ABSA CBSP cheat sheet

Risk assessment = hazard identification + likelihood of exposure + consequence severity; document agent, dose, route, host, and procedure.

Risk groups (RG1–RG4) classify agents by individual and community risk; containment level is assigned by the risk assessment, not by RG alone.

Risk group is an agent property; biosafety level is a facility/practice combination - the two are related but not identical.

Principal routes of exposure: inhalation (aerosols), percutaneous (needlesticks, cuts), mucous membrane splash, ingestion, and animal bite/scratch.

Procedures that generate aerosols (centrifugation, vortexing, sonication, pipetting, loop flaming) raise risk independent of agent volume.

Risk = f(agent hazard, procedure, host susceptibility, concentration, volume); immunosuppression, pregnancy, and age modify host susceptibility.

Risk assessment is repeated whenever agents, procedures, equipment, personnel, or facility conditions change, and at defined intervals.

Risk management = hierarchy of controls: elimination/substitution, engineering controls, administrative controls, then PPE as last line.

Biorisk management integrates biosafety (unintentional exposure) and biosecurity (intentional misuse, theft, diversion) into one framework.

BSL-1: open bench, sink, door; BSL-2: BSC for aerosol-generating work, autoclave access, eyewash, self-closing doors recommended.

BSL-3: controlled access, directional negative airflow, HEPA-filtered exhaust, double-door entry, sealed surfaces; BSL-4: positive-pressure suits or Class III BSC, dedicated air/liquid waste decontamination.

Primary containment protects personnel and immediate environment (BSC, sealed rotor, PPE); secondary containment protects the outside environment (facility, HVAC, waste treatment).

Biological safety cabinets: Class I = inward airflow, no product protection; Class II = personnel + product + environment; Class III = gas-tight, glove-port, maximum containment.

Class II Type A2 recirculates ~70% air to room and exhausts ~30% via HEPA; Type B2 is hard-ducted, 100% exhaust, for volatile chemicals/radionuclides.

BSC airflow verification: face velocity typically ~0.38–0.51 m/s (75–100 fpm); certify at installation, after moves/repairs, and at least annually.

Directional airflow in BSL-3 is from clean corridors toward contaminated spaces; pressure differentials monitored and alarmed.

HEPA filters remove ≥99.97% of particles ≥0.3 µm; used on exhaust, supply, and BSC discharge.

Autoclave and effluent decontamination are engineering controls for waste and liquid effluents; validated with biological indicators.

Standard precautions apply to all blood, body fluids, and potentially infectious material regardless of known diagnosis.

Hand hygiene is the single most effective routine control; wash with soap and water after contact and before leaving; alcohol rub when hands not visibly soiled.

Work practices: minimize aerosol generation, keep BSC sash at correct height, avoid rapid movements, work from clean to dirty within the cabinet.

Sharps: do not recap, bend, or break needles; place in puncture-resistant sharps containers at point of use; never overfill.

Spill response: alert, evacuate if aerosol, allow settling, don PPE, cover with absorbent, apply appropriate disinfectant with contact time, then clean and decontaminate.

Administrative controls include SOPs, training records, medical surveillance, vaccination offers, incident reporting, and access restriction.

Centrifuge safety: use sealed safety cups/rotors, inspect O-rings, balance loads, and wait ≥30 minutes (or per SOP) before opening after a spill to allow aerosols to settle.

Transport of infectious substances: UN2814 (Category A, human/animal) and UN3373 (Category B); triple packaging with absorbent, primary, secondary, and rigid outer.

Biosafety manual and SOPs must be reviewed and updated; personnel trained before work and retrained on changes.

PPE selection is based on risk assessment: agent, route of exposure, procedure; PPE is the last line of defense after engineering and administrative controls.

Gloves: nitrile or latex; double-glove for high-risk work; change when contaminated or torn; never wear gloves outside the lab or touch shared surfaces.

Respiratory protection: N95/P2 filtering facepiece for particulates; powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR) or supplied air for higher risk; fit testing required.

Eye/face protection: goggles or full-face shield for splash risk; safety glasses alone do not seal against splashes.

Gowns/lab coats: fluid-resistant for splash risk; remove before leaving lab; never launder at home; dedicated footwear or shoe covers in high-containment areas.

Donning/doffing order: don in clean-to-dirty sequence; doff gloves last and perform hand hygiene after; contaminated PPE removed at the point of exit.

Medical surveillance: baseline and periodic health evaluation, vaccination (e.g., HBV), and exposure follow-up; post-exposure prophylaxis per protocol.

