IB Philosophy HL cheat sheet

The core theme asks what it means to be human; the IB specifies three sub-themes: the self and the other, mind and body, and freedom and determinism.

Sartre's 'existence precedes essence' means humans first exist and then define themselves through choices; there is no fixed human nature prior to action.

Sartre's 'bad faith' (mauvaise foi) is self-deception in which a person denies their own freedom, treating themselves as a thing with fixed properties.

The 'look' (le regard) in Sartre: being seen by another objectifies me as an object, and shame reveals that I am an object for the Other while remaining a subject.

Descartes' substance dualism holds mind and body are distinct substances; the mind is essentially thinking (res cogitans), the body extended (res extensa).

The interaction problem for dualism: if mind and body are distinct substances, how do they causally affect each other? Descartes' pineal gland answer is widely judged inadequate.

Physicalism holds mental states are identical with or supervene on physical states; the 'explanatory gap' objection is that no physical account explains why experience feels a certain way.

Hard determinism denies free will because every event, including choice, is causally determined; compatibilism redefines freedom as acting from one's own desires without external constraint.

Aesthetic realism holds beauty is an objective property of objects; aesthetic anti-realism holds beauty is projected by the perceiver or relative to a community or culture.

Hume's standard of taste: though beauty is not a property in objects, certain qualified critics, free of prejudice and with delicacy of discernment, converge in judgment.

Kant's judgment of taste is disinterested, universal, and necessary but subjective: it demands agreement without a concept or personal interest.

Kant distinguishes the agreeable (private, interest-based) from the beautiful (universal claim without a concept) and the sublime (pleasure mixed with awe at reason's superiority).

The intentional fallacy (Wimsatt and Beardsley) holds that an artwork's meaning is not determined by the artist's intentions; the work itself is the object of criticism.

The 'institutional theory' of art (Dickie) holds something is art if it is presented as a candidate for appreciation by the artworld; this is a relational rather than intrinsic property.

The paradox of fiction: we respond emotionally to fictional characters we believe do not exist; solutions include 'make-believe' (Walton) and 'thought theory' (Carroll).

Aesthetic cognitivism claims art can yield knowledge or understanding; anti-cognitivism holds aesthetic value is distinct from cognitive value.

Knowledge as justified true belief (JTB) faces Gettier counterexamples: cases where the belief is true and justified but the justification is accidentally connected to the truth.

Foundationalism holds knowledge rests on basic beliefs that need no further justification; coherentism holds beliefs are justified by their relations of mutual support within a system.

The regress problem: any justification seems to require further justification, leading to infinite regress, circularity, or a stopping point (a basic belief).

A priori knowledge is independent of experience (e.g., mathematics); a posteriori knowledge depends on experience; the analytic/synthetic distinction is independent of this.

Descartes' method of doubt uses hyperbolic scepticism to reach a foundation; the cogito ('I think, therefore I am') survives even the evil demon hypothesis.

The problem of induction (Hume): past regularities do not deductively entail future ones; the principle of uniformity of nature cannot itself be justified without circularity.

Popper's falsifiability replaces verification: a hypothesis is scientific if it forbids something observable; ad hoc immunisation against refutation is a mark of pseudo-science.

Reliabilism holds a belief is justified if produced by a reliable cognitive process, even if the subject cannot articulate the justification; it is an externalist theory.

Kant's categorical imperative: act only on maxims you could will as universal law; and treat humanity, in yourself and others, always as an end, never merely as a means.

Kant distinguishes acting in accordance with duty from acting from duty; only the latter has moral worth, which requires acting from respect for the moral law.

The formula of universal law test fails for maxims whose universalisation is self-defeating (e.g., making false promises) rather than merely undesirable.

Utilitarianism (Bentham, Mill) assesses actions by consequences, maximising overall welfare; act- and rule-utilitarianism differ over whether rules or individual acts are evaluated.

Mill's harm principle: the only justified ground for restricting liberty is preventing harm to others; paternalism is restricted to children and the incapacitated.

Aristotle's virtue ethics: virtue is a stable disposition lying between two vices (the doctrine of the mean), acquired by habituation and guided by practical wisdom (phronesis).

The naturalistic fallacy (Moore): one cannot derive 'ought' from 'is'; identifying the good with any natural property commits the 'open question argument' error.

Moral relativism holds right and wrong are relative to cultures or individuals; the objection is that it appears to make moral criticism of harmful practices impossible.

Rawls' veil of ignorance: principles of justice chosen behind a veil that hides one's social position are fair; the result is the liberty principle plus the difference principle.

Rawls' difference principle permits inequalities only if they benefit the worst-off group (maximin); Nozick's entitlement theory rejects patterned redistribution in favour of historical holdings.

