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WBCHSE HS Philosophy study materials
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WBCHSE HS Philosophy practice questions

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Question 1Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

In Indian philosophical classification, the schools that accept the authority of the Vedas are collectively called:

  1. Nāstika schools
  2. Cārvāka schools
  3. Āstika schools Correct answer.
  4. Lokāyata schools

Explanation

Indian darśanas are broadly divided by whether they recognise Vedic authority. The āstika schools accept the Vedas as authoritative, while the nāstika schools reject that authority. This classification is about orthodoxy toward the Vedas, not about whether a school believes in God.

Question 2Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

Which of the following is counted among the nāstika schools of Indian philosophy?

  1. Jainism Correct answer.
  2. Nyāya
  3. Sāṃkhya
  4. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā

Explanation

Jainism is one of the three major nāstika traditions, along with Buddhism and Cārvāka, because it does not accept the Vedas as authoritative scripture. The other options are all āstika darśanas that base themselves on Vedic authority. Membership in the nāstika group is decided by rejection of Vedic authority alone.

Question 3Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

The word 'darśana' as used for the Indian philosophical systems literally suggests:

  1. a written commentary
  2. a vow of silence
  3. a mode of seeing or viewing Correct answer.
  4. a ritual sacrifice

Explanation

Darśana derives from the root dṛś, meaning to see, so a philosophical darśana is a way of seeing reality as a whole. Each school claims to be a distinctive standpoint or vision of truth. The term therefore points to insight rather than to ritual or textual form.

Question 4Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

Cārvāka philosophy is best characterised by which central epistemological claim?

  1. Perception and inference are equally valid
  2. Only perception is a valid source of knowledge Correct answer.
  3. Only testimony is a valid source of knowledge
  4. Only inference is a valid source of knowledge

Explanation

Cārvāka is a materialist school that accepts perception (pratyakṣa) alone as pramāṇa and rejects inference and testimony as unreliable. This restriction underlies its rejection of an afterlife, of karma and of God, since those are known only through inference or scripture. The school is therefore empiricist in a radical sense.

Question 5Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

In Nyāya epistemology, the term 'pramāṇa' refers to:

  1. the doubt preceding enquiry
  2. the means or source of valid knowledge Correct answer.
  3. the object known
  4. the knower or self

Explanation

Pramāṇa literally means the instrument of valid cognition, that by which true knowledge is produced. Nyāya distinguishes pramāṇa from prameya, the object known, and from pramātṛ, the knower. The theory of pramāṇas is central to every Indian school's epistemology.

Question 6Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

Which school admits exactly four pramāṇas: perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony?

  1. Nyāya Correct answer.
  2. Cārvāka
  3. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā
  4. Yoga

Explanation

Nyāya recognises four pramāṇas: pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna and śabda. Cārvāka accepts only perception, while Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta add further means such as postulation and non-cognition. The fourfold list is a standard identifying mark of Nyāya.

Question 7Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

Kaṇāda is traditionally regarded as the founder of which school?

  1. Vaiśeṣika Correct answer.
  2. Sāṃkhya
  3. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā
  4. Vedānta

Explanation

Kaṇāda is credited with the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra and is the traditional founder of the Vaiśeṣika school, known for its atomism and its categories of padārthas. His name is linked to the analysis of the particular (viśeṣa). Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta have different traditional founders.

Question 8Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

In Vaiśeṣika ontology, the ultimate material constituents of physical things are:

  1. the puruṣas
  2. the paramāṇus (atoms) Correct answer.
  3. the five tanmātras alone
  4. the three guṇas

Explanation

Vaiśeṣika explains the physical world through indivisible atoms (paramāṇu) of the four material elements: earth, water, fire and air. Combinations of these atoms produce composite objects, while ākāśa is treated as a non-atomic pervasive substance. This atomic theory is a hallmark of the school.

Question 9Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

Sāṃkhya philosophy is best described as:

  1. a monistic idealism
  2. a theistic atomism
  3. a materialist monism
  4. a dualism of puruṣa and prakṛti Correct answer.

Explanation

Sāṃkhya posits two ultimate realities: puruṣa, pure consciousness, and prakṛti, the primordial material principle. Suffering arises when puruṣa mistakenly identifies with the modifications of prakṛti, and liberation is the discriminative realisation of their difference. This makes the system a thoroughgoing dualism.

Question 10Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

According to Sāṃkhya, the three guṇas that constitute prakṛti are:

  1. dharma, artha and kāma
  2. icchā, jñāna and kriyā
  3. śraddhā, vīrya and smṛti
  4. sattva, rajas and tamas Correct answer.

