Constitutional Law cheat sheet

Marbury v. Madison (1803): Article III courts may declare an act of Congress unconstitutional; the Constitution is supreme law and the judicial oath binds judges to it.

Article III 'case or controversy' limits federal courts to adversarial litigation; advisory opinions, collusive suits, and feigned disputes are nonjusticiable.

Standing requires injury in fact (concrete and particularized, actual or imminent), causation traceable to the defendant, and redressability by a favorable ruling.

Third-party standing is denied except where the litigant has a close relationship with the rights-holder and the rights-holder is hindered from suing (e.g., doctor asserting patient's abortion rights).

Taxpayer standing generally fails (Flast exception for Establishment Clause spending was narrowed by Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation to direct congressional appropriations).

Ripeness bars review of speculative or premature claims; mootness bars review once the dispute ends, except for capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review and voluntary-cessation cases.

Political questions are nonjusticiable: challenges to foreign affairs recognition, impeachment trial procedures, and partisan gerrymandering (Rucho v. Common Cause, 2019).

Congress may control federal court jurisdiction (exceptions clause, Art. III §2) but cannot reopen final judgments or dictate outcomes in pending cases (Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm; United States v. Klein).

Supreme Court review of state court judgments is limited to federal questions actually decided below (independent and adequate state ground doctrine).

Enumerated powers are exclusive source of federal legislative authority; the Necessary and Proper Clause (McCulloch v. Maryland) permits means reasonably adapted to a legitimate enumerated end.

Commerce Clause reaches (1) channels of interstate commerce, (2) instrumentalities and persons in interstate commerce, and (3) activities substantially affecting interstate commerce (United States v. Lopez; United States v. Morrison).

Wickard v. Filburn aggregation principle permits regulating intrastate activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.

NFIB v. Sebelius (2012): the individual mandate was upheld as a tax, not under the Commerce Clause; Congress cannot compel entry into commerce.

Taxing and Spending Clause: taxes must be for general welfare and produce revenue; spending conditions must serve the general welfare, be unambiguous, relate to the federal interest, and not coerce states (South Dakota v. Dole; NFIB coercion holding).

Congress cannot commandeer state legislatures or executive officials to administer federal programs (New York v. United States; Printz v. United States).

Delegation doctrine permits broad authority to agencies so long as Congress supplies an intelligible principle (Whitman v. American Trucking).

Congressional power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is remedial and congruent/proportionate to judicially identified constitutional violations (City of Boerne v. Flores).

Tenth Amendment reserves to states powers not delegated to the United States nor prohibited to the states; it is a rule of construction, not an independent source of limits (Garcia).

Anti-commandeering: Congress may preempt state law or offer states choices, but may not conscript state legislatures or executives into federal service.

Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court by private parties, including citizens of the forum state and foreign states; it does not bar suits by the United States or by other states.

Ex parte Young permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials for ongoing federal-law violations; it does not permit retroactive monetary relief.

Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment only with unmistakably clear statutory language and congruent/proportionate remedial fit (Kimel; Garrett; Tennessee v. Lane).

Congress may condition federal funds on state waiver of immunity if the condition is unambiguous and related to the spending purpose.

State sovereign immunity bars federal agency adjudications against states (Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority).

Dormant Commerce Clause: state laws discriminating against interstate commerce face strict scrutiny; nondiscriminatory laws are upheld unless burdens clearly exceed local benefits (Pike balancing).

Market participant doctrine exempts state proprietary activity from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.

Article II vests executive power in the President; Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer establishes three tiers of presidential authority: express/implied congressional authorization, silence (twilight zone), and express congressional prohibition.

Appointment Clause: principal officers are appointed by the President with Senate advice and consent; inferior officers may be appointed by the President, department heads, or courts of law (Morrison v. Olson; Lucia v. SEC).

Removal: the President may remove purely executive officers at will (Myers v. United States); Humphrey's Executor permits for-cause removal for officers performing quasi-legislative/quasi-judicial functions; Seila Law v. CFPB (2020) struck a single-director for-cause structure.

