Ghana School of Law PLC: Law of Torts (GLC) cheat sheet

Tort law's core aims: compensation of the injured (restitution to the status quo ante), deterrence of careless or intentional wrongdoing, loss distribution (especially through liability insurance and vicarious liability), and vindication of rights; punishment is incidental, not a primary aim, unlike criminal law.

Tort vs crime: a crime is a wrong against the state, prosecuted by the state, with punishment (fine, imprisonment) as the outcome; a tort is a civil wrong against an individual, sued by the claimant, with damages or an injunction as the outcome. The same act may be both (e.g. battery and assault).

Tort vs contract: contractual duties are voluntarily assumed between the parties and generally strict; tortious duties are imposed by law on strangers and usually fault-based. Privity of contract limits contractual claims, whereas tort duties extend to those foreseeably affected (Donoghue v Stevenson).

Concurrent liability in contract and tort arises where a professional's breach of an implied contractual term also breaches a tortious duty of care; the claimant may choose the more advantageous route, subject to limits such as the rule against recovering pure economic loss in tort for defective buildings.

Tort protects a catalogue of interests: bodily integrity and liberty (trespass to the person), reputation (defamation), land and its enjoyment (trespass, nuisance), goods (trespass to goods, conversion, detinue), and economic interests (negligence, deceit, passing off).

Ghanaian tort law is largely common-law based, received through the Courts Act 1993 (Act 459) and earlier ordinances, and developed by the Ghanaian courts; statutes such as the Limitation Act 1972 (NRCD 54) and the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act 1958 (No. 42) modify the common-law position.

The fault principle dominates: liability generally requires intentional or negligent conduct, with strict liability confined to defined pockets (Rylands v Fletcher, liability for dangerous animals, statutory strict liability).

Functions and criticisms: tort may be a poor compensation system because of cost, delay, and the need to prove fault; alternative schemes (industrial injury compensation, motor insurance, no-fault schemes) perform part of the compensation function.

The standard of proof in tort is the balance of probabilities, and the claimant must prove the elements of the tort on that standard; res ipsa loquitur may shift the evidential burden where the cause of harm lies within the defendant's exclusive control.

Negligence requires three elements: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the claimant, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) damage that is causally linked to the breach and not too remote. Duty is a question of law; breach and causation are questions of fact.

Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 established the neighbour principle: a manufacturer owes a duty to the ultimate consumer of a sealed product, and generally one must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions reasonably foreseeable as likely to injure one's 'neighbour'.

Lord Atkin's neighbour test: persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when directing my mind to the acts or omissions called in question.

Anns v Merton LBC [1978] AC 728 introduced a prima facie duty based on proximity plus a policy-based two-stage test; it was overruled in Murphy v Brentwood DC [1991] 1 AC 398, which also confirmed that pure economic loss from defective premises is not recoverable in negligence.

Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 sets the current three-stage test: (1) foreseeability of damage, (2) proximity between the parties, and (3) whether it is fair, just, and reasonable to impose a duty (policy). The test is not mechanical; all three limbs must be satisfied.

The Caparo test is used principally for novel situations; established categories (road users, doctors and patients, manufacturers and consumers, employers and employees) already carry a duty, so Caparo is not re-applied in every case.

Policy factors that may negate a duty: fear of opening the floodgates, protecting the adversarial system (advocates' immunity, witnesses), preserving the proper allocation of public resources, and avoiding indeterminate liability to an unlimited class.

Pure economic loss is generally irrecoverable in negligence unless it results from a negligent statement or the assumption of responsibility (Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] AC 465), and even then the class of claimants must be limited and known.

Duty in special contexts: the police owe no general duty to protect individual members of the public from criminal harm (Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53); rescuers are owed a duty; and the 'unforeseeable claimant' is outside the duty entirely (Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co., 248 NY 339 (1928)).