Explanation

Sāṃkhya analyses prakṛti into three constituent strands: sattva (luminosity, harmony), rajas (activity, restlessness) and tamas (inertia, obscurity). Their varying proportions explain the diversity of the manifest world and of mental states. The equilibrium of the guṇas is the unmanifest state of prakṛti.

Question 11Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

In Yoga philosophy, 'citta-vṛtti-nirodha' is presented as the definition of:

  1. the theory of atoms
  2. yoga or spiritual discipline Correct answer.
  3. perception of external objects
  4. the practice of debate

Explanation

Patañjali's Yoga Sūtra opens by defining yoga as the stilling of the modifications of the mind (citta-vṛtti-nirodha). When these fluctuations cease, the seer abides in its own nature. The definition is therefore about the goal and discipline of yoga, not about perception, debate or atomism.

Question 12Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

The doctrine of anātman, or non-self, is most central to which school?

  1. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā
  2. Vaiśeṣika
  3. Advaita Vedānta
  4. Buddhism Correct answer.

Explanation

Buddhism denies a permanent, unchanging self and analyses the person into impermanent aggregates. The doctrine of anātman, together with anitya (impermanence) and duḥkha, forms a core Buddhist teaching. The other schools listed all defend some conception of a persisting self.

Question 13Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

The Buddhist claim that all conditioned things are impermanent is expressed by the term:

  1. anityatā
  2. āstika
  3. anitya Correct answer.
  4. upamāna

Explanation

Anitya is the adjective meaning impermanent, applied to all conditioned phenomena in Buddhist analysis. It is closely tied to the teaching that whatever arises will pass away. The other options are unrelated terms from classification and epistemology.

Question 14Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

The Jaina doctrine of anekāntavāda holds that:

  1. reality has many aspects and no single judgement captures it wholly Correct answer.
  2. reality is exhausted by a single description
  3. the self is identical with Brahman
  4. only perception yields knowledge

Explanation

Anekāntavāda, the doctrine of many-sidedness, holds that reality is complex and can be described from many standpoints. This leads to syādvāda, the qualified predication of judgements with 'syāt', and to nayavāda, the analysis of partial standpoints. The doctrine is a Jaina response to conflicting metaphysical claims.

Question 15Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

In Jaina epistemology, the term 'kevala-jñāna' refers to:

  1. knowledge derived from inference
  2. knowledge derived from scripture
  3. knowledge gained through comparison
  4. omniscient knowledge attained by the liberated soul Correct answer.

Explanation

Kevala-jñāna is the perfect, all-embracing knowledge that a soul attains when the obscuring karmas are removed. It is the highest of the Jaina levels of knowledge and marks omniscience. Inference, testimony and comparison are ordinary means of knowledge rather than this supreme cognition.

Question 16Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

According to Advaita Vedānta, the relation between the individual self (jīva) and Brahman is that:

  1. the self is a part of Brahman in a literal spatial sense
  2. Brahman is the material cause but not the self of the individual
  3. they are identical in essence, the difference being due to ignorance Correct answer.
  4. they are entirely different substances

Explanation

Advaita teaches that the jīva and Brahman are essentially one, and that the apparent separation is produced by avidyā or māyā. Liberation consists in removing this ignorance and recognising one's identity with Brahman. The doctrine is summed up in the mahāvākya 'tat tvam asi'.

Question 17Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

The term 'māyā' in Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta primarily explains:

  1. the appearance of a manifold world over the one Brahman Correct answer.
  2. the eternity of the Vedas
  3. the validity of sense perception
  4. the reality of the material world

Explanation

Māyā is the beginningless power of illusion that causes the one Brahman to appear as a differentiated world. It is neither real nor utterly unreal, and is described as indescribable (anirvacanīya). Knowledge of Brahman removes this superimposition.

Question 18Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

The theory of satkāryavāda, which holds that the effect pre-exists in its cause, is defended by:

  1. Sāṃkhya Correct answer.
  2. Vaiśeṣika
  3. Nyāya
  4. Cārvāka

Explanation

Satkāryavāda is the Sāṃkhya doctrine that the effect is latent in the cause before it manifests, so production is only an unfolding. This supports the derivation of the whole world from prakṛti. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika instead holds asatkāryavāda, that the effect is a new production.

Question 19Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

In Nyāya logic, the five-membered syllogism (pañcāvayava) includes which set of members in order?

