Castilla-La Mancha PAU History of Philosophy (Historia de la Filosofía - UCLM 2026) flashcards
Castilla-La Mancha PAU History of Philosophy (Historia de la Filosofía - UCLM 2026) · Build recall with a focused review session.
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- Idea (Plato)
- An eternal, immaterial model or form that exists independently of particular things and gives them their intelligibility; sensible objects are imperfect copies that participate in it.
- Participation (méthexis)
- The relation by which a sensible thing derives its being and character from an intelligible Form without being identical to it; it explains unity in multiplicity in Plato's middle dialogues.
- Allegory of the Cave
- Plato's image in Republic VII of prisoners mistaking shadows for reality; it stages the ascent from opinion to knowledge and the philosopher's duty to return and educate others.
- Doxa and episteme
- Plato's distinction between opinion, which concerns changing sensible things and may be true or false, and knowledge, which is justified, stable grasp of what truly is.
- Demiurge
- In Plato's Timaeus, the rational craftsman who orders pre-existing chaotic material by looking to the Forms, producing the best possible sensible cosmos without creating matter from nothing.
- Hylomorphism
- Aristotle's doctrine that every natural substance is a compound of matter (hyle) and form (morphe); form makes the thing what it is, matter is what undergoes change.
- Four causes
- Aristotle's four ways of answering 'why': material (what it is made of), efficient (what produced it), formal (its defining structure) and final (the end or purpose it serves).
- Potentiality and actuality
- Aristotle's pair for explaining change: a capacity to become something (dynamis) and the realized state it reaches (energeia); change is the passage from the former to the latter.
- Substance (ousia)
- For Aristotle, the primary bearer of properties, a concrete composite of matter and form; for later Scholastics, an entity subsisting in itself rather than inhering in another.
- Transcendentals
- Medieval terms convertible with being as such, classically unity, truth, goodness and beauty; they add nothing to being but express it under different aspects of intelligibility.
- Analogy of being
- Aquinas's claim that words like 'wise' apply to God and creatures neither univocally nor equivocally but proportionally, since creaturely perfections resemble their cause without capturing it.
- Five Ways
- Aquinas's five a posteriori arguments in the Summa theologiae for God's existence, moving from motion, causation, contingency, degrees of perfection and the order of nature to a first principle.
- Natural theology
- Knowledge of God attainable by unaided reason from created effects, as distinct from revealed theology, which depends on faith and scripture; central to Aquinas's synthesis of Aristotle and Christianity.
- Illumination (Augustine)
- Augustine's account of how the mind grasps eternal truths: God, the intelligible light, enables the soul to see necessary truths that it cannot derive from changing sensible experience alone.
- Interiority
- Augustine's turn inward in the Confessions: truth is sought not in external things but within the soul, where memory, understanding and will disclose the self and its relation to God.
- Methodological doubt
- Descartes's strategy of suspending assent to anything that admits the slightest doubt, including the senses and mathematics, in order to find an indubitable foundation for knowledge.
- Cogito
- Descartes's first certainty: even while doubting everything, the doubter cannot doubt that he is thinking and therefore exists as a thinking thing.
- Evil demon
- Descartes's hyperbolic hypothesis of a supremely powerful deceiver that could falsify even mathematical judgments, used to push doubt to its extreme before the cogito.
- Clear and distinct ideas
- Descartes's criterion of truth: a perception is clear when present and vivid to an attentive mind, and distinct when sharply separated from everything else.
- Res cogitans
- The thinking thing that Descartes identifies with himself and with the mind; its essence is thought, and it is really distinct from the extended body.
- Substance dualism
- The view that mind and body are two really distinct kinds of substance, defined respectively by thought and extension, which nevertheless interact in the human being.
- Innate ideas
- Ideas that the mind possesses by its own nature rather than deriving from experience, such as the idea of God, of substance, and for Descartes the cogito itself.
- Occasionalism
- The doctrine, associated with Malebranche, that created things have no causal power of their own and that God is the sole true cause on the occasion of each apparent interaction.
- Tabula rasa
- The empiricist image of the mind as a blank slate at birth, so that all its contents come from experience through sensation and reflection rather than from innate stock.
- Impressions and ideas
- Hume's division of perceptions into lively, immediate impressions and fainter copies or ideas derived from them; the distinction grounds his test for the meaningfulness of terms.
- Association of ideas
- Hume's three principles by which the imagination links perceptions: resemblance, contiguity in space and time, and cause and effect; they explain belief and the coherence of mental life.
- Causality (Hume)
- Hume's analysis of the causal relation as constant conjunction plus a customary transition of the mind; we never perceive a necessary connection, only a felt expectation.
- Induction
- Inference from observed regularities to unobserved cases; Hume argues it cannot be justified by reason or experience without circularity, since it presupposes the uniformity of nature.
- Copernican turn
- Kant's metaphor for his claim that objects must conform to the conditions of our cognition rather than the reverse, so that we know appearances as structured by the subject.
- Synthetic a priori
- A judgment that amplifies knowledge yet is known independently of experience; Kant holds that mathematics and the principles of natural science are of this kind, and asks how they are possible.