Breach is judged by the standard of the reasonable person in the defendant's position: the defendant must take the care that a reasonable person would take in the circumstances. The standard is objective, not tailored to the defendant's own capacities.

Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 11 Exch 781: negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable person, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something a prudent and reasonable person would not do.

The 'calculus of risk' (per Lord Reid in Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No. 1)) [1961] AC 388 and earlier cases) weighs: (a) the probability of harm, (b) the seriousness of the potential injury, (c) the cost and practicability of precautions, and (d) the social utility or purpose of the activity.

Probability: the greater the risk, the greater the precautions required; a small risk of very serious harm may still require precautions (Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951] AC 367 - one-eyed worker and goggles).

Cost and practicality: a defendant is not required to take precautions that are grossly disproportionate to the risk (Latimer v AEC Ltd [1953] AC 643 - flooding from a factory floor after a storm; no duty to close the factory).

Special standards: children are judged by the standard of a reasonable child of the same age (Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304); professionals are judged by the standard of the ordinary skilled member of their profession (Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582); learners are held to the standard of a qualified person.

Bolam and Bolitho: a professional is not negligent if they acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of professional opinion, unless that opinion is not capable of withstanding logical analysis (Bolitho v City and Hackney HA [1998] AC 232).

Proof of breach: the claimant bears the burden. Res ipsa loquitur ('the thing speaks for itself') applies where the cause of the accident was under the defendant's control and the accident would not normally happen without negligence (Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co. (1865) 3 H & C 596); it raises a presumption, not a reverse burden.

The 'reasonable person' standard may be adjusted for the circumstances (emergency, sudden danger) but not for the defendant's poverty or lack of resources; the standard remains objective even where the defendant is a public body.

Factual causation is tested by the 'but for' test: but for the defendant's breach, would the claimant's damage have occurred? If the damage would have occurred anyway, the breach is not a cause in fact (Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428).

Where multiple causes are possible, the claimant must show that the defendant's breach was a material contribution to the harm; where the harm is indivisible and multiple defendants are each negligent, the burden may shift (Cook v Lewis [1951] SCR 830; Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2002] UKHL 22 for mesothelioma).

Material contribution to risk applies where the harm is cumulative and indivisible, such as industrial disease; material contribution to damage applies where the harm is divisible and can be apportioned (Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613; Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd [2000] 3 All ER 421).

Legal causation: novus actus interveniens (a new intervening act) breaks the chain of causation; the test is whether the intervening act was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence or an independent, voluntary act of a third party or the claimant.

Medical negligence after an injury does not automatically break the chain; the original tortfeasor remains liable if the medical treatment was reasonably foreseeable and not grossly negligent (R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App R 152 is the exceptional case).

Remoteness: the Wagon Mound (No. 1) [1961] AC 388 replaced the direct-consequences test of Re Polemis [1921] 3 KB 560 with a test of reasonable foreseeability of the kind of damage suffered.

Under Wagon Mound, a defendant is liable only for damage of a kind that a reasonable person would have foreseen, even if the extent or manner of the damage is greater than foreseen; the 'eggshell skull' rule applies to the extent of personal injury.

The Wagon Mound (No. 2) [1967] 1 AC 617 confirmed that foreseeability of the risk is the test, and that where the risk is small and the cost of eliminating it disproportionate, the defendant may not be negligent, but if the risk is foreseeable the defendant is liable for the damage caused.

Damage must be of a recognised kind: personal injury, property damage, and consequential economic loss are recoverable; pure economic loss and psychiatric illness are recoverable only within recognised categories, and psychiatric illness generally requires a recognised psychiatric condition (not mere grief or distress).

Contributory negligence: the claimant's own failure to take reasonable care for their safety contributes to the damage. Under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (and equivalent Ghanaian provisions), damages are reduced to the extent the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility.

The test for contributory negligence is objective: did the claimant fail to take the care a reasonable person would take for their own safety? The claimant's age, knowledge, and circumstances are relevant (Gough v Thorne [1966] 1 WLR 1387 - a child is not expected to exercise adult care).

