ISO/IEC 27034 Lead Application Security Implementer flashcards
ISO/IEC 27034 Lead Application Security Implementer · Build recall with a focused review session.
32 cards. Read the term and the definition here. The deck at the top of this page is optional.
- Organization Normative Framework
- The organization-wide repository of security policies, business context, ASC catalog, baseline levels, roles, and verification criteria from which each application's normative framework is derived.
- Application Normative Framework
- The application-specific framework instantiated from the ONF, recording which ASCs apply to that application, how they are tailored, and the evidence required to verify them.
- Application Security Control
- A reusable control specification with a unique identifier, stated objective, defined verification method, and associated level of trust, catalogued in the ONF and applied via ANFs.
- Target level of trust
- The level of trust stakeholders require for an application, derived from business context such as data sensitivity, exposure, criticality, and regulatory obligations. It sets the success criterion for control implementation.
- Achieved level of trust
- The level of trust actually supported by recorded verification evidence for implemented controls. Comparing it with target level of trust identifies remediation and improvement priorities.
- Application owner accountability
- The application owner is accountable for the application's risk posture and level of trust, including approving target level of trust and formally accepting residual risk that remains after controls.
- Business context determination
- Establishing data sensitivity, user population, exposure, criticality, and legal obligations before control selection, because these factors determine the required target level of trust and control rigor.
- ANF derivation from ONF
- The planning step that filters the ONF control catalog against an application's context, selects applicable ASCs, and records tailoring plus required verification evidence in the application's framework.
- Control tailoring traceability
- Adapting an ASC to an application's technology is permitted, but the tailored control must remain traceable to the ONF ASC objective and verification method so equivalence can be audited.
- Lifecycle verification scheduling
- Assigning owners and timing to verification activities across design, build, test, and operations rather than only at release, since unscheduled verification cannot raise achieved level of trust.
- Threat modeling gap handling
- When threat modeling reveals a threat no existing ASC addresses, the plan must either propose a new ASC to the ONF or record a formal risk acceptance by the application owner.
- Plan baselining
- Version-controlling and baselining the security plan so that later changes to scope, architecture, or target level of trust are detectable and trigger deliberate re-planning.
- Implementation evidence linkage
- Objective, reproducible artifacts such as test results, configuration extracts, and review records must be linked to the specific ASC identifier and ANF version they support.
- Control substitution equivalence
- When a specified ASC cannot be implemented, an alternative control may replace it only if demonstrated equivalence to the original objective and verification method is documented.
- Layered control implementation
- Controls must be implemented and verified across design, code and libraries, configuration, deployment, and operations, because verification at a single layer may not hold for the whole system.
- Enforcement over documentation
- Secure coding and configuration standards are effective only when enforced by build gates, automated policy checks, or review checklists, rather than existing as unreferenced written documents.
- Implementation status states
- Each ASC is tracked as planned, implemented, verified, or accepted risk, enabling achieved level of trust to be computed from recorded states rather than estimated informally.
- Production environment evidence
- Evidence gathered in development or test environments may not demonstrate a control in production, because configuration, data, and network exposure often diverge between environments.
- Incident response phases
- Detection and triage, containment, eradication, recovery, and post-incident review, each with defined entry and exit criteria and assigned owners for the affected application.
- ANF-linked incident triage
- Severity classification uses the affected application, the ASCs implicated, data sensitivity, and current achieved level of trust to determine escalation path and response urgency.
- Containment trade-off record
- Containment choices such as disabling features, revoking credentials, edge virtual patching, or taking the application offline must record the availability versus exposure justification.
- Root cause feedback to ONF
- A recurring incident root cause indicates a defective ASC specification or verification method, so corrective action changes the ONF rather than only fixing the individual application.
- Notification obligation planning
- Regulatory, customer, and partner notification duties are determined by data type and jurisdiction and decided during security planning so response is not improvised under pressure.
- Incident evidence integrity
- Chain of custody, cryptographic hashes, and reliable timestamps preserve incident artifacts so they remain usable in legal, regulatory, and audit proceedings after recovery.
- Verification versus monitoring
- Verification confirms an ASC is implemented as specified at a point in time; monitoring confirms the control keeps operating. Sustained achieved level of trust needs both.
- Verification method types
- Inspection, analysis, demonstration, and testing. The ONF should state which method applies to each ASC and the acceptance criterion that constitutes a pass.
- Independent verification
- Verification performed by parties separate from the implementing team, reducing self-assessment bias and typically expected at higher target levels of trust.
- Configuration drift detection
- Monitoring that compares deployed configuration against the verified baseline. Detected drift reopens the affected ASC and requires re-verification before achieved level of trust is restored.
- Control-objective metrics
- Monitoring metrics expressed against control objectives, such as percentage of ASCs verified or mean time to detect drift, rather than raw activity counts that do not inform trust decisions.
- Verification version linkage
- Verification results carry timestamps and reference the ANF version tested, because evidence produced against a superseded version does not demonstrate the current implementation.
- ONF change propagation
- Revising an ASC in the ONF requires reassessing affected ANFs, re-verifying the revised control, and recording the impact on each application's achieved level of trust.
- Risk acceptance expiry
- A documented risk acceptance needs an owner, rationale, and review or expiry date. Once expired, it reverts to an open gap and reduces the application's achieved level of trust.