Executive privilege protects confidential presidential communications (United States v. Nixon), but yields to a criminal trial need for evidence; it does not shield the President from judicial process.

Presidential immunity from civil damages for official acts (Nixon v. Fitzgerald); absolute immunity from civil suits arising from official acts while in office (Trump v. United States, 2024, for core constitutional acts).

Treaty power requires Senate supermajority ratification; executive agreements require no Senate consent but cannot override inconsistent federal law.

War Powers: President may respond to attacks but sustained hostilities require congressional authorization under the War Powers Resolution.

Bicameralism and presentment define legislative action (INS v. Chadha struck the legislative veto); Congress cannot reserve to itself the power to execute laws.

Selective incorporation: most Bill of Rights provisions apply to states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; the Second, Third, and Seventh Amendment civil jury right are not incorporated (the grand jury indictment right is also not incorporated).

Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before deprivation of life, liberty, or property; Mathews v. Eldridge balancing weighs private interest, risk of error, and government interest.

Substantive due process protects fundamental liberty interests; infringements receive strict scrutiny (compelling interest, narrow tailoring).

Economic and social legislation receives rational basis review (Lochner overruled; Williamson v. Lee Optical).

Vagueness doctrine voids laws failing to give fair notice or inviting arbitrary enforcement; overbreadth permits facial challenges to laws chilling protected speech.

Irrebuttable presumptions and status-based deprivations may violate due process (e.g., Vlandis v. Kline).

The Bill of Rights applies to the federal government directly and to states through incorporation; state constitutional protections may exceed federal floors.

Due process protects against punitive damages awards lacking guidance (State Farm v. Campbell) and excessive fines (Timbs v. Indiana, incorporated 2019).

Suspect classifications (race, national origin, alienage in some contexts) receive strict scrutiny: compelling interest and narrowly tailored means.

Sex and illegitimacy classifications receive intermediate scrutiny: important governmental interest and substantially related means (Craig v. Boren; United States v. Virginia).

Rational basis review applies to age, wealth, disability, and sexual orientation classifications (Romer v. Evans applied rational basis with bite; Obergefell rested on due process and equal protection).

Affirmative action in higher education: Grutter permitted narrowly tailored race-conscious admissions; Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (2023) held race-based admissions policies violate equal protection.

Racial segregation in public schools violates equal protection (Brown v. Board of Education); de jure segregation requires desegregation remedies, de facto does not.

Discriminatory intent is required to establish an equal protection violation; disparate impact alone is insufficient (Washington v. Davis).

Alienage: federal classifications receive rational basis; state classifications receive strict scrutiny unless the alien is a political functionary or the law concerns self-government.

Voting: equal protection requires one person, one vote (Reynolds v. Sims); racial gerrymandering claims require strict scrutiny (Shaw v. Reno).

Pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination for equal protection purposes (Geduldig distinguished; Congress abrogated via PDA).

Content-based restrictions receive strict scrutiny; content-neutral time, place, and manner rules must be narrowly tailored to a significant government interest and leave open ample alternatives (Ward v. Rock Against Racism).

Incitement is unprotected only when directed to producing imminent lawless action and likely to produce it (Brandenburg v. Ohio).

Fighting words, true threats, obscenity (Miller test), and child pornography are unprotected categories; hate speech as such is protected (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul).

Prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional; licensing schemes need narrow, objective standards and prompt judicial review (Freedman v. Maryland).

Public employees' speech is protected when speaking as citizens on matters of public concern (Pickering balancing; Garcetti v. Ceballos limits protection for official-duty speech).

Public forums: traditional public forums (streets, parks) and designated forums receive strict scrutiny; nonpublic forums receive reasonable, viewpoint-neutral rules.

Commercial speech receives intermediate scrutiny (Central Hudson): lawful, nonmisleading speech about lawful activity is protected unless the regulation directly advances a substantial interest and is narrowly tailored.