Contributory negligence is a partial defence, not a complete one; it does not defeat the claim but reduces the award. Apportionment is a matter of judgment, and appellate courts are slow to interfere.

Volenti non fit injuria (voluntary assumption of risk) is a complete defence: the claimant knowingly and voluntarily consented to the risk of the defendant's negligence. It requires knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk and a free and informed consent to it.

Volenti is difficult to establish in employment (Smith v Baker & Sons [1891] AC 325 - mere knowledge of danger does not imply consent) and in rescue cases (Baker v T.E. Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966 - rescuer not volens unless the rescue was unreasonable).

Consent to medical treatment is not volenti where the patient is not informed of the risks; the doctor's duty is to disclose material risks (Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432; Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871).

Illegality (ex turpi causa non oritur actio): a claimant cannot recover for damage caused by their own criminal or seriously immoral conduct where to allow recovery would be an affront to the public conscience (Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341; Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 - a trio of considerations: the purpose of the prohibition, other relevant public policies, and proportionality).

Defences to negligence also include: inevitable accident (no breach), act of God, statutory authority, and limitation (generally three years for personal injury and six years for other torts under the Limitation Act 1972 (NRCD 54) in Ghana, subject to the provisions on disability and latent damage).

Illegality and contributory negligence can overlap: a claimant injured while committing a crime may be met with both defences; the court examines the causal link between the illegal conduct and the injury.

An occupier is a person with a sufficient degree of control over premises (not necessarily the owner or the legal tenant); there may be more than one occupier, and each owes the duty in respect of their own area of control (Wheat v E. Lacon & Co. Ltd [1966] AC 552).

The Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 (England) governs lawful visitors: the occupier owes the 'common duty of care' to take such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the purposes for which they are invited or permitted to be there.

The 1957 Act distinguishes visitors from trespassers; visitors include invitees, licensees, and those entering under a contract or by legal right (e.g. police executing a warrant). The duty extends to the state of the premises and to things done or omitted on them.

Occupiers may discharge the duty by giving warnings, but a warning does not absolve the occupier where it is insufficient in the circumstances; the warning must be enough to enable the visitor to be reasonably safe (Roles v Nathan [1963] 1 WLR 1117 - chimney sweeps warned of the risk).

Independent contractors: the occupier is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor if it was reasonable to entrust the work to them and the occupier took reasonable steps to satisfy themselves that the contractor was competent (Haseldine v C.A. Daw & Son Ltd [1941] 2 KB 343).

Trespassers: under the Occupiers' Liability Act 1984 (England), the occupier owes a duty only if (a) they are aware of the danger or have reasonable grounds to believe it exists, (b) they know or have reasonable grounds to believe the trespasser is in or may come into the vicinity of the danger, and (c) the risk is one against which, in all the circumstances, they may reasonably be expected to offer some protection.

The 1984 Act duty is a lesser duty than the 1957 Act duty; the occupier may discharge it by taking reasonable steps to warn of the danger and discourage entry (British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877 was the precursor, establishing a duty of common humanity).

Child trespassers: the occupier must consider whether the danger is one that would attract a child, and whether warnings would be understood; the 'allurement' principle (things tempting children) is relevant (Glasgow Corporation v Taylor [1922] 1 AC 44 - poisonous berries).

Ghana: the common-law duties of occupiers apply, with the distinction between invitees, licensees, and trespassers; the Occupiers' Liability Acts 1957 and 1984 are English statutes and are not automatically part of Ghanaian law, so the common-law rules (including Herrington) govern where not locally enacted.

An employer owes a personal, non-delegable duty to provide competent staff, adequate plant and equipment, a safe place of work, and a safe system of work (Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co. Ltd v English [1938] AC 57). This duty is owed to each employee individually and cannot be escaped by delegating it to an independent contractor.

