PRMIA CCRM flashcards
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31 cards. Read the term and the definition here. The deck at the top of this page is optional.
- Risk identification output
- The documented set of assets, threats, and vulnerabilities with their linkages. It defines scope for later assessment; it does not assign probabilities or monetary values.
- Crown jewel analysis
- Ranking assets by the operational dependency they create, such as identity, backup, or network control systems, rather than by purchase price or data volume alone.
- STRIDE categories
- Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege. Each category points to a specific control family during threat modeling.
- Fourth-party risk
- Concentration risk from vendors of your vendors, such as a shared cloud or CDN provider. Failure is correlated across many contracts, so losses cannot be treated as independent.
- Insider threat indicators
- Behavioral and access signals such as unusual bulk downloads, privilege escalation attempts, access outside role, and activity near resignation dates. Detected by monitoring, not by perimeter controls.
- Loss event taxonomy
- Grouping incidents into confidentiality, integrity, availability, fraud/theft, and legal/regulatory liability. Each category has different frequency and cost drivers, so mixing them distorts estimates.
- OT/ICS convergence risk
- Connecting operational technology to enterprise networks exposes availability-critical industrial control systems to IT-origin threats. Identification must cover legacy protocols lacking authentication or encryption.
- Identification gap test
- A completeness check requiring every asset to map to at least one threat and one loss category. Unmapped assets represent unknown exposure, not zero exposure.
- FAIR risk formula
- Risk equals Loss Event Frequency multiplied by Loss Magnitude. Loss Event Frequency is Threat Event Frequency times Vulnerability, expressed as a probability between zero and one.
- Annualized loss expectancy
- ALE equals single loss expectancy multiplied by annualized rate of occurrence. It expresses expected annual cost of a scenario and supports control cost-benefit comparison.
- Single loss expectancy
- SLE equals asset value multiplied by exposure factor. Exposure factor is the proportion of asset value impaired by one event, not the likelihood of the event.
- Loss magnitude components
- Primary loss covers direct response, replacement, and productivity cost. Secondary loss covers fines, legal defense, customer churn, and reputation damage, often exceeding primary loss.
- Vulnerability in FAIR
- The probability that a threat event becomes a loss event, given existing controls. Effective controls lower vulnerability and therefore lower loss event frequency.
- Monte Carlo P95
- The loss value not exceeded in 95 percent of simulated years. Used to size capital reserves and insurance limits, because the mean hides the heavy right tail.
- Risk appetite versus tolerance
- Appetite is the broad willingness to accept risk; tolerance is the quantified limit at a stated confidence, such as annual loss at the 95th percentile below a set amount.
- 5x5 risk matrix limits
- Produces ordinal scores from 1 to 25. Scores cannot be averaged, summed, or compared arithmetically across risks; use them only for ranking and escalation thresholds.
- Correlated risk aggregation
- Combining loss distributions rather than summing individual annualized losses. Simple summation assumes independence and understates aggregate exposure when common causes exist.
- Threat event frequency
- How often a threat actor attempts or a natural event occurs against an asset in a period. Estimated from internal incident counts, external loss data, or expert elicitation.
- Control effectiveness mapping
- Preventive controls reduce loss event frequency; detective and corrective controls reduce loss magnitude by shortening event duration and limiting scope.
- Scenario calibration rule
- Use internal incident data when at least five to ten events per year exist. Below that, combine external loss data with documented expert ranges and state confidence.
- Loss exceedance curve
- A plot of probability that annual loss exceeds a given amount. It communicates risk appetite breaches and tail exposure to executives more clearly than single-point estimates.
- Risk treatment options
- Mitigate, transfer, avoid, and accept. Each accepted residual risk requires a named owner, a threshold, and a scheduled review date.
- Control cost-benefit rule
- A control is justified when the reduction in annualized loss expectancy exceeds its total lifecycle cost, including implementation, licensing, staffing, and maintenance.
- Cyber insurance limit sizing
- Set the limit near the 95th to 99th percentile annual aggregate loss. Verify sublimits for extortion, dependent business interruption, and regulatory defense costs.
- RTO versus RPO
- Recovery time objective is maximum tolerable downtime; recovery point objective is maximum tolerable data loss. RPO drives backup frequency; RTO drives recovery architecture.
- Incident response sequence
- Detect, contain, eradicate, recover, then post-incident review. Containment precedes eradication, and validated recovery testing precedes return to full production.
- Key risk indicators
- Quantitative forward-looking metrics with thresholds, such as patch latency, MFA coverage, privileged account count, and backup restore pass rate. They signal rising exposure before losses occur.
- Risk register contents
- Risk identifier, scenario description, inherent score, controls, residual score, owner, treatment plan, key risk indicator, and review date. It is the audit trail for treatment decisions.
- Board-level cyber reporting
- Expressing cyber risk in financial and operational terms, such as loss exceedance curves and tolerance breaches, rather than counts of technical controls or vulnerabilities.
- Notification clock obligations
- Contractual and regulatory deadlines for reporting breaches to regulators, customers, and partners. They constrain containment speed and must be pre-mapped in the response plan.
- Residual risk acceptance
- Formal decision to retain risk after treatment, recorded with owner, quantified level, rationale, and expiry. Undocumented acceptance is a governance failure, not a treatment choice.