  1. pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya, nigamana Correct answer.
  2. pakṣa, sādhya, liṅga, vyāpti, dṛṣṭānta
  3. āgama, anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti, anupalabdhi
  4. pramāṇa, prameya, saṃśaya, prayojana, dṛṣṭānta

Explanation

Nyāya formulates inference with five members: the thesis (pratijñā), the reason (hetu), the general example (udāharaṇa), the application (upanaya) and the conclusion (nigamana). This structure is designed to persuade an interlocutor in debate. The other lists contain epistemological or methodological terms rather than the members of the syllogism.

Question 20Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

The Nyāya concept of 'vyāpti' refers to:

  1. the invariable relation between hetu and sādhya Correct answer.
  2. the authority of scripture
  3. the perception of a single instance
  4. the fallacy of the circular argument

Explanation

Vyāpti is the universal, invariable concomitance between the reason (hetu) and what is to be proved (sādhya), such as smoke and fire. It is the logical ground that makes inference valid. Without vyāpti, an inference is at best a guess.

Question 21Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

Consider the inference: 'The hill has fire, because it has smoke.' In Nyāya terms, what is the hetu here?

  1. the example of a kitchen
  2. the hill
  3. smoke Correct answer.
  4. fire

Explanation

In a Nyāya inference the hetu is the reason or evidence from which the conclusion is drawn. Here smoke is the middle term that leads to the knowledge of fire on the hill. The hill is the pakṣa and fire is the sādhya.

Question 22Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

In Sāṃkhya, the first evolute of prakṛti when its guṇas are disturbed is:

  1. ahaṃkāra
  2. the five mahābhūtas
  3. manas
  4. buddhi (mahat) Correct answer.

Explanation

Sāṃkhya's evolutionary sequence begins with mahat or buddhi, the first product of disturbed prakṛti. From buddhi arises ahaṃkāra, from which the manas, the senses, the tanmātras and the gross elements develop. The gross elements are therefore far later in the sequence.

Question 23Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

The Cārvāka view of the self is that the self is:

  1. a part of Brahman
  2. the conscious body produced from the elements Correct answer.
  3. a plurality of atoms
  4. an eternal, unchanging substance

Explanation

Cārvāka identifies the self with the living, conscious body, arising when the material elements combine. Consciousness is treated as a by-product of matter, like the intoxicating power of fermented ingredients. Death therefore ends the self, and there is no afterlife to be feared or sought.

Question 24Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

Pūrva Mīmāṃsā's central concern is best described as:

  1. interpreting and defending Vedic ritual injunctions Correct answer.
  2. proving the existence of God
  3. establishing the doctrine of non-self
  4. analysing the categories of being

Explanation

Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, founded on Jaimini's Sūtra, focuses on the interpretation of Vedic ritual and the injunctions that command it. Its epistemology and theory of language serve this exegetical purpose. The school is therefore primarily practical and hermeneutic rather than theological or ontological.

Question 25Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

Which pair correctly matches a school with its traditional founder?

  1. Vedānta – Kaṇāda
  2. Nyāya – Jaimini
  3. Sāṃkhya – Kapila Correct answer.
  4. Vaiśeṣika – Gautama

Explanation

Sāṃkhya is traditionally attributed to Kapila, and this pairing is standard in histories of Indian philosophy. The other options deliberately swap founders among schools. Matching founders correctly helps distinguish the schools' foundational texts.

Question 26Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

In Indian philosophical classification, the term 'āstika' (orthodox) is applied to a school primarily because it:

  1. rejects the authority of the Vedas
  2. denies the existence of God
  3. accepts only perception as a valid source of knowledge
  4. accepts the authority of the Vedas Correct answer.

Explanation

The standard classification divides schools into āstika and nāstika according to whether they acknowledge the Vedic corpus as authoritative. Acceptance of the Vedas, not theism or a particular pramāṇa theory, is the criterion, so even atheistic schools such as Pūrva Mīmāṃsā count as āstika.

Question 27Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

The word 'darśana' as used for the Indian philosophical systems carries the primary sense of:

  1. a commentary on a sutra
  2. a vision or way of seeing reality Correct answer.
  3. a logical fallacy
  4. a ritual injunction

Explanation

Darśana literally means 'seeing' and is used for a philosophical system as a distinctive way of viewing or intuiting reality. The term thus points to a standpoint or perspective rather than to ritual, logic or literary form.

Question 28Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

The pair of terms 'pramāṇa' and 'pramā' are related in Indian epistemology as:

  1. the object of knowledge and the knower respectively
  2. scriptural testimony and inference respectively
  3. doubt and error respectively
  4. the means of valid cognition and the resulting valid cognition Correct answer.