Expressive conduct is protected if the actor intends to convey a message and a reasonable observer would perceive it (Texas v. Johnson flag burning; O'Brien test for incidental regulation of conduct).

Press: no special reporter's privilege recognized by the Supreme Court (Branzburg v. Hayes); access rights are qualified (Richmond Newspapers).

Lemon v. Kurtzman three-part test (secular purpose, primary effect neither advancing nor inhibiting religion, no excessive entanglement) was abandoned in Kennedy v. Bremerton (2022), which endorsed historical practices and traditions analysis.

Coercion and endorsement tests have been used in school prayer and display cases (Engel v. Vitale; Lee v. Weisman; Van Orden v. Perry; McCreary County).

Government may not compel religious observance or punish religious disbelief; conscientious objector exemptions are permissible accommodations.

Sherbert/Yoder strict scrutiny for free exercise burdens was narrowed by Employment Division v. Smith (1990): neutral, generally applicable laws need not provide religious exemptions.

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and Title VII religious accommodation survive Smith; Congress may grant exemptions broader than the Constitution requires.

Ministerial exception bars employment discrimination suits by ministers against religious employers (Hosanna-Tabor; Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru).

Tax exemptions for religious organizations are permissible (Walz v. Tax Commission); direct cash subsidies raise establishment concerns.

Public funds may reach religious schools through neutral, private-choice programs (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris; Espinoza v. Montana; Carson v. Makin).

Religious displays on public property are assessed for context and history; sectarian displays alone in a courthouse violate the Establishment Clause (County of Allegheny v. ACLU).

Fundamental rights triggering strict scrutiny include marriage (Loving; Obergefell), procreation (Skinner), contraception (Griswold; Eisenstadt), family integrity, voting, interstate travel, and access to courts.

Substantive due process protects personal decisions on marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education (Casey; Lawrence v. Texas for intimate conduct).

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022) overruled Roe and Casey; abortion is no longer a federal constitutional right, and regulation is tested under rational basis.

Privacy rights derive from the Due Process Clause and are limited to personal, intimate decisions; no general right to informational privacy beyond limited contexts (NASA v. Nelson).

The right to refuse unwanted medical treatment exists (Cruzan), but physician-assisted suicide is not a fundamental right (Washington v. Glucksberg).

Travel: the right to travel interstate is fundamental; durational residency requirements for welfare benefits violate equal protection (Saenz v. Roe).

Voting is a fundamental right; poll taxes (Harper) and property qualifications for state elections (Kramer) violate equal protection.

Unenumerated rights must be objectively, deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition and implicit in ordered liberty (Glucksberg; Dobbs reaffirmed this method).

The Contract Clause prohibits states from impairing contract obligations, but reasonable regulation survives under intermediate scrutiny (Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light).

State action is required for Fourteenth Amendment claims; private conduct is generally not actionable unless there is significant state involvement (Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority; Shelley v. Kraemer).

Public function doctrine: private entities performing traditionally exclusive governmental functions (elections, company towns) are state actors (Marsh v. Alabama; Smith v. Allwright).

Entanglement and encouragement tests: state licensing, subsidies, or coercion may convert private conduct into state action; mere approval or acquiescence is insufficient (Blum v. Yaretsky; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn).

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; municipalities are liable only for official policy or custom (Monell v. Department of Social Services).

Bivens implied damages against federal officers for constitutional violations; Ziglar v. Abbasi narrowed Bivens to a limited set of contexts (Fourth and Fifth Amendment cases).

Qualified immunity shields officers unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would know (Harlow v. Fitzgerald).

Sovereign immunity bars damages against states; Ex parte Young permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials.

Section 5 enforcement power is remedial and preventive, not a license to redefine constitutional rights (City of Boerne; Shelby County v. Holder struck the Voting Rights Act coverage formula).

Suit against federal officers for unconstitutional conduct may proceed under the APA or Bivens; the APA does not authorize damages (5 U.S.C. §702).