The employer's personal duty is not strict: the employer must take reasonable care, and the standard is that of a reasonable and prudent employer taking positive steps for the safety of employees in light of what they know or ought to know (Stokes v Guest, Keen & Nettlefold (Bolts and Nuts) Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 1776).

Vicarious liability: an employer is liable for the torts of an employee committed in the course of employment, even without fault. The three elements are: (1) a tort by the employee, (2) an employment relationship (not independent contractor), and (3) the tort committed in the course of employment.

Distinguishing employee from independent contractor: the control test, the integration/organisation test, and the multiple test (Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions [1968] 2 QB 497 - control, provision of own equipment, and other terms). Labels are not decisive.

'Course of employment': the employee must be doing the employer's work, or something reasonably incidental to it. A 'frolic of his own' is outside the course of employment (Joel v Morison (1834) 6 C & P 501); authorised acts done in an unauthorised or negligent manner remain within the course of employment (Century Insurance Co. Ltd v Northern Ireland Road Transport Board [1942] AC 509).

The 'close connection' test extends vicarious liability to intentional wrongdoing where the employee's conduct is so closely connected with their employment that it would be fair and just to hold the employer liable (Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22 - warden's sexual abuse of boys in his care).

The close connection test has been applied to police officers (Attorney General of the British Virgin Islands v Hartwell [2004] UKPC 12) and to a bank's employee who disclosed confidential information (Bernard v Attorney General of Jamaica [2004] UKPC 47).

The employer may have a right of indemnity against the employee for the employee's tort, but in practice this is rarely enforced; the employer's liability is usually covered by insurance.

Ghana: the employer's common-law duty of care and vicarious liability apply; the Labour Act 2003 (Act 651) and the Workmen's Compensation Act 1987 (PNDCL 187) provide statutory compensation for workplace injuries, which may overlap with common-law claims.

Trespass to the person protects bodily integrity and liberty; it is actionable per se, without proof of actual damage. The three torts are assault, battery, and false imprisonment, and each requires intentional (or possibly reckless) conduct, not mere negligence.

Assault: an intentional act by the defendant that causes the claimant reasonably to apprehend an imminent battery. Words alone may amount to assault if they are threatening and the claimant reasonably apprehends immediate violence (R v Ireland [1998] AC 147; Stephens v Myers (1830) 4 C & P 349).

Battery: the intentional application of unlawful force to the claimant's person, however slight. It requires direct contact without consent or lawful justification; the contact need not be hostile in the sense of ill will (Cole v Turner (1704) 6 Mod 87; Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237).

False imprisonment: the intentional and complete deprivation of the claimant's liberty without lawful justification. The restraint must be total, and the claimant must be confined within a defined area; reasonable conditions on movement are not imprisonment (Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742).

The claimant need not know of the imprisonment at the time for the tort to be committed (Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co. Ltd (1919) 122 LT 44), although knowledge is relevant to damages.

Defences: consent (including lawful medical treatment and contact sports within the rules), lawful arrest and detention (Criminal Procedure Code 1960 (Act 30) in Ghana; the police may arrest without warrant in defined circumstances), self-defence and defence of others, and parental or quasi-parental authority.

Lawful arrest and detention: the arresting officer must have reasonable grounds and must comply with constitutional and statutory requirements; the 1992 Constitution of Ghana (articles 14 and 19) protects personal liberty and fair trial, and unlawful detention may found both a tort claim and constitutional relief.

Damages for trespass to the person are compensatory and may include aggravated damages for high-handed conduct; exemplary damages are available in limited categories of oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional conduct by servants of the government (Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; Attorney General v Faroe Atlantic Co. Ltd [2005-2006] SCGLR 271).

The tort is committed by the person who applies the force or orders the detention; a person who merely gives information to the police is not liable unless they actively promote the arrest (Davidson v Chief Constable of North Wales [1994] 2 All ER 597).