Explanation

Pramāṇa denotes the instrument or means by which valid cognition arises, while pramā denotes the valid cognition itself. The distinction matters because schools differ over how many instruments there are, even when they agree that the resultant cognition is valid.

Question 29Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

The doctrine of triṣaṭ-padārtha, or six categories, is associated with which system?

  1. Advaita Vedānta
  2. Cārvāka
  3. Vaiśeṣika Correct answer.
  4. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā

Explanation

Vaiśeṣika analyses reality into six padārthas: substance, quality, action, universality, particularity and inherence. Later Vaiśeṣika adds absence (abhāva) as a seventh, but the classical sixfold scheme is distinctively Vaiśeṣika.

Question 30Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

In Nyāya, the term 'pakṣa' in a syllogistic inference such as 'the hill has fire because it has smoke' refers to:

  1. the conclusion, namely that the hill has fire
  2. the universal relation between smoke and fire
  3. the reason, namely smoke
  4. the subject locus about which the inference is made, namely the hill Correct answer.

Explanation

In Nyāya inference the pakṣa is the subject or locus under consideration, here the hill, which is suspected of possessing the probandum. The reason (hetu) is smoke, and the conclusion (nigamana) states that the locus possesses fire.

Question 31Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

The term 'apoha' in Buddhist logic, especially as developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, is used to explain:

  1. the validity of Vedic testimony as a source of knowledge
  2. the eternal and independent reality of a class property
  3. the meaning of a general word as exclusion of what is other than the intended referent Correct answer.
  4. the positive inherence of a universal in each individual substance

Explanation

Apoha theory holds that universals are not positive entities but constructions formed by excluding what is not the intended thing. Since Buddhism denies real universals, a word like 'cow' functions by excluding non-cows rather than by naming an enduring class-essence.

Question 32Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

According to Sāṃkhya, the guṇa called 'rajas' is characterised as the principle of:

  1. illumination and intelligibility
  2. activity and agitation Correct answer.
  3. pure consciousness itself
  4. inertia and restraint

Explanation

Sāṃkhya assigns three functions to the guṇas: sattva illumines, rajas activates and agitates, and tamas restrains and renders inert. Rajas is thus the dynamic principle that keeps prakṛti in motion and makes evolution possible.

Question 33Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

In Yoga philosophy, the term 'kaivalya' denotes:

  1. the isolation of puruṣa from prakṛti, attained when the mind is fully stilled Correct answer.
  2. the accumulation of extraordinary powers (siddhis) through practice
  3. the bondage produced by beginningless ignorance
  4. the merging of the individual self into a supreme Lord

Explanation

Kaivalya is the state in which puruṣa abides in its own nature, completely dissociated from the modifications of prakṛti. It is not union with anything but the final isolation achieved through sustained citta-vṛtti-nirodha.

Question 34Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

The Jaina doctrine of syādvāda is best understood as:

  1. the doctrine that the self is identical with the body
  2. the theory of sevenfold predication qualified by 'in some respect' Correct answer.
  3. the view that all statements are simply false
  4. the claim that only one perspective on reality is ever true

Explanation

Syādvāda prescribes that every assertion be qualified by syāt, 'in some respect', yielding a sevenfold scheme of conditional predications. It complements anekāntavāda by showing how apparently conflicting descriptions can each be true from a limited standpoint.

Question 35Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

In Advaita Vedānta, the term 'adhyāsa' is used to describe:

  1. the final removal of ignorance through scriptural study
  2. the ritual obligation incumbent on a householder
  3. the causal relation between Brahman and the world
  4. the superimposition of one thing upon another, as when a rope is mistaken for a snake Correct answer.

Explanation

Adhyāsa is the error of attributing the properties of one thing to another, classically illustrated by mistaking a rope for a snake. Śaṅkara treats this superimposition as the root of the subject-object duality that Advaita seeks to remove.

Question 36Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

The Mīmāṃsā concept of 'apūrva' is introduced primarily to explain:

  1. how the unseen result of a Vedic ritual arises and ripens for the performer Correct answer.
  2. how the world is created by a personal God
  3. how the self is distinct from the body
  4. how perception yields knowledge of external objects

Explanation

Mīmāṃsā holds that ritual action produces an unseen potency, apūrva, which later yields the prescribed result when the visible action has ceased. The concept is designed to preserve the efficacy of Vedic injunction without invoking a divine dispenser of rewards.

