Abandoned Call Backlog During a Regional Power Outage
A consolidated PSAP with 14 call-taking positions and 6 dispatch positions loses commercial power at 02:10. The UPS carries the center for 22 minutes; the generator fails to start due to a fuel solenoid fault. The center transfers to its backup PSAP 40 miles away under a pre-existing backup agreement. During the 9-minute transfer window, 61 9-1-1 calls go unanswered and roll to the backup or to voicemail-like carrier handling. When primary power is restored at 04:40, the center resumes. At 05:00 the center has 47 abandoned 9-1-1 calls in queue with no callback attempt logged. The on-duty supervisor wants to "clear the queue" and move on, arguing the calls were answered by the backup PSAP.
1. Should the 47 abandoned calls be called back? Justify the decision using operational risk, not just policy.
Read the worked answer
Yes - abandoned 9-1-1 calls should be treated as potentially unanswered emergencies until proven otherwise. The supervisor's assumption is unsafe for several reasons:
- Backup coverage is not guaranteed per-call. During a transfer, some calls roll to the backup PSAP, but others may terminate at the carrier or fail entirely. "Answered by backup" cannot be assumed for all 47.
- Abandonment is ambiguous. A caller may have hung up because they were injured, because the situation escalated, or because they reached a human elsewhere. The PSAP cannot know without attempting contact.
- Callback is a recognized best practice in 9-1-1 operations for abandoned wireless and wireline calls, with a documented attempt and disposition.
Operationally: assign a callback team, use a scripted callback that identifies the PSAP and asks whether the caller had an emergency, log every attempt and outcome (reached, no answer, voicemail, wrong number, callback refused), and route any live emergency to dispatch immediately. The queue should be worked, not cleared.
2. What should the after-action review examine about the transfer window itself?
Read the worked answer
The after-action review should separate the power failure from the transfer decision and execution:
- Generator failure - root cause (fuel solenoid), maintenance records, test logs, and why the failure was not caught in periodic load tests.
- UPS runtime vs. actual load - 22 minutes was insufficient given generator unreliability; was the runtime budget based on measured load?
- Transfer trigger and timing - who authorized the transfer, at what point, and whether the 9-minute window was avoidable.
- Call handling during transfer - how calls were routed, whether carrier handling was verified, and whether callers received any informative treatment.
- Staffing and roles - were call takers directed to log abandoned calls, and was there a defined callback procedure?
- Backup PSAP coordination - did the backup have capacity and awareness, and was the handoff documented?
Outputs should be specific corrective actions with owners and dates, not general observations. The review should also verify that the callback gap is closed by procedure, since the same gap will recur in any future outage.