VCE Philosophy cheat sheet

Metaphysics asks what exists and what things are fundamentally like; epistemology asks what knowledge is, its sources, and its limits.

A deductive argument aims to guarantee its conclusion: if the premises are true, the conclusion cannot be false. Validity concerns form; soundness requires validity plus actually true premises.

An inductive argument makes the conclusion probable rather than certain; it is assessed as strong or weak, and cogent when strong with true premises.

A counterexample to validity is a possible situation in which all premises are true and the conclusion false; one counterexample is enough to refute validity.

Descartes' dreaming argument: since dream experiences can be indistinguishable from waking ones, sensory evidence cannot rule out that one is dreaming, so sensory beliefs are not certain.

Descartes' evil demon hypothesis extends doubt to mathematics and logic; the cogito ('I think, therefore I am') survives because doubting itself presupposes a thinker.

Empiricism holds that significant knowledge derives from sense experience; rationalism holds that reason alone can yield substantive knowledge, e.g. of innate ideas or necessary truths.

The problem of induction (Hume): no deductive justification exists for inferring future regularities from past ones, since the uniformity of nature cannot itself be established without circularity.

A necessary truth cannot be false in any possible world (e.g. all bachelors are unmarried); a contingent truth is true but could have been false.

Substance dualism (Descartes): mind and body are distinct substances; the mind is essentially thinking and non-extended, the body essentially extended and non-thinking.

The interaction problem for dualism: if mind and body are radically different kinds of substance, no account is given of how non-physical events cause physical ones.

Physicalism/materialism holds that mental states are identical with, or wholly realised by, physical states of the brain; it must explain consciousness without residue.

Logical behaviourism analyses mental terms as dispositions to behave; it struggles with occurrent thoughts and with the possibility of a perfectly disguised inner state.

Functionalism identifies mental states by their causal role between inputs, other states and outputs, allowing the same state to be realised in different physical substrates.

Identity theory claims mental state types are identical to brain state types; multiple realisability (the same mental state in different brains or machines) is a standard objection.

Chalmers' philosophical zombie thought experiment: a physically identical being with no inner experience seems conceivable, which is used to argue that physical facts do not entail facts about consciousness.

Personal identity: psychological continuity accounts (Locke's memory criterion, Parfit's connectedness) contrast with bodily and brain-continuity accounts; fission cases test intuitions about what matters in survival.

Hard determinism: every event, including choice, is causally determined, and determinism is incompatible with free will, so free will is an illusion.

Libertarianism (free will) holds that at least some choices are free and undetermined; it must explain how an undetermined choice is still attributable to the agent rather than random.

Compatibilism holds that free will is compatible with determinism, defining freedom as acting on one's own desires without external constraint, not as exemption from causation.

The consequence argument: if determinism is true, our acts are consequences of laws and past events beyond our control, so our acts are not up to us.

Kant's categorical imperative: act only on maxims you could will as universal law, and treat humanity always as an end, never merely as a means.

Utilitarianism (Mill) judges actions by their tendency to maximise overall happiness; act and rule versions differ over whether rules or individual acts are assessed.

Aristotelian virtue ethics locates right action in what a person of practical wisdom would do, with virtues as stable character traits lying between vices of excess and deficiency.

Metaethics distinguishes moral realism (mind-independent moral truths) from anti-realism, including error theory and expressivism, which deny that moral claims describe objective facts.

Hume's is-ought gap: descriptive premises about what is the case cannot by themselves entail prescriptive conclusions about what ought to be done.

Hobbes' state of nature: without a common power, equality of ability plus scarcity of goods yields a war of all against all; the social contract trades liberty for security.

Locke's natural rights include life, liberty and property; government is a trust that may be legitimately overthrown when it violates those rights.

Rousseau's general will aims at the common good; the tension is that citizens may be 'forced to be free' when they resist it.

Rawls' veil of ignorance and two principles: equal basic liberties first, then inequalities permitted only if they benefit the worst off (difference principle) under fair equality of opportunity.

Nozick's entitlement theory: holdings are just if acquired justly, transferred justly, or rectified; patterned redistribution violates the separateness of persons.

Mill's harm principle: the only justified ground for coercing an adult is preventing harm to others; self-regarding conduct and offence as such fall outside it.

Negative liberty is absence of interference; positive liberty is the capacity to be one's own master, which critics warn can justify paternalist coercion.

Distributive justice criteria include equality, need, desert and entitlement; each answers a different question about what is to be distributed and why.

