BCS Written Philosophy common mistakes
BCS Written Philosophy · Understand the traps and how to avoid them.
Answering an essay question by narrating a philosopher's biography and the chronology of his works instead of reconstructing the argument asked about, so that the essay reads as a timeline rather than an analysis.
Candidates revise from survey histories and lecture timelines, so dates and life events are the most rehearsed material and surface first under time pressure; the question's operative verb ('assess', 'compare', 'explain why') is skimmed rather than parsed.
What to do instead
Before writing, underline the operative verb and the object of the question, then draft a one-sentence thesis that answers it directly. Allocate at most two sentences to context and spend the body on premises, inferences, and objections. Check at the end that every paragraph advances the thesis rather than the chronology.
Presenting a philosopher's position as a bare list of slogans ('the Forms', 'the categorical imperative', 'the veil of ignorance') without stating the argument that is supposed to establish it or the problem it was designed to solve.
Summary notes compress positions into labels, and labels are easier to recall than multi-step arguments; candidates mistake recognition of terminology for understanding of the reasoning.
What to do instead
For each major position, rehearse a three-part template: the problem it addresses, the argument in numbered premises, and the conclusion. In the exam, write the argument out explicitly and only then use the label as shorthand. If you cannot reconstruct the premises, you do not yet know the position well enough to score on it.
Treating 'compare and contrast' questions as two separate summaries placed side by side, with no statement of where the two views actually conflict, what they share, or which considerations favour each.
Revision is organised philosopher by philosopher, so the essay is reproduced in the same order; candidates lack practice in identifying the precise point of disagreement.
What to do instead
Structure comparison essays around axes of disagreement rather than around authors: state the question, then for each axis give A's answer, B's answer, and the reason they diverge. Reserve a section for shared assumptions, since examiners reward spotting common ground as well as conflict.
Defining a metaphysical term such as 'substance', 'property', 'essence', or 'possible world' by example only, then arguing as if a single contested reading were the only one, so objections land against a position the candidate never actually held.
Introductory texts use paradigm examples, and candidates carry the example without the theoretical commitments it encodes; ambiguity in the term is never noticed.
What to do instead
At the start of any metaphysics answer, give a one-line stipulative definition and flag the main rival readings. Then show that your argument survives, or is explicitly restricted to, the reading you chose. Naming the ambiguity earns credit even when you cannot resolve it.
Asserting that a belief is knowledge because it is true and sincerely held, or that it is justified because the believer feels certain, without engaging the Gettier-style gap between justification, truth, and knowledge.
Everyday usage conflates confidence with warrant, and candidates have not internalised the standard counterexamples that separate the conditions.
What to do instead
Use the tripartite analysis explicitly as a checklist and then test it against a luck case you construct yourself. State which condition fails and why. Where you invoke justification, specify the kind (evidential, reliabilist, coherentist) rather than leaving it as a placeholder.
Using formal notation decoratively: writing a syllogism or a truth table that is not needed, mislabelling a valid argument as sound, or confusing necessary with sufficient conditions in the surrounding prose.
Candidates learn symbols late and under pressure, and the notation is deployed to signal competence rather than to do work; validity and soundness are memorised as a pair without the distinction being applied.
What to do instead
Only formalise when it clarifies the inference, and always state in words what the formalisation shows. Drill the validity/soundness distinction and necessary/sufficient condition pairs until you can state each in one sentence with an example. Check every 'if' and 'only if' in your own prose.
Committing a fallacy while diagnosing fallacies: labelling an opponent's argument 'a straw man' or 'question-begging' without showing the specific defect, or attacking the arguer's motives rather than the argument in a critical-reasoning answer.
Fallacy names are learned as vocabulary and applied by pattern-matching on surface features; the discipline of reconstructing the argument charitably first is skipped.
What to do instead
Always reconstruct the target argument in its strongest form before criticising it, then name the defect only if you can point to the exact step that fails. If you cannot locate the failing step, describe the problem without the label. Avoid ad hominem framing even when evaluating a weak argument.
Answering an applied ethics question with a verdict and a list of intuitions, without stating the normative theory being applied, deriving the verdict from it, or considering the strongest opposing case.
Moral convictions feel self-evident, so candidates argue from gut reaction and treat theory as decoration; the requirement to argue against oneself is uncomfortable and unpractised.
What to do instead
Use a fixed structure: state the theory, derive the verdict in explicit steps, present the strongest objection, and respond. Where intuitions conflict with the theory, discuss the conflict rather than suppressing it. Acknowledging a counterexample to your own framework scores higher than ignoring it.
Confusing description with prescription in political philosophy: inferring what ought to be from claims about human nature or historical development, or treating a thought experiment about an ideal society as a direct recommendation for present institutions.
Political theories are often presented through narratives of origins or ideal conditions, and the normative step from premise to principle is left implicit in the source material.
What to do instead
Mark every premise as descriptive or normative and check that at least one normative premise supports any normative conclusion. When using an ideal-theory device, state explicitly what it is meant to model and what it abstracts away, then say what follows for non-ideal conditions.
Sliding between mental and physical vocabulary in philosophy of mind, language, or science: explaining a mental state by naming a brain state without saying whether identity, causation, or correlation is claimed, or using 'meaning' and 'reference' interchangeably.
These debates turn on distinctions that are invisible in ordinary speech, and candidates absorb conclusions from popular summaries without the terminological discipline that makes the conclusions defensible.
What to do instead
Before arguing, fix your terms: state whether you claim identity, supervenience, causation, or mere correlation, and keep to it. In language questions, separate sense from reference and use the terms consistently. In philosophy of science, distinguish explanation, prediction, and confirmation whenever you invoke a theory.