Trespass to land: an unjustified, direct interference with land in the possession of another. It is actionable per se; the claimant need not prove damage. The claimant must have possession (not necessarily ownership) at the time of the trespass.

Forms of trespass to land: entering the land, remaining on it after the right to be there has ended, placing or projecting objects on it (including overhanging signs or encroaching roots), and abuse of a right of way.

Defences to trespass to land: licence (express or implied, e.g. a visitor's implied licence to approach the front door), lawful authority (statutory powers, police entry with a warrant), necessity, and jus tertii (a defence that a third party, not the claimant, has title).

Remedies for trespass to land: damages (including nominal damages for trespass without damage), an injunction (prohibitory or mandatory), an order for possession, and self-help (abatement) subject to the limits of reasonable force.

Trespass to goods: an intentional, direct interference with goods in the possession of another, such as taking, damaging, or moving them, without lawful justification. It is actionable per se.

Conversion (trover): an intentional dealing with goods that is inconsistent with the claimant's right of possession, such as selling, destroying, or wrongfully retaining them. The remedy is damages measured by the value of the goods at the time of conversion.

Detinue: the wrongful detention of goods after a demand for their return. Unlike conversion, the defendant may have come into possession lawfully but refuses to return the goods; the remedy is an order for delivery or damages.

Distinctions: trespass to goods requires direct interference; conversion requires a dealing inconsistent with the claimant's title; detinue requires a demand and refusal. The Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 (England) reformed the remedies and abolished detinue as a separate tort in England, but the common-law position persists in Ghana.

Defences to interference with goods: consent, lawful authority, necessity, and jus tertii. The claimant must have an immediate right to possession; a bailee may sue a third party in trespass or conversion.

Private nuisance: an unlawful, substantial, and unreasonable interference with a person's use or enjoyment of land, or of some right over it. It protects land and interests in land, not personal injury or pure economic loss.

The claimant must have a proprietary interest in the land affected (or exclusive possession); a lodger or a family member without an interest cannot sue in private nuisance (Malone v Laskey [1907] 2 KB 141; Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655).

Unreasonableness is assessed by reference to factors including: the character of the locality (Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852 - what is reasonable in a residential area differs from an industrial one), the duration and intensity of the interference, the sensitivity of the claimant (the 'eggshell' rule does not apply to abnormally sensitive uses - Robinson v Kilvert (1889) 41 Ch D 88), and the social utility of the defendant's activity.

Physical damage to land or property is treated more seriously than mere amenity interference; where there is material damage, the defendant may be liable even if the activity is reasonable in the locality (St Helen's Smelting Co. v Tipping (1865) 11 HL Cas 642).

Defences to private nuisance: prescription (20 years' continuance), statutory authority, and the claimant's own conduct; coming to the nuisance is not a defence (Sturges v Bridgman), and neither is the defendant's good intentions or the utility of the activity.

Public nuisance: an unlawful act or omission that materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of a class of Her Majesty's subjects (Attorney General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169). It is a crime and a tort; a private individual may sue only if they have suffered special damage over and above the general inconvenience.

Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330: a person who brings onto their land something likely to do mischief if it escapes, and keeps it there non-naturally, is liable for damage caused by its escape, even without negligence. The rule is one of strict liability, subject to defences.

The elements of Rylands v Fletcher: (1) the defendant brought something onto the land, (2) which was likely to do mischief if it escaped, (3) the use was non-natural, and (4) the thing escaped and caused damage. The rule has been narrowly confined in modern English law (Cambridge Water Co. v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264 - foreseeability of damage is required; Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] UKHL 61).

Defences to Rylands v Fletcher: act of God, act of a stranger, statutory authority, consent of the claimant, and default of the claimant. The rule does not apply to things naturally on the land or to ordinary domestic uses.

Defamation is the publication of a false statement that tends to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society, or to expose them to hatred, ridicule, or contempt, or to cause them to be shunned or avoided, or to injure them in their office, trade, or profession.