Metaphysics asks what exists and what things are fundamentally like; epistemology asks what knowledge is, its sources, and its limits.

A deductive argument aims to guarantee its conclusion: if the premises are true, the conclusion cannot be false. Validity concerns form; soundness requires validity plus actually true premises.

An inductive argument makes the conclusion probable rather than certain; it is assessed as strong or weak, and cogent when strong with true premises.

A counterexample to validity is a possible situation in which all premises are true and the conclusion false; one counterexample is enough to refute validity.

Descartes' dreaming argument: since dream experiences can be indistinguishable from waking ones, sensory evidence cannot rule out that one is dreaming, so sensory beliefs are not certain.

Descartes' evil demon hypothesis extends doubt to mathematics and logic; the cogito ('I think, therefore I am') survives because doubting itself presupposes a thinker.

Empiricism holds that significant knowledge derives from sense experience; rationalism holds that reason alone can yield substantive knowledge, e.g. of innate ideas or necessary truths.

The problem of induction (Hume): no deductive justification exists for inferring future regularities from past ones, since the uniformity of nature cannot itself be established without circularity.

A necessary truth cannot be false in any possible world (e.g. all bachelors are unmarried); a contingent truth is true but could have been false.

Substance dualism (Descartes): mind and body are distinct substances; the mind is essentially thinking and non-extended, the body essentially extended and non-thinking.

The interaction problem for dualism: if mind and body are radically different kinds of substance, no account is given of how non-physical events cause physical ones.

Physicalism/materialism holds that mental states are identical with, or wholly realised by, physical states of the brain; it must explain consciousness without residue.

Logical behaviourism analyses mental terms as dispositions to behave; it struggles with occurrent thoughts and with the possibility of a perfectly disguised inner state.

Functionalism identifies mental states by their causal role between inputs, other states and outputs, allowing the same state to be realised in different physical substrates.

Identity theory claims mental state types are identical to brain state types; multiple realisability (the same mental state in different brains or machines) is a standard objection.

Chalmers' philosophical zombie thought experiment: a physically identical being with no inner experience seems conceivable, which is used to argue that physical facts do not entail facts about consciousness.

Personal identity: psychological continuity accounts (Locke's memory criterion, Parfit's connectedness) contrast with bodily and brain-continuity accounts; fission cases test intuitions about what matters in survival.

Hard determinism: every event, including choice, is causally determined, and determinism is incompatible with free will, so free will is an illusion.

Libertarianism (free will) holds that at least some choices are free and undetermined; it must explain how an undetermined choice is still attributable to the agent rather than random.

Compatibilism holds that free will is compatible with determinism, defining freedom as acting on one's own desires without external constraint, not as exemption from causation.

The consequence argument: if determinism is true, our acts are consequences of laws and past events beyond our control, so our acts are not up to us.

Kant's categorical imperative: act only on maxims you could will as universal law, and treat humanity always as an end, never merely as a means.

Utilitarianism (Mill) judges actions by their tendency to maximise overall happiness; act and rule versions differ over whether rules or individual acts are assessed.

Aristotelian virtue ethics locates right action in what a person of practical wisdom would do, with virtues as stable character traits lying between vices of excess and deficiency.

Metaethics distinguishes moral realism (mind-independent moral truths) from anti-realism, including error theory and expressivism, which deny that moral claims describe objective facts.

Hume's is-ought gap: descriptive premises about what is the case cannot by themselves entail prescriptive conclusions about what ought to be done.

Hobbes' state of nature: without a common power, equality of ability plus scarcity of goods yields a war of all against all; the social contract trades liberty for security.

Locke's natural rights include life, liberty and property; government is a trust that may be legitimately overthrown when it violates those rights.

Rousseau's general will aims at the common good; the tension is that citizens may be 'forced to be free' when they resist it.

Rawls' veil of ignorance and two principles: equal basic liberties first, then inequalities permitted only if they benefit the worst off (difference principle) under fair equality of opportunity.

Nozick's entitlement theory: holdings are just if acquired justly, transferred justly, or rectified; patterned redistribution violates the separateness of persons.

Mill's harm principle: the only justified ground for coercing an adult is preventing harm to others; self-regarding conduct and offence as such fall outside it.

Negative liberty is absence of interference; positive liberty is the capacity to be one's own master, which critics warn can justify paternalist coercion.

Distributive justice criteria include equality, need, desert and entitlement; each answers a different question about what is to be distributed and why.