Ten Who Claimed a Split, Eight Who Took Office
Party X has 25 MLAs in the 175-member Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly. In July 2025, ten of them write to the Speaker claiming they have 'split' from Party X and now constitute a separate legislature party, X (Progressive). They do not merge with any other party. In the same week, eight other Party X MLAs, without resigning, take oath as ministers in a cabinet headed by the ruling party, and thereafter vote for the government's Finance Bill although Party X had issued a whip to vote against it. The Speaker recognises the group of ten as a separate party, then disqualifies the eight. Party X moves the High Court, arguing that the Speaker acted with partisan motive and that his recognition of the ten is beyond his jurisdiction. The ten recognised MLAs argue that the anti-defection law is being used to punish internal dissent and that the Speaker's decision must be final.
1. Is the claim of the ten MLAs valid under the Tenth Schedule? Explain the position after the 91st Amendment.
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No - the claim rests on a provision that no longer exists. Paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule, which protected a 'split' supported by one-third of a legislature party, was deleted by the 91st Constitutional Amendment (2003). After that amendment the only defence available is merger under paragraph 4, which requires two-thirds of the members of the legislature party to agree to merge with another party.
Applying the numbers. Ten of twenty-five is 40%, well short of the seventeen members needed for two-thirds. More fundamentally, the ten claim to have formed a separate group, not to have merged with anyone. There is no constitutional space for a 'separate legislature party' carved out of a split.
Speaker's error. Recognising the group is therefore a jurisdictional error on the face of the order, not a discretionary appreciation of evidence. Each of the ten remains liable to disqualification under paragraph 2(1)(a) for voluntarily giving up membership of the party, since forming a breakaway group is the clearest conduct from which that conclusion follows.
The dissent argument. Internal dissent, criticism of leaders or abstention in party forums are not defection; but walking out of the party's legislative wing is. The line is between disagreement and separation, and the ten crossed it.
2. Are the eight ministers liable to disqualification? Assess both the 'voluntary giving up' ground and the whip ground.
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Yes, on two independent grounds.
Paragraph 2(1)(a) - voluntarily giving up membership. This is a question of conduct, not of formal resignation. Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994) and G. Vishwanathan v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu (1996) hold that accepting office in a government led by another party, without resigning from one's own, is strong evidence of giving up membership. Taking ministerial oath in the ruling party's cabinet is a public, voluntary act.
Paragraph 2(1)(b) - voting contrary to the whip. They voted for the Finance Bill after a whip to the contrary. That is a direct violation, and the defence that the vote was in the State's interest is irrelevant; the Schedule does not permit a member to substitute his own judgment for the party's on a whipped vote.
No exception applies. Paragraph 4 requires a merger supported by two-thirds of the party, which eight members cannot supply, and the merger must be with another legislature party, not with a cabinet. Note the converse rule - a member expelled from the party is not disqualified, because expulsion is not voluntary - which confirms that the test is volition, and here volition is plain.
3. Can the Speaker's order be challenged in the High Court? What about the delay or the pre-decision stage, and what relief should follow?
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Reviewability. While deciding a disqualification petition the Speaker acts as a tribunal, not as an officer of the House. Kihoto Hollohan (1992) therefore holds that the decision is subject to judicial review under Articles 226 and 32, though review is confined to jurisdictional error, perversity, mala fides and breach of natural justice - not a re-appreciation of evidence. Paragraph 6 bars interference before a decision; it does not shield the decision itself.
On these facts. The jurisdictional error is patent: recognising a split that the 91st Amendment abolished. No deference is due to an order that proceeds on a repealed provision.
On timing. Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Manipur (2020) holds that a Speaker must decide within a reasonable time - the Court indicated about three months - and that courts may intervene where delay is deliberate. Here the Speaker acted, but selectively: recognising one group and disqualifying the other.
Relief. Quash the recognition of the ten, uphold the disqualification of the eight, and direct that the Assembly's composition be corrected before any further confidence vote. The court should also record that the Speaker's selective recognition was itself a breach of the neutrality the office demands.