XSIAM Analyst cheat sheet
XSIAM Analyst · Keep the key ideas within reach.
Automation with Cortex XSIAM
Playbook types: issue-triggered playbooks run on alerts/incidents; indicator playbooks run on indicators; built-in system playbooks cannot be deleted, only disabled or duplicated for editing.
Playbook task types include: manual task, conditional (else/default path), data collection, script, command, and timer/delay; each task's input must be mapped from parent context or a literal.
War Room is the per-incident execution console: run commands and playbooks manually there, and inspect task inputs/outputs for debugging failed automations.
Automation scripts run in a sandboxed Python environment; the demisto object exposes demisto.args(), demisto.executeCommand(), demisto.getFilePath(), demisto.results(), and demisto.incidents().
Playbook trigger logic: a trigger binds a playbook to a query and object type (e.g., alert), and pre-processing rules can modify fields before playbook evaluation.
Incident/alert field mapping: use the mapper to translate raw alert fields into incident fields; unmapped fields break playbook filters that reference them.
Job scheduling: Jobs run scripts or playbooks on a cron-like schedule (e.g., every 5 minutes) and are the mechanism for recurring enrichment or cleanup tasks.
Loop limits: playbook tasks have a maximum iteration count to prevent infinite loops; exceeding it fails the task and can be surfaced in the War Room.
Automation debugging rule: if a command returns an error, check the task's input mapping first, then the integration instance status, then the command's arguments.
Threat Detection with Cortex XSIAM
XSIAM ingests three primary data classes: endpoint (Cortex XDR agent), network (firewall/proxy logs), and cloud/identity logs; detection depends on normalized XDM fields.
XQL query structure: dataset selection (e.g., xdr_data), pipe-separated stages (filter, fields, sort, limit), and time range specified in the query UI, not in the query body.
XDM normalization maps vendor fields into standard schema fields (e.g., actor_effective_username, action_local_ip); detections referencing XDM fields work across data sources.
BIOC (behavioral indicator of compromise) rules are custom detection logic written in XQL that generate alerts when their condition matches.
Analytics/Correlation rules combine multiple alerts or events over a time window to produce higher-confidence detections and reduce noise.
Alert severity and confidence are separate fields; severity reflects impact, confidence reflects detection certainty, and both can drive routing.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping: detections and alerts carry tactic/technique tags used for coverage gap analysis and reporting.
Detection tuning: exclusion rules and alert suppression reduce false positives; suppression must be scoped by field values to avoid hiding true positives.
Causality chain: XSIAM links alerts into a causal graph so analysts can see the sequence of events leading to an incident rather than isolated alerts.
Threat Response with Cortex XSIAM
Incident lifecycle states include new, under investigation, and closed; closing requires a resolution reason (e.g., true positive, false positive, duplicate).
Response actions on endpoints: isolate, quarantine file, terminate process, and run script - each requires the endpoint to have a live agent connection.
Isolation blocks network traffic except the management channel to the Cortex XSIAM/Cortex XDR tenant, allowing the analyst to keep controlling the host.
Indicator handling: indicators can be manually or automatically blocked (e.g., file hash, IP, domain); blocklists apply to endpoints and can be scoped by policy.
Incident war room actions are logged in an audit trail; each action records the user, timestamp, and target for post-incident review.
Playbook-driven response: a response playbook can auto-isolate an endpoint, block a hash, and assign the incident to an owner based on severity.
Remediation vs containment: containment limits spread (isolate host, block hash); remediation removes the artifact (quarantine file, delete registry key).
Resolution reasons must match the actual outcome; choosing false positive when an action was taken corrupts detection metrics and tuning data.
Role-based access: analyst roles determine who can execute destructive actions (e.g., isolate, quarantine) versus read-only investigation.