A broad endpoint exception hides the actual match
A fictional organization removes standing administrator rights from a pilot group of laptops. One approved business application stops working after an endpoint policy change. The supplied event identifies a blocked child process in a user-writable temporary directory, but the parent application has a valid publisher signature. A helpdesk proposal would allow and elevate every executable under that temporary path for all users. The administrator has not verified whether the intended endpoints received the same policy revision or whether the child process is part of the approved workflow. The exercise permits written review of supplied events only. It asks for a narrow investigation and controlled exception design rather than a live policy update, a promise that every signed file is harmless or a universal precedence rule.
1. What evidence should be checked before granting an exception?
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Confirm the actual user/device scope, agent and policy revision, matched rule, child process identity, directory write permissions and approved business behavior. A signed parent does not authorize every child executable.
2. Why is the broad temporary-path elevation proposal risky?
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A user-writable location may accept unrelated binaries, so the exception can grant unintended execution and privilege. Evaluate narrowly justified criteria, representative tests, owner/expiry and a recovery plan under actual authority.