Nozick's three principles of justice in holdings: acquisition, transfer, and rectification; taxation beyond minimal state functions is treated as forced labour.

Negative liberty (Berlin) is freedom from interference; positive liberty is freedom to be one's own master; positive liberty risks justifying paternalist coercion.

Mill's 'tyranny of the majority' concern: social pressure and public opinion can coerce individuals as effectively as law, so liberty must be protected against it.

Habermas' public sphere and communicative action: legitimacy derives from uncoerced rational agreement in conditions free of domination.

Foucault argues power is dispersed and productive rather than held by a sovereign; institutions produce docile bodies through disciplinary practices.

The capability approach (Sen, Nussbaum) assesses justice by whether people have real freedoms to achieve valuable functionings, not merely by resources or utility.

Anselm's ontological argument: God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived; a being existing in reality is greater than one existing only in the understanding, so God exists.

Gaunilo's 'perfect island' reply attacks the ontological argument by substituting a contingent object; Kant's reply is that existence is not a predicate adding to a concept.

Aquinas' five ways include the argument from motion, efficient causation, contingency, degrees, and teleology; each concludes a being identified as God.

The cosmological argument's key premise is that an infinite regress of causes is impossible; Hume and Russell object that the universe may be a brute fact needing no cause.

Paley's watchmaker analogy supports the teleological argument; Hume's Dialogues object that apparent design may be explained by chance or by analogy to biological generation.

The problem of evil: an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God seems incompatible with evil; the free-will defence and soul-making theodicy (Hick) are standard replies.

The Euthyphro dilemma: is an action good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good? The first horn threatens arbitrariness; the second threatens divine sovereignty.

Fideism holds religious truth is grasped by faith rather than reason; Clifford's evidentialist principle asserts it is wrong to believe anything on insufficient evidence.

The demarcation problem asks what distinguishes science from non-science; Popper's answer is falsifiability, the logical positivists' answer was verifiability.

Logical positivism's verification principle holds meaningful statements are analytic or empirically verifiable; the principle itself appears neither, a self-referential problem.

Kuhn's paradigm shift: normal science operates within a paradigm; anomalies accumulate and trigger a revolution, and paradigms are incommensurable.

Incommensurability means rival paradigms cannot be fully translated into each other's terms; the charge is that this makes theory choice non-rational.

Lakatos' research programmes have a hard core protected from refutation and a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses; progressive programmes predict novel facts.

The Duhem-Quine thesis: a failed prediction refutes only a whole web of beliefs, not a single hypothesis; auxiliary assumptions may be blamed instead.

The problem of underdetermination: evidence is compatible with multiple theories, so theory choice also depends on simplicity, scope, and fruitfulness.

Scientific realism holds successful theories are approximately true and refer to unobservable entities; constructive empiricism (van Fraassen) holds acceptance requires only empirical adequacy.

The prescribed text is studied in depth; assessment requires accurate exposition of its arguments, not merely summary of its conclusions.

Identify the text's central question, the author's thesis, and the argumentative steps connecting premises to conclusion.

Distinguish the author's own claims from positions they report, attack, or concede; quoting briefly with explanation demonstrates textual grounding.

Reconstruct arguments in premise-conclusion form, then evaluate: check validity, question premises, and consider the strongest available counterargument.

Locate the text in its historical and philosophical context (e.g., responses to rationalism, empiricism, or earlier moral theory) where the syllabus requires it.

Note key technical terms as the author defines them, not as everyday usage defines them; equivocation on such terms is a common error.

Assess the text critically: identify unstated assumptions, possible counterexamples, and whether the conclusion follows from the stated premises.

Connect the text to the core theme and optional themes, since exam questions often ask how the text illuminates a broader philosophical issue.

The stimulus must be non-philosophical (e.g., a news article, advertisement, film scene, photograph, or literary passage) and must be reproduced or clearly described in the analysis.

The analysis identifies the philosophical issues the stimulus raises and explicitly names the relevant concepts, theories, or arguments used to analyse them.

A strong analysis states a clear philosophical claim or thesis about the stimulus rather than merely describing the stimulus.

The stimulus itself is not argued philosophically; the task is to apply philosophical reasoning to it, not to summarise it.

Each philosophical claim should be supported by reasons or by reference to a named philosopher's argument, not by assertion alone.

Counterarguments and alternative interpretations should be considered and answered to demonstrate critical evaluation.

The word limit and required format are set by the school's IB guide; exceeding the limit or omitting the stimulus typically costs marks.

Assessment criteria reward understanding of philosophical concepts, analysis, and organisation; description of the stimulus alone earns little credit.