VCE Philosophy flashcards

33 cards. Read the term and the definition here. The deck at the top of this page is optional.

Validity

A property of deductive form: an argument is valid when it is impossible for all its premises to be true while its conclusion is false. Validity says nothing about whether premises are actually true.

Soundness

An argument is sound when it is valid and all its premises are actually true. Soundness therefore guarantees the truth of the conclusion, while validity alone does not.

Inductive strength

An inductive argument is strong when true premises would make the conclusion highly probable, and weak when they lend it little support. Strength comes in degrees, unlike deductive validity.

Cogent argument

A strong inductive argument whose premises are all true. Cogency is the inductive analogue of soundness and still does not guarantee the conclusion, only makes it probable.

Counterexample to validity

A described possible situation in which every premise of an argument is true and the conclusion is false. Finding one such case proves the argument's form invalid.

Cartesian doubt

Descartes' method of withholding assent from anything that could possibly be false. Because senses sometimes deceive and dreams mimic waking life, sensory beliefs are provisional.

Cogito ergo sum

Descartes' claim that the act of doubting proves a doubter exists. Even an evil demon deceiving him presupposes a thinking subject who is being deceived.

Problem of induction

Hume's point that past regularities cannot deductively justify predictions about the future, since any premise asserting nature is uniform itself relies on induction.

Substance dualism

The view that mind and body are two distinct kinds of substance: mind is essentially thinking and unextended, body essentially extended and non-thinking.

Interaction problem

The objection that dualism cannot explain how an immaterial mind causally affects a physical body, since no mechanism connects substances with no properties in common.

Logical behaviourism

The view that statements about mental states mean statements about behavioural dispositions. It is criticised for ignoring inner experiences and hidden, suppressed mental states.

Identity theory

The physicalist claim that mental states are identical with brain states. Multiple realisability, the same mental state in different physical systems, is a standard objection.

Functionalism

The view that a mental state is defined by its causal role among inputs, other states and outputs, so it could be realised in brains, silicon or other substrates.

Philosophical zombies

Imagined beings physically identical to humans but lacking conscious experience. If conceivable, this is used to argue that physical facts do not entail facts about consciousness.

Locke's memory criterion

Locke holds personal identity consists in continuity of consciousness, especially memory, so a person extends as far back as they can remember their past experiences.

Qualia

The introspectively accessible qualitative features of experience, such as the felt redness of red. Physicalist accounts must explain how such features fit the physical world.

Hard determinism

The view that determinism is true and incompatible with free will, so no one acts freely and moral responsibility rests on an illusion.

Libertarian free will

The view that some human choices are genuinely free and not fully determined by prior causes. It must explain how undetermined choices remain the agent's own.

Compatibilism

The view that free will is compatible with determinism. Freedom is identified with acting on one's own desires without coercion, not with exemption from causal laws.

Consequence argument

If determinism is true, our actions follow from past events and laws that were never up to us; therefore our present actions are not up to us either.

Categorical imperative

Kant's unconditional moral law: act only on maxims you could will as universal law, and treat humanity always as an end, never merely as a means.

Act utilitarianism

The view that each individual action is right when it maximises overall happiness or welfare, assessed case by case without appeal to fixed rules.

Rule utilitarianism

The view that actions are right when they conform to rules whose general acceptance maximises overall welfare, rather than when each act is assessed separately.

Virtue ethics

An approach locating right action in what a person of practical wisdom would do, with virtues as stable character traits between vices of excess and deficiency.

Is-ought gap

Hume's claim that purely descriptive premises about what is the case cannot by themselves entail prescriptive conclusions about what ought to be done.

State of nature

A thought experiment describing human life without political authority. Hobbes pictures a war of all against all; Locke pictures natural rights and imperfect enforcement.

Social contract

The idea that political authority is justified by an agreement among people to surrender some freedom in exchange for security, order or protection of rights.

Veil of ignorance

Rawls' device for fair choice: principles of justice are selected without knowing one's talents, wealth, sex or conception of the good, so bias is excluded.

Difference principle

Rawls' rule that social and economic inequalities are just only if they benefit the least advantaged members of society, alongside fair equality of opportunity.

Entitlement theory

Nozick's account: a holding is just if originally acquired justly, justly transferred, or rectified after injustice. It rejects patterned redistribution as violating individual rights.

Harm principle

Mill's rule that the only justified reason to coerce an adult against their will is to prevent harm to others; self-regarding conduct and mere offence are insufficient.

Negative liberty

Freedom as the absence of interference by others. On this account a person is free to the extent that no one prevents or coerces their action.

Positive liberty

Freedom as self-mastery or the real capacity to pursue one's goals. Critics warn it can license paternalism by defining a person's 'true' interests for them.