Needlestick/splash: wash, report immediately, identify source, and initiate PEP evaluation per institutional protocol.

PPE must be compatible with the task; BSC work with gloves and gown; suit-based BSL-4 uses positive-pressure suits with dedicated air supply.

Sterilization kills all microorganisms including spores; disinfection reduces but may not eliminate; decontamination renders an item safe to handle.

Spaulding classification: critical (enters sterile tissue/vasculature) requires sterilization; semicritical (mucous membrane contact) requires high-level disinfection; noncritical requires low-level disinfection.

High-level disinfectants: glutaraldehyde, ortho-phthalaldehyde, hydrogen peroxide; low-level: quaternary ammonium, phenolics, chlorine.

Chlorine: ~0.5–1% (5,000–10,000 ppm) for blood/large spills; ~10% (5,000 ppm) for general surface disinfection; prepare fresh, check concentration, respect contact time.

Contact time and concentration determine efficacy; organic matter (blood, protein) inactivates many disinfectants - clean before disinfecting.

70% ethanol/isopropanol is effective; higher concentrations evaporate too quickly and are less effective; alcohols are not sporicidal.

Autoclave parameters: typically 121°C at ~15 psi for 15–30 min (gravity) or 134°C for shorter cycles; validated with biological indicators (Geobacillus stearothermophilus).

Biological indicators (spores) and chemical indicators are used to monitor sterilization; physical parameters (temperature, pressure, time) logged each cycle.

UV light is a surface/air adjunct only; it has poor penetration and requires direct line of sight; not a primary sterilant.

Waste segregation at the point of generation: sharps, infectious/biohazardous, pathological, chemical, and general waste kept separate.

Infectious waste includes cultures, contaminated materials, blood-soaked items, and sharps; treated by autoclaving, incineration, or approved alternative before disposal.

Sharps go in puncture-resistant, leak-proof, labeled containers; never compact, recap, or place in regular trash.

Liquid waste is decontaminated (chemical or thermal) before drain disposal; validated per SOP and local regulations.

Autoclave efficacy for waste verified with biological indicators and load configuration; bags should be labeled and not overfilled.

Waste tracking: manifest/chain-of-custody for transport; records retained per regulation; waste handlers trained and vaccinated.

Regulatory frameworks: local/national rules (e.g., EPA, state, or ministry of health) plus transport rules (DOT/UN) govern packaging and movement.

Pathological and animal waste may require incineration; chemical and radiological waste segregated and handled under separate programs.

Minimize waste generation by substitution and proper segregation; misclassification increases cost and risk.

Key frameworks: WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual (4th ed., risk-group/containment-based), CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL), and national regulations.

Select agents/toxins are governed by lists (e.g., U.S. Federal Select Agent Program, 42 CFR 73, 9 CFR 121, 7 CFR 331) with registration, security, and inventory requirements.

Dual-use research of concern (DURC) policies apply to certain experiments with high-consequence agents; requires review and oversight.

Transport: UN Model Regulations, IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations, and national rules; Category A = UN2814, Category B = UN3373.

Occupational safety: OSHA Bloodborne Pathogens Standard (29 CFR 1910.1030) requires exposure control plan, training, HBV vaccination offer, and PPE.

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) reviews recombinant DNA and certain high-risk work; Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) oversees animal work.

Biosafety officer (BSO) role: program oversight, risk assessment support, incident investigation, training, and regulatory liaison.

Guidelines are advisory; regulations are enforceable; institutional policy may be stricter than either.

Recordkeeping: training, incidents, equipment certification, and waste manifests retained per applicable retention schedules.

A biosafety program includes: risk assessment, SOPs, training, medical surveillance, PPE, engineering control certification, waste management, incident reporting, and audit.

Biosafety officer and committee structure: BSO implements, IBC/committee reviews and approves; roles and responsibilities documented.

Training must be role-specific, documented, and competency-based; retraining at defined intervals and after procedure/agent changes.

Competency verification includes observation, written assessment, and demonstrated technique (e.g., BSC work, spill response).

Incident/near-miss reporting system with root-cause analysis and corrective actions; lessons learned fed back into training.

Audits and inspections: scheduled self-inspections, equipment certification records, and corrective action tracking.

Emergency preparedness: spill kits, eyewash/showers, fire/extraction plans, and drills; contact lists posted.

Personnel health: medical surveillance, vaccination, exposure follow-up, and restricted work for immunocompromised staff per assessment.

Program metrics: training completion, incident rates, audit findings closure, and equipment certification currency.