The elements: (1) a defamatory statement, (2) referring to the claimant (identification), (3) published to at least one third party, and (4) the statement is false (falsity is presumed; the defendant must prove truth).

Libel is defamation in permanent form (writing, print, broadcast, film); slander is defamation in transient form (spoken words, gestures). Libel is actionable per se; slander generally requires proof of special damage unless it falls within an exception (e.g. imputation of a crime, unchastity, or unfitness for trade).

The statement must be published to a third party; communication to the claimant alone is not publication. Each repetition is a fresh publication, and the original publisher may be liable for authorised repetitions (the 'repetition rule').

Defences: (1) truth (justification) - the defendant proves the imputation is substantially true; (2) fair comment (honest opinion) - an opinion on a matter of public interest based on true facts; (3) absolute privilege - statements in Parliament, in court, and in official communications between officers of state; (4) qualified privilege - statements made in the performance of a duty or in the protection of an interest, without malice.

Responsible journalism and public interest: the common-law defence of qualified privilege was extended in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 to responsible journalism on matters of public interest; the Defamation Act 2013 (England) replaced it with a statutory public interest defence.

Innocent dissemination: a distributor (bookseller, newsagent, internet service provider) may rely on a defence if they did not know and had no reason to know of the defamatory content.

Remedies: damages (compensatory, aggravated, and in rare cases exemplary), an injunction to restrain further publication, and a declaration. The court may also order publication of a correction or apology.

Ghana: defamation is governed by the common law and the Defamation Act 1961 (Act 57), which codifies aspects of libel and slander, including the requirement of a fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings and the defence of justification; the 1992 Constitution (article 21(1)(a)) protects freedom of expression, and the courts balance that against reputation.

Damages in tort aim to put the claimant, so far as money can, in the position they would have been in but for the tort (restitutio in integrum). In contract, the aim is to put the claimant in the position they would have been in had the contract been performed.

Compensatory damages cover pecuniary loss (medical expenses, loss of earnings) and non-pecuniary loss (pain and suffering, loss of amenity). Special damages are pleaded and proved (pre-trial losses); general damages are awarded for losses that the law presumes to flow from the tort (future losses, pain and suffering).

Remoteness limits recovery: the damage must be of a kind reasonably foreseeable (The Wagon Mound (No. 1) [1961] AC 388); the defendant takes the claimant as they find them (the 'eggshell skull' rule - Smith v Leech Brain & Co. Ltd [1962] 2 QB 405).

Mitigation: the claimant must take reasonable steps to mitigate their loss, and cannot recover for loss that could reasonably have been avoided. The defendant bears the burden of proving that the claimant failed to mitigate.

Collateral benefits: benefits received by the claimant from third parties (insurance, charitable payments) are generally not deducted from damages, but state benefits and certain statutory payments may be deducted or recouped under statute.

Exemplary damages are available only in the categories identified in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129: (1) oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional action by servants of the government, (2) conduct calculated to make a profit exceeding the compensation payable, and (3) where statute expressly authorises them.

Aggravated damages compensate for the claimant's injured feelings caused by the defendant's high-handed or insulting conduct; they are compensatory, not punitive, and are available in torts such as trespass to the person and defamation.

Injunctions: prohibitory injunctions restrain a continuing or threatened wrong (e.g. nuisance, trespass, defamation); mandatory injunctions require positive steps. The court considers whether damages would be an adequate remedy and the balance of convenience (American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 for interlocutory injunctions).

Ghana: the courts have power to award damages and grant injunctions under the Courts Act 1993 (Act 459) and the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004 (C.I. 47); interest on damages may be awarded under the Courts Act, and the Supreme Court has addressed the award of exemplary damages in public law cases (Attorney General v Faroe Atlantic Co. Ltd [2005-2006] SCGLR 271).