ATP Pilot common mistakes
ATP Pilot · Understand the traps and how to avoid them.
On takeoff and landing performance charts, the candidate enters the full reported wind velocity (e.g., 24015KT) into the headwind column instead of the along-runway component, then accepts the resulting shorter distance as valid.
The chart has a single wind axis and candidates default to the number in the METAR rather than decomposing it; they also skip the runway-slope and contamination corrections because those rows are less familiar.
What to do instead
Force a written decomposition step on every performance calculation: runway heading, wind direction, crosswind/headwind components, then slope, then surface condition. Recompute with a second method (AFM table vs. calculator) and reject any result that differs by more than a few percent.
The candidate runs the before-takeoff flow and checklist from memory while taxiing or talking, and never physically verifies flight controls free and correct, trim set, or that the fuel selector and transponder are in the briefed positions.
Repetition breeds complacency; the flow becomes a recitation of switch names rather than a tactile check, and heads-down taxiing removes the visual cross-check that would catch a missed item.
What to do instead
Treat the before-takeoff checklist as a do-list, not a challenge-response ritual: stop the aircraft, touch each control through its full range, and verbally confirm the trim indicator. Any interruption resets the checklist to the top.
No departure brief is given before takeoff. After an engine failure at 400 ft AGL the candidate turns back toward the departure runway, away from the pre-briefed open area, and loses the terrain/obstacle picture.
Candidates treat the departure brief as paperwork for IFR flights only, and under startle the instinct is to return to the runway environment regardless of altitude or performance.
What to do instead
Brief every departure aloud, VFR or IFR: initial heading, engine-out turn direction, minimum turnback altitude, obstacles, and the alternate action if below that altitude. State the numbers before advancing power.
During stall recovery the candidate relaxes back pressure at the break but then pulls aft again within a second or two while still at high angle of attack, producing a secondary stall and a much larger altitude loss.
The startle response and the ingrained 'don't lose altitude' instinct cause an immediate re-pull before the wing has actually unstalled and airspeed has recovered.
What to do instead
Train the sequence to a cadence: reduce AOA positively, add power, roll wings level, and hold altitude loss only after the buffet stops. Brief a minimum airspeed and buffet-free confirmation before any aft input is allowed.
The candidate crosses the approach gate at 1,000 ft IMC with airspeed 25 kt fast, a sink rate over 1,000 fpm, and not on the extended centerline, and continues the approach rather than calling the go-around.
Commitment bias and schedule pressure make a go-around feel like a failure; the deviation is rationalized as 'it'll settle down by minimums.'
What to do instead
Pre-brief the stability criteria and the exact callout ('gate - go around') before the approach begins, and rehearse it so the decision is made by the numbers, not by feel. Treat any criterion bust as an automatic go-around with no discussion.
The candidate performs the after-start and taxi checklists by reciting them from memory without looking at the items, and misses a configuration item such as flaps or trim that the checklist would have caught.
Familiarity with the aircraft leads to running the checklist as a memory test; distraction during taxi then removes the cross-check entirely.
What to do instead
Use do-verify for critical configuration items: point at the indicator and read the value aloud. If the flow is interrupted for any reason, restart it at the last confirmed item.
In a rapid depressurization scenario the candidate reaches for the QRH and begins reading the checklist before donning the oxygen mask and establishing an emergency descent.
Candidates are trained to 'use the checklist' and default to it under stress, forgetting that at altitude the time of useful consciousness may be under 30 seconds and the checklist cannot be read first.
What to do instead
Drill the memory items to automaticity: masks on, establish communications, emergency descent, then the checklist. Practice with a timed start from a surprise call to mask-on and descent initiation.
After an engine failure just after liftoff the candidate immediately initiates a 180-degree turn back to the runway at low altitude, without considering the turn radius, bank angle required, or obstacle clearance in the turn.
The runway behind looks like the only safe surface, and candidates underestimate how much altitude and radius a 180 consumes at low speed and high bank.
What to do instead
Pre-compute and brief the turnback altitude and bank angle for the actual weight and density altitude, and practice the maneuver at altitude. Below the briefed altitude, commit to the pre-briefed off-airport landing area instead.
At high-altitude cruise the candidate manages the airplane by indicated airspeed alone, holding a KIAS that was appropriate at lower altitudes, and enters low-speed buffet without recognizing that the IAS/Mach crossover point has been crossed.
Candidates learn stall and maneuvering speeds in KIAS and do not convert to Mach/TAS; at high altitude the same KIAS sits far closer to the low-speed buffet boundary and the margin shrinks with weight.
What to do instead
Build the climb and cruise profile around Mach above the crossover altitude, and brief both the high- and low-speed buffet margins for the actual weight. Cross-check KIAS against Mach at each level-off and treat any buffet as an immediate reduction in AOA.
After shutdown the candidate leaves the aircraft without writing up a squawk observed in flight (a slow gear retraction or a flickering caution light) and leaves the master switch or fuel selector in a non-standard position.
End-of-flight fatigue and the assumption that 'the next crew will find it' lead to skipped write-ups; the securing flow is done quickly and without reference to the checklist.
What to do instead
Make the discrepancy write-up part of the shutdown flow, before leaving the seat, with specific symptoms and conditions noted. Complete the securing checklist as a do-list, physically confirming master, avionics, fuel selectors, and control lock.