Stop-Work Decision on a River Inspection Dive
You are shadowing a three-person dive team conducting a bridge-pier inspection in a tidal river. The dive plan calls for a 28 m/92 ft dive in a 1.5-knot current, with a planned bottom time of 25 minutes. The diver is recently certified to 30 m but has only 12 logged dives, none in current. The standby diver is the tender, who is also running the surface supply panel. There is no written risk assessment or JSA for the day, and the supervisor says 'we do this every month.' The gas supply is a bank of two cylinders with no analysis tag; the dive computer shows a maximum depth of 31 m on the previous dive. The client's representative is on site and asks you not to delay. You must decide whether to allow the dive, what stop-work authority applies, and what corrective actions are required before resuming.
1. Do you have grounds to stop the dive? Justify using risk assessment and competence principles.
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Yes. The planned dive combines a near-limit depth, a strong current, and a diver with only 12 logged dives and no current experience, so the diver's competence does not match the task demand. The standby diver is also the tender and panel operator, which means no dedicated rescue capability if the diver gets into difficulty. There is no written risk assessment or JSA, no gas analysis tag, and the previous dive exceeded the planned maximum depth-evidence that depth control is weak. These are not isolated paperwork gaps; they are uncontrolled hazards with credible severe outcomes. The supervisor's 'we do this every month' is custom and practice, not a control. Stop-work authority applies because the operation lacks the minimum planning, reserve capacity, and competent personnel needed to manage a foreseeable emergency. Document the specific hazards and the fact that no effective controls were in place.
2. What corrective actions and revised plan would you require before authorizing resumption?
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Require a written JSA and dive plan that identify the current, depth, bottom time, gas supply, communications, emergency extraction, and stop conditions. Assign a qualified supervisor and separate the standby diver from the tender/panel role so a rescue can be launched without interrupting gas supply. Confirm the diver's experience and, if necessary, replace the diver with someone current in similar current and depth, or reduce the task to a shallower/less demanding scope. Analyze and tag the breathing gas before use, and verify cylinder contents and pressure. Establish depth and current limits, a dive computer review, and a communications check. Brief the client on the stop-work basis and the resumption conditions. Authorize resumption only after the revised plan is briefed, the roles are staffed, and the gas analysis and equipment checks are documented.
3. How should the inspector address the client's request not to delay and the supervisor's 'we do this every month' justification?
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Address both as pressure to normalize unsafe practice. Tell the client representative that the delay is caused by missing controls for a high-consequence dive, that you cannot accept the risk on the divers' behalf, and that resumption depends on objective conditions, not schedule. Record the client's request, time, and your response. For the supervisor, explain that repetition does not equal risk control: the absence of a JSA, a dedicated standby, gas analysis, and depth discipline are the reasons for the stop, regardless of past practice. Check whether previous monthly dives also lacked these controls; if so, expand the inspection to the operator's management system. Escalate if the client or supervisor attempts to override the stop. The final record should show that the stop was risk-based, communicated, and lifted only after verified corrective action.