Question 37Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

In Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, the relation between Brahman and the individual selves and world is best described as:

  1. the selves and world are wholly other than Brahman and eternally separate
  2. the selves and world are an unreal illusion superimposed on Brahman
  3. the selves and world are real modes or attributes of Brahman, inseparably related Correct answer.
  4. the selves and world are identical with Brahman without any qualification

Explanation

Rāmānuja holds that Brahman is qualified by real selves and matter as its modes or body, so unity and distinction are both preserved. The relation is one of identity-in-difference, avoiding both pure monism and dualism.

Question 38Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

Consider the Cārvāka claim that inference is not a valid source of knowledge because it depends on an unobserved universal relation. This claim is best classified as:

  1. a form of scepticism about the external world
  2. a rationalist defence of inference
  3. a radical empiricism that restricts knowledge to perception Correct answer.
  4. a theistic argument for the existence of God

Explanation

Cārvāka epistemology accepts only perception and rejects inference and testimony, since both rely on relations that cannot be perceived. This is a radical empiricism rather than a general scepticism, because the reality of perceived material objects is not itself doubted.

Question 39Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, the category of 'samavāya' is required to explain:

  1. the relation of a cause to its effect in a temporal sequence
  2. the relation of contact between two substances that are separate
  3. the relation between a word and its conventional meaning
  4. the relation between a whole and its parts, a quality and its substance, or a universal and its instances Correct answer.

Explanation

Samavāya is inherence, the inseparable relation that holds between a whole and its parts, a quality and its substrate, and a universal and its individuals. It is distinguished from saṃyoga, which is the separable contact between two substances.

Question 40Indian Philosophy: introduction, schools and basic concepts

In Sāṃkhya, the relation between puruṣa and prakṛti is said to be like that of a lame man and a blind man. This analogy is used to show that:

  1. puruṣa is conscious but inactive, while prakṛti is active but unconscious, and their conjunction enables experience and liberation Correct answer.
  2. puruṣa and prakṛti are both conscious and jointly create the world
  3. puruṣa and prakṛti are identical and the distinction between them is illusory
  4. puruṣa is active and prakṛti is inert, so puruṣa alone produces the world

Explanation

The lame man can see but cannot move, while the blind man can move but cannot see; together they act. Similarly, puruṣa is witness-consciousness without activity, and prakṛti is active but unconscious, and their conjunction allows experience and eventually discrimination and release.

Question 41Indian epistemology and metaphysics (Cārvāka, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta)

Cārvāka holds that perception (pratyakṣa) is the only valid means of knowledge. Which claim follows most directly from this?

  1. Imperceptible entities such as ātman cannot be established as knowable Correct answer.
  2. Testimony of trustworthy persons is a separate pramāṇa
  3. The validity of a cognition is known by svataḥprāmāṇya
  4. Inference is valid only when it concerns perceptible objects

Explanation

If pratyakṣa alone is a pramāṇa, then whatever cannot be perceived cannot be known; the self, heaven and liberation fall outside knowledge. Cārvāka therefore rejects inference and śabda as independent sources and treats talk of ātman as beyond verification.

Question 42Indian epistemology and metaphysics (Cārvāka, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta)

In Nyāya, the pramāṇa called upamāna is best illustrated by which case?

  1. Remembering yesterday's lecture on the categories
  2. Knowing a gavaya to be a cow-like wild animal after being told it resembles a cow Correct answer.
  3. Hearing a reliable teacher say that a cow is a bovine animal
  4. Seeing smoke on a hill and concluding that there is fire

Explanation

Upamāna is knowledge of a thing through its similarity to something already known, as when a forester's statement that a gavaya resembles a cow leads to recognising the gavaya. It is neither inference from a sign nor verbal testimony alone.

Question 43Indian epistemology and metaphysics (Cārvāka, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta)

Sāṃkhya's satkāryavāda explains the effect as pre-existent in its cause. Which statement expresses this doctrine?

  1. The effect is a new creation produced from nothing
  2. The effect is the manifest form of what was unmanifest in the cause Correct answer.
  3. The effect is unreal and the cause alone exists
  4. The effect is wholly different in nature from its material cause

Explanation

Satkāryavāda holds that the effect already exists in the cause in an unmanifest condition and merely becomes manifest, as oil is present in sesame seeds. Production is thus manifestation rather than fresh creation.

Question 44Indian epistemology and metaphysics (Cārvāka, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta)

According to Patañjali's Yoga, cittavṛtti-nirodha is achieved through abhyāsa and which companion discipline?

