Federalism, State Sovereignty, and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments
What this domain tests
This domain tests the structural limits that protect states: anti-commandeering, state sovereign immunity, and the line between federal regulation of private conduct and federal direction of state government.
Core rules
- Tenth Amendment: not a free-standing limit on federal power over private conduct, but it bars Congress from commandeering state legislatures or executive officials to implement federal programs.
- New York v. United States and Printz: Congress may not force states to enact a federal regulatory scheme or commandeer state executive officers.
- Spending power alternative: Congress may condition federal funds to induce state cooperation, but conditions must be unambiguous, related, and not coercive.
- Eleventh Amendment: bars private damages suits against states in federal court; it does not bar suits by the United States or by other states.
- Ex parte Young: prospective injunctive relief against state officials is allowed to stop ongoing violations of federal law.
- Congressional abrogation: Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not under Article I commerce power.
Worked example
A federal statute orders state attorneys general to conduct background checks on handgun buyers. Printz invalidates it: the statute commandeers state executive officials. If Congress instead offers funds conditioned on states performing checks, the Spending Clause may permit it, assuming the conditions are clear, related to the federal interest, and not coercive. A private damages suit against the state itself would also face Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Traps
- Anti-commandeering protects state governments, not private parties.
- Eleventh Amendment immunity does not protect municipalities.
- A state may waive immunity or consent to suit.
- Ex parte Young requires ongoing or threatened violation and prospective relief.
- Section 5 abrogation must be congruent and proportional.