Kava Ceasefire Monitoring Mandate

The main drivers are security, economic exclusion, and weak rule of law. Cattle raiding is both a livelihood strategy and a symptom of the security dilemma: each group arms to protect itself, which makes the other feel threatened. The drought, with a 40% harvest loss and 18,000 unemployed young people, raises the value of cattle and the incentive to raid. The refusal to prosecute raiders reinforces impunity, and the two armed groups use disarmament as leverage. Withdrawal would affect these drivers differently. It might reduce the government's cost and signal confidence, but it would remove the main deterrent to night raids and weaken the monitoring that documents violations. Because the groups have not disarmed, withdrawal could intensify the security dilemma and make the drought-related competition for resources more violent. The livelihoods programme addresses only one driver. The conflict is therefore likely to worsen if withdrawal is not sequenced with local security and prosecution mechanisms.

Extension is the better option, but only if it is conditional. Withdrawal after three years, with only 34% of weapons surrendered and nightly raids continuing, would remove a credible monitor at the moment when both armed groups still distrust each other. The monitoring team provides information, deters some violence, and creates a channel for complaints, even if it has not achieved disarmament. However, an open-ended extension risks moral hazard: armed groups may keep weapons because they expect monitors to stay. The donor's 12-month extension tied to livelihoods is therefore a useful compromise if it includes benchmarks: disarmament milestones, prosecution of known raiders, and a phased handover to local authorities. The cost of $18 million a year is significant, but it is small compared with renewed war. The judgement depends on whether the extension is designed as an exit strategy rather than a permanent subsidy. A conditional extension is preferable to both unconditional extension and abrupt withdrawal.

The programme should target unemployed youth, women, and ex-combatants in the areas most affected by cattle raiding, and it should be designed with local peace committees rather than only with the armed groups. Cash-for-work on irrigation and water points would address the drought-related livelihood pressure and reduce the incentive to raid. Training should be linked to market access, not just skills, and ex-combatants should be included without rewarding violence. A conflict-sensitive design would also monitor whether benefits create new grievances between groups. The main risk is elite capture: armed leaders may control access to the programme and use it to reward supporters, which would entrench their power and undermine the peace objective. To mitigate this, the donor should publish beneficiary lists, use community verification, and tie continuation to reductions in raids. The programme should be sequenced with monitoring and prosecution, because livelihoods alone cannot stop violence when weapons remain available.