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Self-Funded Health Plan Under a 6% Cap: GLP-1 Spend, Stop-Loss Renewal, and a Union Contract

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Self-Funded Health Plan Under a 6% Cap: GLP-1 Spend, Stop-Loss Renewal, and a Union Contract

Halden Logistics self-funds medical and pharmacy for 4,200 employees and 2,600 dependents. Paid claims in 2025 were $38.5M, trend is 9.8%, and the CFO has capped the 2026 increase at 6%. The plan carries specific stop-loss at a $350K deductible, and the carrier has proposed a 12% renewal increase. Three claimants above $1M account for $8.5M, or 22% of total claims. GLP-1 spending reached $2.1M, up from $600K in 2023, driven by 214 utilizers; the PBM contract guarantees 92% rebate pass-through but explicitly excludes GLP-1s from that guarantee. The plan design is a $1,500 deductible PPO with $30 copays and no spousal carve-out. Thirty percent of the population is unionized under a collective bargaining agreement that fixes plan design through 2027. The broker has proposed raising the deductible to $2,500, carving pharmacy out to a pass-through PBM, adding GLP-1 prior authorization with step therapy, adding a $150 monthly working-spouse surcharge, and moving facility claims to reference-based pricing.

1. Decompose the cost drivers and separate what is controllable from what is not. What is the right basis for measuring whether the plan is hitting the 6% cap?

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Separating the drivers

The $38.5M gross figure overstates what the plan actually bears. With three claimants above $1M and specific stop-loss at $350K, recoveries on those three alone approximate $8.5M minus three times $350K, or about $7.45M, before counting any other claimant above the attachment point. Net cost of risk is therefore far below gross claims, which means the CFO's 6% cap should be applied to net cost, not to gross claims. Setting the target on gross claims will either force unnecessary plan cuts or produce a phantom "saving."

Not controllable through plan design: the three catastrophic claimants, the timing of new high-cost diagnoses, and large-claim volatility generally. These are managed through case management, centers of excellence, and stop-loss structure, not through deductibles.

Controllable: GLP-1 utilization and eligibility criteria, rebate economics and PBM contract terms, site of service, spousal and dependent eligibility, and formulary placement. GLP-1 at $2.1M is roughly $8,000 per utilizer per year and grew roughly 250% in two years; even at only about 5% of total claims it is clearly the trend driver, and the rebate exclusion means the plan is absorbing the gross cost in a way general pharmacy spend does not.

Measurement basis

Use three-year normalized claims with a credibility adjustment rather than a single year, and report on a PMPM basis for the ongoing population plus a separately funded large-claim pool. Set the 2026 budget on net cost after stop-loss recoveries, with a stated volatility reserve. Also model a bad year: if the three catastrophic claimants run again, gross claims rise regardless of design, and the CFO needs to know that in advance.

First conclusion

Roughly a third of the 6% gap is addressable through pharmacy and vendor levers, a third through utilization management, and the remainder may simply need to be funded. Say that early.

2. Build a package that hits the 6% cap. For each lever, quantify the estimated impact, state the constraint, and explain what you would not do.

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Package

Lever Est. annual impact Constraint
Carve pharmacy out to a pass-through PBM with 100% rebate pass-through and a GLP-1 rebate guarantee $700K–$1.1M Contract transition lead time; verify the guarantee against actual GLP-1 volume, not general pharmacy
GLP-1 prior authorization with step therapy and indication-based criteria $450K–$600K Formulary changes generally require notice but not bargaining; check CBA drug language
Site-of-service steerage to ambulatory surgery centers with a waiver of cost-sharing differentials $200K–$300K Provider network disruption; member education required
Dependent eligibility audit plus working-spouse surcharge for non-union population only $330K combined Applying it only to non-union staff creates an equity problem; consider bargaining it in 2027
Stop-loss re-marketing at a higher specific deductible to reduce premium $250K–$350K Increases retained risk; requires a reserve, not a savings

Combined realistic midpoint is roughly $2.1M–$2.6M against a gap of about $2.3M on a net basis.

What I would not do

  • Raise the deductible to $2,500. The CBA freezes plan design for 30% of the population through 2027, so it cannot be applied consistently; it shifts rather than reduces cost; and a $1,500 deductible is already competitive in a logistics labor market where hourly recruiting is hard. If cost-sharing must move, use coinsurance on a narrow service category, not the deductible floor.
  • Reference-based pricing without wrapping it. Balance billing exposure and provider litigation risk are real, and it conflicts with the surprise-billing protections members already expect. If pursued, pair it with a member advocacy vendor and a balance-billing hold-harmless.
  • Cutting GLP-1 coverage outright. Abrupt termination drives members to alternative high-cost care and creates adherence problems for diabetes patients.

Compliance and relationships

Any change to the union group requires bargaining; do not implement on the non-union group first and announce it, because that is how a mid-term bargaining demand gets filed. Any material reduction in benefits requires a summary of material modifications and plan amendment. Confirm ACA preventive coverage and out-of-pocket maximum limits before touching cost-sharing, and run a mental health parity analysis on any new prior authorization that touches behavioral health.

3. Assess the risk of the reference-based pricing and GLP-1 levers specifically, and define the metrics and governance you would put in place.

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Reference-based pricing

The savings estimate is real but so is the tail risk. Providers have litigated against plans that pay a multiple of Medicare without adequate member protection, and members can receive balance bills that damage the employer's reputation in a tight labor market. It also interacts badly with federal surprise-billing protections if not structurally aligned. Conditions for proceeding: a written balance-billing protection for members, an advocacy vendor reachable before payment is due, a defined exception process, and a provider relations plan for the top facilities in each market. If those four cannot be funded inside the savings, do not proceed.

GLP-1 management

The trap is optimizing for the rebate rather than for net cost. The current contract already excludes GLP-1s from the rebate guarantee, which means the plan may be paying near-list for drugs that generate large rebates elsewhere in the market; the carve-out negotiation matters more than the prior authorization. Second risk: overly blunt criteria push diabetic members off therapy, and the downstream cost of uncontrolled diabetes exceeds the drug cost. Criteria should differentiate indication, not just drug class. Third: utilization is 214 people and growing; without a defined eligibility and renewal-review process, spend continues on the current trajectory.

Metrics

  • PMPM and trend on a net-of-stop-loss basis, reported quarterly with a rolling four-quarter view.
  • Large-claim variance against the budgeted pool; stop-loss laser exposure by named claimant.
  • GLP-1: utilizers, adherence, discontinuation rate, average cost per utilizer, and gross versus net spend after rebates.
  • Pharmacy: rebate yield as a percentage of eligible spend, and a specific check on the excluded categories.
  • Site of service mix, avoidable emergency visits, and preventive screening completion, which is the leading indicator that cost-sharing changes are backfiring.
  • Dependent eligibility and spousal surcharge uptake, with an attrition read on the hourly population.

Governance

A quarterly benefits committee that reviews claims and trend with the broker and consultant, minutes documenting the fiduciary rationale for each design decision, a formal RFP cycle for PBM and stop-loss every three years, and a reserve policy for large claims that prevents a single bad year from forcing emergency plan cuts.