  1. Īśvarapraṇidhāna
  2. Vairāgya Correct answer.
  3. Tapas
  4. Svādhyāya

Explanation

Yoga Sūtra 1.12 states that the restraint of mental modifications is accomplished by abhyāsa, repeated practice, and vairāgya, dispassion or detachment. The two are paired as the twin means of stilling the mind.

Question 45Indian epistemology and metaphysics (Cārvāka, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta)

Prabhākara's theory of error is called akhyāti. Which description fits it?

  1. A non-existent object is directly presented to the senses as existent
  2. A real object is misperceived because a defect in the sense organ distorts its form
  3. A single cognition combines a real object with a real but absent object, and the perceiver fails to discriminate them Correct answer.
  4. A previous cognition is simply remembered and mistaken for present perception

Explanation

Akhyāti, the 'non-apprehension' theory, explains illusion as a failure to discriminate between two real elements, such as the real shell and the real silver remembered from elsewhere. Error lies in non-discrimination, not in the fabrication of a non-existent object.

Question 46Indian epistemology and metaphysics (Cārvāka, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta)

Which statement correctly pairs a Vedānta school with its account of the relation between Brahman and the world?

  1. Dvaita: the world and selves are eternally distinct from Brahman and dependent on it Correct answer.
  2. Viśiṣṭādvaita: Brahman is one without any internal distinction whatsoever
  3. Śuddhādvaita: the world is wholly illusory and Brahman alone is real
  4. Advaita: the world is a real transformation of Brahman into many parts

Explanation

Madhva's Dvaita affirms five real and eternal distinctions, including that between Brahman and the individual selves and the world, while the world remains dependent on Brahman. Real difference, not identity, is the governing relation.

Question 47Indian epistemology and metaphysics (Cārvāka, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta)

Nyāya's definition of perception includes the condition 'avyapadeśya'. What does this condition rule out?

  1. Cognition that is verbally associated or expressible in words at the moment of arising Correct answer.
  2. Cognition that is non-erroneous
  3. Cognition produced through the contact of sense organ with object
  4. Cognition arising from a defect in the sense organ

Explanation

Avyapadeśya means 'not associable with words' and excludes cognition that is already structured by verbal designation at the time it arises. Perception proper is the bare sensory awareness prior to verbal articulation.

Question 48Indian epistemology and metaphysics (Cārvāka, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta)

In Sāṃkhya, which set correctly lists the three internal organs (antaḥkaraṇa) and their functions?

  1. Citta (memory), buddhi (doubt), manas (will)
  2. Manas (determination), buddhi (I-sense), ahaṃkāra (deliberation)
  3. Ahaṃkāra (determination), manas (I-sense), buddhi (memory)
  4. Buddhi (determination), ahaṃkāra (I-sense), manas (deliberation) Correct answer.

Explanation

Sāṃkhya groups buddhi, ahaṃkāra and manas as the antaḥkaraṇa: buddhi ascertains, ahaṃkāra generates the sense of 'I', and manas deliberates and coordinates the senses. All three are evolutes of prakṛti.

Question 49Indian epistemology and metaphysics (Cārvāka, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta)

A student argues: 'Because every observed case of smoke has fire, all smoke has fire.' Which Nyāya criticism applies most sharply?

  1. Vyāpti is established by scriptural testimony alone
  2. Vyāpti cannot be established by mere observation of positive instances alone; it requires consideration of absence and non-deviation Correct answer.
  3. Vyāpti concerns only the relation between a word and its meaning
  4. Vyāpti is a matter of convention fixed by grammarians

Explanation

Nyāya holds that universal concomitance is grasped through the method of agreement and difference, including vyatireka, and through careful elimination of deviation. Simple enumeration of observed cases, udāharaṇa alone, does not guarantee the universal relation.

Question 50Indian epistemology and metaphysics (Cārvāka, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta)

Kumārila's theory of error is called viparītakhyāti. How does it explain the cognition 'this is silver' when a shell is seen?

  1. The silver is a real transformation of the shell
  2. The silver is entirely non-existent and is projected by the perceiver
  3. The silver is remembered and the memory is mistaken for perception
  4. The silver is a real object existing somewhere else and is truly perceived, though the relation of identity with 'this' is misapprehended Correct answer.

Explanation

Viparītakhyāti holds that both the shell and the silver are real and are genuinely apprehended, but the relation between them is misjudged as identity rather than as a relation of similarity or recollection. Error therefore lies in the misrelation, not in the objects.