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Halcyon Components: Inventory Policy, a Wage Step, and a Padded Budget

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Halcyon Components: Inventory Policy, a Wage Step, and a Padded Budget

Halcyon Components budgets quarterly. Sales forecast: Q1 24,000 units, Q2 30,000, Q3 36,000. Stated policy is ending finished goods equal to 20% of next quarter's sales; 1 January inventory is 4,800 units, consistent with that policy. The plant manager wants the target raised to 30% "to protect service levels," noting Q2 sales missed forecast in two of the last three years. Each unit requires 0.5 direct labor hours. A new labor contract raises the wage from $22.00 to $23.50 effective 1 April. Inventory carrying cost is $4.50 per unit per quarter, and inventory build is financed on a $500,000 revolver at 8%. The plant manager's bonus is based on meeting the quarterly production budget.

1. Prepare the Q1 production budget under both the 20% and 30% policies. Quantify the difference and its carrying-cost consequence.

Read the worked answer

Production = Sales + Required ending FG − Beginning FG.

20% policy

  • 24,000 + (0.20 × 30,000 = 6,000) − 4,800 = 25,200 units

30% policy

  • 24,000 + (0.30 × 30,000 = 9,000) − 4,800 = 28,200 units

Difference: 3,000 additional units produced in Q1 with no additional sales.

Consequences:

  • Ending Q1 inventory rises from 6,000 to 9,000 units; the 3,000 units carry $4.50 × 3,000 = $13,500 per quarter in holding cost.
  • At, say, $40 of variable cost per unit, the build absorbs roughly $120,000 of cash that must be financed at 8% - about $2,400 per quarter of interest - and the inventory is not sold until Q2 at the earliest.
  • Under absorption costing, those 3,000 units push fixed overhead into inventory, so reported Q1 profit rises even though nothing has been sold. That is exactly the number the plant manager is rewarded on.

2. Using the existing 20% policy, prepare the Q2 direct labor budget (units, hours, dollars) and explain why the wage-rate change must be applied by period rather than to the annual total.

Read the worked answer

Q2 production = 30,000 + (0.20 × 36,000 = 7,200) − (0.20 × 30,000 = 6,000) = 31,200 units

Direct labor hours = 31,200 × 0.5 = 15,600 hours

Direct labor dollars = 15,600 × $23.50 = $366,600

Why period-by-period matters:

  • Q1 hours are still paid at $22.00; only hours worked on/after 1 April bear $23.50. Using a blended annual rate (e.g., $22.75) would misstate both quarters even if the annual total looked right - and it would hide the fact that Q2's labor cost per unit rose 6.8%.
  • The rate change also invalidates any standard cost set before the contract: the Q2 labor efficiency variance would be contaminated by a rate change unless the standard is updated, and a favorable efficiency variance could mask an unfavorable rate variance.
  • For the full-year flexed budget, the correct approach is to price each quarter's hours at the rate in force, then compare to actuals quarter by quarter.

(Under the 30% proposal, Q2 production would be 30,000 + 10,800 − 9,000 = 31,800 units, or 15,900 hours × $23.50 = $373,650 - $7,050 more labor for inventory that is not yet sold.)

3. Evaluate the plant manager's 30% proposal and his incentive. What should the budget committee do, and what measurement changes would reduce the gaming risk?

Read the worked answer

The proposal is not unreasonable on its face, but the motive and the metric are.

Legitimate support for 30%: Q2 sales have missed forecast twice in three years, and a stockout costs lost margin and possibly the customer. That is a real service-level argument and should be tested against actual fill rates and lead times.

Reasons to resist as presented:

  1. The incremental 3,000 units in Q1 are pure build - no forecast sales increase. Cost is $13,500 per quarter in carrying cost plus financing, with obsolescence risk.
  2. The manager's bonus is tied to meeting the production budget. Raising the inventory target mechanically raises the production budget, making the target easier to hit and inflating absorption-costing profit. He is proposing a change to the very measure he is paid on - a textbook budget-slack / dysfunctional-incentive conflict.
  3. If sales do miss, the 30% policy converts a stockout risk into an inventory write-down risk, and the write-down lands in a later period.

What the committee should do:

  • Approve nothing until the stockout claim is supported with fill-rate data, lost-order logs, and customer lead-time requirements; a safety stock based on demand variability (not a flat 30%) is the better design.
  • Cap the change so it does not create build in a quarter with no supporting demand.

Measurement fixes:

  • Base part of the bonus on gross margin and inventory turns or days-on-hand, not units produced.
  • Add a fill-rate/on-time-delivery target so service is rewarded without rewarding excess.
  • Budget inventory in dollars and reconcile production to sales forecasts; require the sales and operations plan to be signed off jointly by sales and operations.