Philosophy of Mind, Language, and Science
What to master
This domain spans three connected fields. Philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem, dualism versus physicalism, behaviourism, identity theory, functionalism, and the hard problem of consciousness; also intentionality and the Chinese room argument. Philosophy of language: sense and reference, definite descriptions, speech acts, and the distinction between semantics and pragmatics; know Frege, Russell, and the causal theory of reference. Philosophy of science: demarcation and falsifiability, the hypothetico-deductive method, Kuhn's paradigms and normal science, underdetermination, realism versus anti-realism, and the problem of induction. Candidates should connect them: mental content depends on language and representation, and scientific theories are linguistic structures.
Traps to expect
Functionalism is not behaviourism: it identifies mental states by causal role, not by observable behaviour. Falsifiability is a criterion of demarcation, not of meaning or truth. Kuhn is often misread as claiming science is irrational; he describes paradigm shifts, not the absence of standards. Sense and reference are not the same as connotation and denotation in every context. Underdetermination does not entail that all theories are equal.
Worked example
Asked whether a thermostat has beliefs, a functionalist may allow that it has states playing a belief-like role, while a biological naturalist denies it lacks the right substrate. Rule of thumb: state the criterion a theory uses for mentality, then apply it to the case.