilities.
- NICE Framework
- Defines work roles using task, knowledge, and skill statements. It supports workforce planning, training needs analysis, and competency definition for cybersecurity roles.
- FIPS versus SP 800
- FIPS publications are mandatory federal standards. SP 800-series publications are guidelines that become binding through law, regulation, or contract.
- Residual risk
- The risk remaining after controls are applied. It must be accepted by the authorizing official and documented in the authorization decision.
- FedRAMP authorization
- Requires a third-party assessment organization, system security plan, assessment report, plan of action and milestones, and continuous monitoring. Agencies may reuse authorizations through reciprocity.
- AI RMF Functions
- Govern, Map, Measure, and Manage. The framework is voluntary and intended to be used alongside the CSF and Privacy Framework for AI risk.
- Post-quantum standards
- FIPS 203 ML-KEM, FIPS 204 ML-DSA, and FIPS 205 SLH-DSA were finalized in 2024. Migration planning should begin before deprecation deadlines.
- SP 800-88 sanitization
- Defines Clear, Purge, and Destroy actions for media sanitization before reuse, release, or disposal. Method selection depends on media type and confidentiality level.
- Authenticator assurance levels
- SP 800-63B defines AAL1, AAL2, and AAL3. AAL3 requires hardware-based authenticators and resistance to verifier impersonation.
- FIPS 140-3
- Validates cryptographic modules at security levels 1 through 4. New acquisitions should require modules validated under 140-3 as 140-2 certificates retire.
- Boundary protection SC-7
- Requires monitoring and control of communications at external and internal boundaries. Deny-by-default rules and DMZ architecture are common implementations.
- CVSS score meaning
- Measures technical severity, not organizational risk. Environmental and temporal metrics adjust the base score for context and current threat activity.
- Alternate site types
- Hot sites are fully operational, warm sites partially equipped, and cold sites provide space and power only. Selection depends on recovery time objectives and cost.
- Controlled Unclassified Information
- Governed by 32 CFR Part 2002 and the NARA CUI Registry. Handling requirements come from the applicable category and applicable contracts or laws.
- Policy hierarchy
- Laws and regulations, then organizational policy, then standards, then procedures and guidelines. Each lower level must trace upward to the level above it.
- Mean time to detect
- The average time between the start of an incident and its detection. It is a key security operations metric that should trend downward over time.
- Threat hunting
- A proactive, hypothesis-driven search for threats that evaded existing detection. It differs from alert-driven monitoring and produces new detection rules.
- Assessment versus authorization
- Assessment produces a security assessment report. Authorization produces an authorization decision such as an ATO signed by the authorizing official.
- Resilience design goals
- Anticipate, withstand, recover, and adapt. Design for graceful degradation and ensure recovery objectives are validated through testing.
- Phishing simulation use
- Results should target training and improve reporting, not punish individuals. Punitive programs reduce reporting and increase incident impact.
- C2M2
- A NIST-supported maturity model for cybersecurity capability in energy and other sectors. It assesses program capability across domains rather than individual controls.
- OMB M-22-09
- Directs federal agencies to adopt zero trust architecture with milestones tied to SP 800-207. It emphasizes identity-centric controls and continuous verification.
- Tailoring versus supplementation
- Tailoring removes or scopes baseline controls. Supplementation adds controls from other sources. Both must be documented and justified in the system security plan.
- Compensating controls
- Alternatives that provide equivalent protection when a baseline control cannot be implemented. They require authorizing official approval and documentation.
- System security plan
- Documents control implementation, authorization boundary, environment, and inheritance. It is the primary evidence for assessment and part of the authorization package.
- Risk reporting to leadership
- Reports should use business terms: likelihood, impact, and residual risk against appetite. Dashboards should show trends and exceptions, not raw control counts.
- ATO versus SAR
- An ATO is an authorization decision accepting risk. A SAR is an assessment product documenting findings and evidence. They serve different purposes.